| American Express National Bank v. Anna Perretta | 5/15/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-05-15T04:00:00Z | 2024-0396-Appeal. | The defendant, Anna Perretta, appealed from the July 23, 2024 final judgment of the Superior Court entered in favor of the plaintiff bank. On appeal, the defendant contended that the hearing justice erred by disregarding Rule 6 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure when he granted the plaintiff bank’s motion for summary judgment in reliance upon an affidavit that was “not in the record and not provided to the [defendant] with the motion.”
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff bank’s affidavit, which was e-mailed to the hearing justice’s clerk on the morning of the hearing, was not timely filed and that, therefore, the hearing justice should not have relied upon that affidavit in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court vacated the grant of summary judgment and the entry of final judgment in favor of the plaintiff bank and remanded the case to the Superior Court for such further proceedings as may be required. |
| State v. Bradley Peterson | 5/7/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-05-07T04:00:00Z | 2024-0323-C.A. | The pro se defendant, Bradley Peterson, sought review of an adjudication of a probation violation that was entered after a hearing in the Providence County Superior Court on June 10 and June 11, 2024. On appeal, the defendant contended that the hearing justice abused his discretion because, in the defendant’s view, the sentence imposed for the probation violation was excessive.
The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in imposing nine years of the defendant’s original ten-year suspended sentence.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and commitment on the probation violation. |
| State v. Miguel Lacourt | 5/7/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-05-07T04:00:00Z | 2024-0264-C.A. | The defendant, Miguel Lacourt, appealed from a May 24, 2024 judgment of conviction and commitment on one count of second-degree murder, one count of discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, and one count of carrying a firearm without a license. Those convictions were the result of a jury trial held in the Providence County Superior Court. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter “when there was more than minimal evidence of adequate provocation and that [the defendant] acted in the heat of passion.”
The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |
| State v. William Gilbert | 4/30/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-04-30T04:00:00Z | 2025-0022-C.A. | The defendant, William Gilbert, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction after having been found guilty by a jury of first-degree sexual assault in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-37-2. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred in allowing into evidence statements that the defendant’s roommate made to the complainant after the assault, arguing that the testimony was impermissible hearsay. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in admitting the testimony because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |
| Pace Organization of Rhode Island v. Sarah Frew, in her capacity as Tax Assessor for the City of East Providence | 4/28/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-04-28T04:00:00Z | 2024-0127-Appeal. | The plaintiff, PACE Organization of Rhode Island, appealed from a Superior Court judgment entered in favor of the defendant, Sarah Frew, in her capacity as Tax Assessor for the City of East Providence, following the grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred by holding that G.L. 1956 § 44 3 3(a)(12) was ambiguous. The Supreme Court held that the relevant statute could reasonably be read in different ways and was therefore ambiguous. Because an ambiguity in a taxing statute must be resolved in favor of the taxing authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |
| State v. Adauris Garcia | 4/27/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-04-27T04:00:00Z | 2024-0265-C.A. | The defendant, Adauris Garcia, was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, one count of discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, and one count of carrying a pistol or revolver without a license or permit. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred by (1) excluding witness testimony pursuant to State v. Harnois, 638 A.2d 532 (R.I. 1994), and (2) denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in applying Harnois when defense counsel attempted to cross examine the state’s witness from testifying as to the defendant’s statements to her because the defendant had not testified. The Supreme Court further held that the trial justice was clearly wrong in his order denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court vacated the order denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial and remanded the matter for a new hearing on the motion for a new trial. |
| Asa S. Davis, III v. Wood Estates, Inc., et al.; Asa S. Davis et al. v. Town of Exeter et al. | 4/23/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-04-23T04:00:00Z | 2024-0010-M.P. and 2024-0087-M.P. | The Supreme Court granted two petitions for writ of certiorari filed by the defendant, Town of Exeter, seeking review of (1) a Superior Court order denying the town’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in WC 20 515 (asserting constitutional and statutory claims) and (2) a Superior Court order denying the town’s motion to dismiss claims filed by the plaintiff, Asa S. Davis, in WC 23 139 (asserting adverse possession claims). The town asserted several assignments of error: (1) that Davis’s claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel; (2) that the town did not consent to proceeding with separate actions; (3) that the disputed area is public property and cannot be adversely possessed; and (4) that WC 23 139 should have been dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice erred in denying the defendant’s motions because plaintiff’s claims in both cases arose from the same transaction previously at issue in Davis v. Town of Exeter, 285 A.3d 15 (R.I. 2022). The Supreme Court also held that both collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel barred WC 23-139. Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the orders of the Superior Court. |
| Leonard J. LaPadula, III v. Citizens Financial Group, Inc. | 4/15/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-04-15T04:00:00Z | 2025-0054-Appeal. | The plaintiff, Leonard J. LaPadula III appealed from the denial of his motion to appear before the Superior Court by WebEx for purposes of a hearing on Citizens Financial Group, Inc.’s motion to dismiss his complaint. Mr. LaPadula raised eleven “questions of law” which he requested this Court answer. However, Mr. LaPadula did not appeal from an appealable judgment, order, or decree of the Superior Court. Rather, he appealed from the docket entry denying his motion to attend the hearing remotely. Accordingly, the Supreme Court denied and dismissed his appeal in accordance with the Court’s final judgment rule. |
| In re DDH | 3/25/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-03-25T04:00:00Z | 2025-0156-Appeal. | The petitioner, Zoila Amanda Barnica Rodriguez, filed a petition in the Family Court seeking temporary custody of her nephew, DDH, as well as an order for special findings of fact (the petition). Although the petition was filed before DDH’s eighteenth birthday, it was not heard until after DDH attained the age of eighteen. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that the Family Court was without subject-matter jurisdiction because, at the time of the hearing, DDH was more than eighteen years old. Additionally, while Rodriguez invited the Family Court to issue a decree on the merits and then enter the order nunc pro tunc, (viz., retroactively, to February 12, 2024, the date the petition was filed), the Supreme Court concluded that Rodriguez provided no compelling authority for this unwarranted expansion of the Family Court’s jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the order of the Family Court dismissing the petition for want of subject-matter jurisdiction was affirmed. |
| State v. Trequan Baker | 3/24/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-03-24T04:00:00Z | 2024-0280-C.A. | During the cross-examination of the defendant, Trequan Baker, the prosecutor twice impermissibly questioned the defendant concerning his post-arrest decision to remain silent while in custody at the Pawtucket Police Department. The offending questions posed by the prosecutor endeavored to undermine the defendant’s credibility by suggesting that his testimony—that he acted in the defense of others—had been recently manufactured as evidenced by his previous silence. Although the trial justice sustained the objections to the offending questions and issued a cautionary instruction, as well as a final jury instruction, that the defendant had the right to remain silent and that the jury may not draw an adverse inference from the exercise of that constitutional right, the Supreme Court concluded that the offending cross-examination questions were inherently prejudicial and violated the defendant’s right to due process.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s conviction. |