| Koziol Firearms, Inc. v. Kevin Marchand, in his capacity as member of the Zoning Board of Review of the City of Central Falls, Rhode Island, et al. | 5/13/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-05-13T04:00:00Z | 2024-0128-Appeal. | The plaintiff corporation, Koziol Firearms, Inc., appealed from a May 20, 2024 final judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the defendants, which in part dismissed without prejudice the plaintiff corporation’s request for declaratory relief concerning a zoning ordinance that it claimed had not been validly amended. On appeal, the plaintiff corporation contended, inter alia, that the trial justice overlooked and misconstrued material evidence in that he “erroneously limited his review of the record as to Count II of [the] Amended Complaint to the ‘certified record’ of the proceedings and hearing before [the] City of Central Falls Zoning Board of Review.”
The Supreme Court held that, because the trial justice did not undertake the fact-finding that would be necessary for him to be able to determine whether declaratory relief would be appropriate, the case should be remanded for a new hearing.
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| Edgar Sepulveda, in his capacity as Trustee of the 7 Half Mile Road Living Trust v. John Buffum et al.; John Buffum et al. v. Edgar Sepulveda | 5/9/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-05-09T04:00:00Z | 2024-0028-Appeal. and 2024-0029-Appeal. | Edgar Sepulveda appealed from Superior Court judgments in favor of John Buffum and Angie Salem on: (1) Sepulveda’s claim for adverse possession; and (2) Buffum and Salem’s claims for trespass and declaratory relief. On appeal, Sepulveda argued that the trial justice erred in finding that Sepulveda’s exclusive use of the disputed area did not begin until 2016 or 2017, thereby falling short of the ten-year exclusive use element of adverse possession. Sepulveda also contended that the trial justice reached this conclusion erroneously by finding his testimony wanting in credibility.
Upon reviewing the record, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice’s findings were well within his discretion and were sufficient to reject the credibility of Sepulveda and Steven Rufino, a witness who testified at trial. Ultimately, the Court affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court, concluding that the trial justice’s findings were not clearly erroneous or born out of evidentiary misconceptions, or that they failed to provide justice between the parties. |
| Evoqua Water Technologies LLC, et al. v. Matthew Moriarty et al. | 4/29/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-04-29T04:00:00Z | 2023-0250-Appeal. | The defendant, Matthew Moriarty (defendant), appealed from a Superior Court order and judgment dismissing his amended counterclaim which sought declaratory relief and tort damages against Evoqua Water Technologies LLC and Neptune-Benson, LLC (Evoqua and Neptune-Benson, together, plaintiffs). The trial justice granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss all but one counterclaim on the basis of the litigation privilege; the remaining count was dismissed by stipulation of the parties. The Supreme Court held that the litigation privilege applied to six of the counts in the amended counterclaim because they arose from testimony given by a witness at a prior preliminary injunction hearing, and therefore upheld their dismissal on that ground. The Court further held that the remaining two counterclaims could be dismissed on other grounds. The first was dismissed as moot because it was based on the terms of an expired contract; and the second was dismissed because it asserted a cause of action that is not recognized in the state and, even if it were fashioned as an appropriate cause of action, failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order and judgment of the Superior Court. |
| Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for the Registered Holders of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-1 v. Alebia, Inc. | 4/17/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-04-17T04:00:00Z | 2023-0044-Appeal. | The defendant, Alebia, Inc., appealed from the Superior Court’s entry of a partial judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for the Registered Holders of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-1, in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The judgment reforms a mortgage, thus allowing the plaintiff to proceed to attach property of the defendant as collateral for the debt resulting from a defaulted mortgage. The Supreme Court perceived no abuse of discretion or error of law on the part of the hearing justice and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |
| Congregation Shearith Israel v. Congregation Jeshuat Israel | 4/10/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-04-10T04:00:00Z | 2023-0345-Appeal. | The defendant, Congregation Jeshuat Israel, appealed from a Superior Court judgment granting the plaintiff, Congregation Shearith Israel, the right to take immediate possession of the property located at 72 Touro Street in Newport, including the Touro Synagogue building and all appurtenances and paraphernalia contained therein.
