| Cassandra Constantino v. Zsolt Orban | 7/17/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-17T04:00:00Z | 2025-0082-Appeal. | In this divorce action, the defendant, Zsolt Orban, appealed pro se from a Family Court decision pending the entry of final judgment. Orban challenged the distribution of several marital assets and the trial justice’s award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff, Cassandra Constantino. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in his determinations regarding the equitable division and award of attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court. |
| State v. Quelon Page | 7/16/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-16T04:00:00Z | 2025-0050-C.A. | The defendant, Quelon Page, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction following a trial at which the jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit an assault with a dangerous weapon, discharge of a firearm when committing a crime of violence resulting in death, and carrying a pistol or revolver without a license or permit. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the verdict was against the fair preponderance of the evidence and the trial justice’s decision “failed to point to any evidence that showed [the defendant] was the shooter.” The Supreme Court held that the trial justice erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial because she failed to articulate a sufficient rationale in support of her conclusion that reasonable minds could differ as to the defendant’s culpability for the charged offenses. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the trial justice’s decision denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial and remanded the matter for a new hearing on the motion for a new trial. |
| Terrel Barros v. State of Rhode Island | 7/16/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-16T04:00:00Z | 2023-0308-M.P. | The Supreme Court granted the state’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review a Superior Court judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Terrel Barros, on his application for postconviction relief. Before the Court, the state argued that the hearing justice erred in sustaining Mr. Barros’s claims and granting his application for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court granting Mr. Barros’s application for postconviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence and remanded the record of the case to the Superior Court. |
| State v. Noel Ignacio Moronta | 7/15/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-15T04:00:00Z | 2025-0083-C.A. | Noel Ignacio Moronta appealed from a judgment of conviction and commitment following a bench trial at which he was found guilty of failing to report a death with the intention of concealing a crime, to wit, possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, and a number of other crimes relating to possession and intent to deliver fentanyl, xylazine, and cocaine. On appeal, Mr. Moronta argued that police officers entered an apartment without a warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances and that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of the warrantless search. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice erred in denying Mr. Moronta’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated his conviction and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new trial. |
| Galbin Fernandez, in his capacity as the Administrator of the Estate of Eva Pena v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority et al. | 7/15/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-15T04:00:00Z | 2025-0045-Appeal. | The plaintiff, Galbin Fernandez, in his capacity as the Administrator of the Estate of Eva Pena, appealed from a Superior Court order denying his motion for a new trial, which he filed after a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (defendant or RIPTA). On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in admitting into evidence the alleged statements of Pena to a RIPTA supervisor, statements which were procured through an unidentified Spanish interpreter. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice abused her discretion in admitting the challenged statements into evidence, reversed the Superior Court order denying the plaintiff’s motion, and remanded the case for a new trial. |
| Thomas Sculco et al. v. Town of Hopkinton Zoning Board of Review Sitting as the Board of Appeal et al. | 7/14/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-14T04:00:00Z | 2024-0143-M.P. | |
| Vanessa Carlton et al. v. Artak Avagyan et al. | 7/14/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-14T04:00:00Z | 2025-0132-Appeal. | The defendants, Artak Avagyan and Lee Beausoleil, appealed from an order of the Superior Court granting a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, Vanessa Carlton and John McCauley. Before this Court, the defendants contended that the hearing justice erred in granting the preliminary injunction.
The Court held that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court. |
| State v. Leron Porter | 7/9/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-09T04:00:00Z | 2023-0237-C.A. | The defendant, Leron Porter, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction for murder in the second degree and two related firearms offenses. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial and that, as a result, his conviction should be reversed. Principally, the defendant argued that the state’s peremptory strike of the sole African-American venireperson during voir dire violated his equal protection rights as guaranteed by the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In opposition, the state asserted that the trial justice correctly found that the state’s striking of the prospective juror was constitutional because the prosecutor’s proffered basis for the strike was race-neutral. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, determining that the trial justice failed to undertake the requisite analysis under Batson’s third step. The Supreme Court held that, in order to safeguard a criminal defendant’s inalienable right to a fair trial, a trial justice must engage in a meaningful Batson analysis, in which the trial justice must address, delineate, and explain his or her rationale as to all three steps of the tripartite test on the record. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the matter for a new trial. |
| Michele B. Codere-Wilson v. Craig S. Wilson | 7/8/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-08T04:00:00Z | 2025-0121-Appeal. | The defendant, Craig S. Wilson, appealed from an April 16, 2025 order of the Family Court, which awarded the plaintiff, Michele B. Codere-Wilson, one half of the defendant’s pension pursuant to the Property Settlement Agreement that the parties entered into at the time of their divorce. Before this Court, the defendant contended (1) that the plaintiff’s motion to reopen the divorce was not timely pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-1-13; (2) that the Family Court erred in ordering the defendant to specifically perform in accordance with the terms of the Property Settlement Agreement entered into at the time of the divorce; (3) that “the Property Settlement Agreement does not call for a second Qualified Domestic Relations Order;” and (4) that “[t]he PSA was effectively reformed by the [c]ourt absent a finding of mutual mistake and without the parties’ consent.”
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s motion to reopen the divorce was not barred by the statute of limitations and that the Family Court did not err in ordering the defendant to comply with the unambiguous terms of the Property Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Family Court. |
| Reagan Marine Construction, LLC v. Victor Costa et al. | 7/7/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-07T04:00:00Z | 2024-0344-Appeal. | The defendants, Victor Costa and Costa Companies, Inc., appealed from a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Reagan Marine Construction, LLC, in the amount of $716,001.83, inclusive of costs, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial justice erred in entering a default judgment because the plaintiff’s service of motions for conditional order of default, default judgment, and attorney’s fees were defective. The defendants also argued that this Court’s imposition of a cash bond as a condition for a remand to file a motion pursuant to Rule 60 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure in the lower court violated their due-process rights. The Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ notice argument on the grounds that the issue was not timely raised below and, thus, was not properly preserved for appellate review. The Supreme Court also concluded that the trial justice did not err in entering a default judgment because the defendants were afforded multiple opportunities to comply with discovery requests and to procure legal counsel for the corporate defendant prior to the entry of default. Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the defendants’ due-process rights were not violated because their request to remand was properly conditioned on a cash bond pursuant to this Court’s authority under Article I, Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. |