| Dana Gallop v. State of Rhode Island | 11/26/2025 5:00:00 AM;2025-11-26T05:00:00Z | 2023-0082-M.P. | The petitioner, Dana Gallop (petitioner or Gallop), sought review of a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his application for postconviction relief. On certiorari, Gallop challenged what he characterized as the trial justice’s decision to deny his motion for summary disposition, as well as the state’s purported failure to disclose alleged inducements given to two eyewitnesses in exchange for their testimony.
The Supreme Court rejected these claims and concluded that Gallop never objected to the cancellation of the hearing on the motion for summary disposition. Accordingly, that issue was waived. The Supreme Court also determined that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive any material evidence when he determined that the state disclosed that the two eyewitnesses were in the witness protection program (WPP). Having determined that the trial justice’s finding was supportable, the Supreme Court further concluded that Gallop knew—or should have known—that both eyewitnesses could have incurred WPP expenses. Finally, the state’s nondisclosure of a $2,500 WPP expenditure (and the nearly $18,000 that had been approved for WPP expenditures) did not represent a deliberate nondisclosure and did not prejudice petitioner in light of the state’s overwhelming evidence of guilt and trial counsel’s extensive impeachment efforts.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment dismissing the application for postconviction relief. |
| Porch Swing Holdings LLC v. Wayne A. Mallory et al. | 11/6/2025 5:00:00 AM;2025-11-06T05:00:00Z | 2024-0108-Appeal. | The defendants, Wayne A. Mallory and Linda M. Mallory, appealed from a Superior Court order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Porch Swing Holdings LLC. In so doing, the Superior Court concluded that, despite not possessing the promissory note, Porch Swing Holdings was entitled to foreclose upon the property that the Mallorys had mortgaged in exchange for a loan. On appeal, the Mallorys argued that the trial justice erred when he permitted Porch Swing Holdings to foreclose despite not possessing the promissory note. The Supreme Court rejected this premise and recognized that it has “repeatedly said in a long line of cases stemming from Bucci v. Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, 68 A.3d 1069 (R.I. 2013), [that] a mortgagee need not hold the note in order to foreclose on a property.” Pimentel v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, 174 A.3d 740, 745 (R.I. 2017). Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the granting of summary judgment. |
| State v. Nathan Cooper | 8/19/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-08-19T04:00:00Z | 2024-0038-C.A. | The defendant, Nathan Cooper, appealed from a judgment of conviction and commitment following a jury trial held in the Providence County Superior Court. The defendant was charged with nine counts stemming from a shooting that occurred in March of 2022. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to suppress tangible evidence seized as the result of a warrantless search of his apartment. After carefully considering the defendant’s argument, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |
| State v. Miguel Montero | 8/18/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-08-18T04:00:00Z | 2023-0092-C.A. | After a jury trial, the defendant Miguel Montero (defendant or Montero) was convicted on one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault in violation of G.L. 1956 §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2. The trial justice sentenced defendant to sixty years at the Adult Correctional Institutions, with thirty years to serve and the balance suspended, with probation. The defendant raised five issues on appeal.
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he admitted into evidence certain testimony regarding uncharged sexual misconduct pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Specifically, the complaining witness testified that the defendant sexually assaulted her during visits to Virginia and the Dominican Republic, and the complaining witness’s mother testified that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with her when she was thirteen years old. The Supreme Court also concluded that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he admitted prior consistent statements into evidence pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, travel records from the United States Department of Homeland Security detailing the date and time defendant and the complaining witness entered or departed the United States was not subject to the Confrontation Clause because such evidence was not “testimonial,” and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), did not apply because the trial justice excused a juror for cause, and neither party exercised a peremptory challenge.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. |
| State v. Matthew Peckham | 7/30/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-30T04:00:00Z | 2023-0075-C.A. | The defendant, Matthew Peckham (defendant), appealed from a judgment of conviction following a jury trial at which he was found guilty of three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon (counts 1-3); conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon (count 4); drive-by shooting (count 12); and conspiracy to commit a drive-by shooting (count 13). Before this Court, the defendant argued that (1) the trial justice abused her discretion in not admitting the juvenile record of a witness at trial; (2) the trial justice abused her discretion in improperly admitting hearsay evidence; (3) the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial; and (4) the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.
The Supreme Court determined that, at best, the trial justice’s decision to sustain the state’s objection to the defendant’s inquiry into the dismissal of a witness’s juvenile charges was harmless error. The Supreme Court further determined that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in admitting what the defendant purported to be hearsay evidence because such evidence was not hearsay. Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s decisions to deny the defendant’s motions for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal.
Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. |
| Rhode Island Truck Center, LLC v. Daimler Trucks North America, LLC | 7/29/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-29T04:00:00Z | 2024-0047-M.P. | The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified a question to this Court regarding whether the term “relevant market area” as used in G.L. 1956 § 31-5.1-4.2(a), and defined in § 31-5.1-1(13), could include an area outside the state. The Supreme Court concluded, based on the plain meaning of the statute, that it could. Specifically, the Court concluded that the definition of “relevant market area” contained no geographic limiting language and, instead, contained language that defined “relevant market area” by reference to a specified distance, or the parties’ contract terms, regardless of the state’s borders. Accordingly, the Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. |
| Walter M. Potenza et al. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for the Registered Holders of CBA Commercial Assets Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-01. | 7/29/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-29T04:00:00Z | 2023-0291-Appeal. | The plaintiffs, Walter Potenza and Carmela Natale (plaintiffs), appealed from a Superior Court decision granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for the Registered Holders of CBA Commercial Assets Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-01 (Deutsche Bank), in the plaintiffs’ independent action in equity filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the elements required to prevail on an independent action in equity under Rule 60(b). Thus, because the plaintiffs would not have been entitled to relief under any set of facts that could have been proven in support of their claim, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice was correct to grant Deutsche Bank’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order and judgment of the Superior Court. |
| Capital Video Corporation v. Joseph A. Bevilacqua | 7/22/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-22T04:00:00Z | 2023-0244-Appeal. | The plaintiff, Capital Video Corporation (plaintiff), appealed from a Superior Court order in favor of the intervenor, Donna Bevilacqua, (1) invalidating two pluries executions on a judgment entered in 2002 against the defendant, Joseph A. Bevilacqua, and (2) requiring the plaintiff to release and discharge those pluries executions. Before this Court, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in “[d]iverging” from the language of G.L. 1956 § 9-25-19 and “[i]nvalidating the [e]xecutions under § 9-25-3’s six-year limitations period.”
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s decision invalidating the pluries executions, but on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial justice. The Supreme Court determined that §§ 9-25-3 and 9-25-19 do not conflict and that, in harmonizing the statutes to effectuate the legislature’s intent, replacement executions pursuant to § 9-25-19 are subject to the time limitations set forth in § 9 25-3. Applying the foregoing interpretation to the facts of the plaintiff’s appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to seek the 2020 and 2022 pluries executions within the prescribed time limitations in § 9-25-3, and that the plaintiff additionally failed to satisfy certain procedural requirements for seeking a replacement execution under § 9-25-19.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court. |
| State v. Larry Threadgill | 7/18/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-18T04:00:00Z | 2023-0023-C.A. | The defendant, Larry Threadgill, came before the Court on appeal from a judgment of conviction for first-degree sexual assault following a jury trial in the Superior Court. The defendant argued that the trial justice’s refusal to instruct the jury on the defense of consent was erroneous; that the trial justice erred when he refused to give a spoliation instruction; and that the trial justice erred when he gave an Allen charge to the jury, rather than declaring a mistrial.
First, with respect to the instruction on the defense of consent, the Supreme Court reviewed de novo the challenged portions of jury instructions in the context in which they were rendered, and concluded that the trial justice’s instruction on force and coercion was adequate. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice’s refusal to instruct the jury on consent was not erroneous.
Second, the Supreme Court observed that the record lacked any evidence to suggest that the pair of jeans the complaining witness wore on the day of the incident were exculpatory in value, that the defendant could not obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable means, or that the state acted in bad faith. Accordingly, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s contention that the trial justice erred when he refused to instruct the jury on spoliation.
Finally, the defendant argued that the trial justice’s Allen charge was improperly coercive. After having reviewed the Allen charge in its entirety, and in light of the totality of the circumstances, the Supreme Court declared that the trial justice’s Allen charge was fair, neutral, and not coercive; accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice’s Allen charge did not constitute reversible error. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
|
| RH McLeod Family LLC et al. v. Westerly Zoning Board of Review et al.; 4 Spray Rock, LLC v. Westerly Zoning Board of Review et al. | 7/18/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-18T04:00:00Z | 2023-0104-M.P. and 2023-0117-M.P. | The Supreme Court issued writs of certiorari to review a Superior Court judgment affirming a decision by the Westerly Zoning Board of Review that granted a dimensional variance to the respondents, Todd Nordstrom and Karyn Nordstrom, enabling them to demolish the existing house on the property and build a new three story house. The petitioners, RH McLeod Family LLC, Margot Perot, and 4 Spray Rock, LLC, argued that the trial justice erred in affirming the decision of the zoning board.
The Supreme Court held that trial justice erred in affirming the decision of the zoning board because the plain language of the ordinance prevented the Nordstroms from obtaining a dimensional variance to demolish the existing nonconforming structure and building a new nonconforming structure. Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the Superior Court.
|