Upon reviewing the record, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice was correct in determining that the plaintiff’s termination notice was valid and that, therefore, the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. The remaining issues before this Court turned on whether the 1945 agreement modified the lease between the parties to include a condition precedent to an eviction action. The Court concluded that the 1945 agreement did not modify the 1908 lease to create a condition precedent requiring that the plaintiff consult the defendant before initiating eviction proceedings, as such an action does not fall within the scope of the program of historical preservation and conservation. Because the 1945 agreement did not modify the lease, the only question before the Superior Court was whether the elements required for ejectment were satisfied. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff, granting it “the right to take immediate possession of the [p]remises * * * together with the appurtenances and paraphernalia belonging thereto in accordance with the 1903 and 1908 leases.” |
| State of Rhode Island, Department of Corrections v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board et al. | 4/9/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-04-09T04:00:00Z | 2022-0285-M.P. | This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers (union), seeking review of a Superior Court judgment that reversed a decision of the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board (SLRB or board), which held that the Department of Corrections (DOC) had violated the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Act when it implemented several changes to its Absenteeism Management Program (AMP) in 2019. The Superior Court found that the board’s decision “was not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record and was clearly erroneous or affected by error of law.” On appeal, the union argued (1) that the Superior Court had improperly engaged in factfinding and in the weighing of evidence to justify reversing the decision of the board; (2) that the Superior Court erred in finding that the DOC was not obligated to bargain with the union because the director was exercising her nondelegable statutory authority under G.L. 1956 § 42-56-10; (3) that the Superior Court erred in concluding that the changes to the AMP were not material and substantial; and (4) that there was legally competent evidence in the record to support the decision of the SLRB. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in finding that the board’s decision was not supported by legally competent evidence in the record. Additionally, the Court determined that the AMP changes were a valid exercise of the director’s statutory authority under § 42 56 10(2), (5), and (7). Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |
| Sara Roman v. The City of Providence et al. | 4/8/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-04-08T04:00:00Z | 2024-0075-Appeal. and 2024-0120-Appeal. | In these consolidated appeals, the plaintiff, Sara Roman, appealed from two Superior Court judgments, the first in favor of the defendants, the City of Providence, Shomari Husband in his capacity as Treasurer for the City of Providence, and Harrison Peters in his capacity as superintendent of Providence Public School District (collectively, the city), and the second in favor of the defendant K. Scott Construction & Disposal, Inc., following the grant of each respective defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Following a de novo review, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the city and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in favor of K. Scott Construction & Disposal, Inc. The matter was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. |
| Christopher Thornton v. State of Rhode Island | 4/1/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-04-01T04:00:00Z | 2022-0276-M.P. | This Court issued a writ of certiorari to review a Superior Court amended judgment partially granting Cristopher Thornton’s application for postconviction relief. The issue before the Court was whether or not Thornton’s claim was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Before the Supreme Court, the state argued that Thornton’s claim was precluded by res judicata as codified in G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-8. Conversely, Thornton argued that his claim should have been permitted pursuant to the interest-of-justice exception to res judicata. Upon reviewing the record, the Supreme Court held that the hearing justice erred in partially granting Thornton’s application for postconviction relief. Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the amended judgment of the Superior Court insofar as it vacated Thornton’s convictions for felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury and witness intimidation. |
| Francisco Rosario, on behalf of himself and all others so similarly situated v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC NKA Mr. Cooper et al. | 3/24/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-03-24T04:00:00Z | 2024-0145-Appeal. | The named plaintiff, in an uncertified class action brought by Francisco Rosario (Rosario), appealed from a Superior Court order dismissing his breach of contract complaint against the defendants, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC NKA Mr. Cooper and Bank of New York Mellon, as trustee for First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-AA1 (defendants). On appeal, Rosario argued that the Superior Court erred by determining that G.L. 1956 § 19 14 26.1 does not provide a private right of action for borrowers to recoup fees collected by a third party servicer while the servicer was not properly licensed in Rhode Island. Rosario pointed to a number of decisions by the Rhode Island Superior Court and the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island interpreting the statute to permit borrowers to sue for illegally collected fees. The Supreme Court analyzed the key provisions of the contract and determined that the plaintiff’s claims were barred as a matter of law because § 19-14-26.1(b) applied only to lenders and loan brokers, not loan servicers. Further, the Court determined that the statute did not confer a private right of action on the borrower. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court. |
| Judith Clinton v. Chad Babcock et al. | 3/24/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-03-24T04:00:00Z | 2023-0310-Appeal. | The plaintiff, Judith Clinton, appealed from a Superior Court order granting the defendants’ motion to enforce a dismissal stipulation and a motion to vacate a scheduling order. She also sought to appeal from three interlocutory orders. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial justice erred in granting the defendants’ motion to enforce the dismissal stipulation and the motion to vacate a scheduling order. The Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court record and determined that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in granting the motions and in reinstating the dismissal stipulation. |