| Staci K. Shepherd v. Rhode Island State Police et al. | 7/10/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-10T04:00:00Z | 2024-0099-Appeal. | After suffering a heart attack at the state police training academy, the plaintiff filed an application for a disability pension in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 42-28 21, which the superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police denied. Specifically, the superintendent concluded that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the burden and prove that the heart attack was causally related to her employment. The plaintiff responded by filing a declaratory-judgment complaint and a justice of the Superior Court declared that the superintendent’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, and that the plaintiff was entitled to a disability pension.
On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the superintendent overlooked the admonition that in heart-attack cases “we do not equate the term ‘causal relationship’ with the term ‘proximate cause’ as found in negligence actions. Here, it is enough if the conditions and nature of the employment contribute to the injury.” Mulcahey v. New England Newspapers, Inc., 488 A.2d 681, 684 (R.I. 1985). The Supreme Court reviewed the undisputed record de novo and determined that the plaintiff’s employment with the state police contributed to the heart attack. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |
| State v. Joseph Coletta | 7/9/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-09T04:00:00Z | 2022-0035-C.A. | The defendant, Joseph Coletta (Mr. Coletta or defendant), appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction following a jury trial at which he was found guilty of five counts of second-degree child molestation. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress his post-arrest statement to police because it was obtained in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution; (2) denying his motion to suppress his post-arrest statement to police because it was obtained in violation of Rule 5(a) of the District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure; (3) granting the state’s motion in limine to preclude the defendant’s false-confessions expert from testifying; and (4) denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
The defendant waived his argument that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to suppress under the Rhode Island Constitution. The Supreme Court evaluated whether the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress was clearly erroneous under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and whether his statement to police was obtained in violation of Rule 5(a) of the District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because the defendant gave his post-arrest police statement knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and any purported delay in his presentment to the District Court under Rule 5(a) was not operative in inducing his statement, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not clearly err in denying the motion to suppress. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in granting the state’s motion in limine to preclude the defendant’s expert witness from testifying about false confessions because the defendant failed to alert the trial justice that scientific or medical evidence was at issue. Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not clearly err in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |
| New Phase Realty, LLC, assignor and prior owner, et al. v. Jeremy J. Fournier et al. | 7/8/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-08T04:00:00Z | 2024-0215-Appeal. and 2024-0216-Appeal. | The plaintiffs, Daniel B. Struebing and Amanda L. Lyons, appealed in these consolidated trespass and adverse possession cases from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Jeremy J. Fournier and Jennifer M. Fournier. On appeal, the plaintiffs contended, inter alia, that the hearing justice overlooked the fact that a “seizure” by the United States government of the plaintiffs’ property interrupted the running of the statutory time period relative to the defendants’ adverse possession claim. The plaintiffs also contended that the hearing justice impermissibly acted as a factfinder and that he overlooked the federal district court’s express determination regarding the alleged forfeiture of the lot in question.
In reviewing the plaintiffs’ contentions, the Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not err in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |
| Kristina Urbonas et al. v. John Gullison et al. | 7/3/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-03T04:00:00Z | 2024-0060-Appeal. | The defendant, NRI 51 Kingston Partnership (NRI), appealed from a January 18, 2023 final judgment of the Superior Court, which awarded title to a portion of land to the plaintiffs, Kristina Urbonas and Arunas Aniukstis, which land had been considered by NRI to be its property. The defendant contended that the trial justice “misapplied the doctrine of acquiescence” to the portion of land at issue. The defendant further contended that the trial justice erred in awarding title to abutters other than the plaintiffs as said abutters had not requested such relief. The plaintiffs argued that the case was not properly before the Supreme Court because the defendant did “not receive[] an order from this Court extending the time by which they [would be] permitted to file the transcript in this case.”
The Supreme Court held that, in view of the very unusual travel of this case, the defendant’s appeal would not be dismissed even though it did not initially request the transcripts in a timely manner. The Court further held that, although the trial justice erred in applying the doctrine of acquiescence to the parcel of property in dispute, the plaintiffs had established an easement by prescription. In addition, the Court held that the trial justice erred in granting the same relief to parties that had not requested it. |
| Robert Stratoberdha et al. v. Clements Properties, LLC, et al. | 7/3/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-03T04:00:00Z | 2024-0017-Appeal. | The plaintiff, Robert Stratoberdha, appealed a Superior Court order approving a settlement agreement despite his objection. Critically, however, Mr. Stratoberdha failed to timely appeal any of the three orders rendered in the Family Court during the divorce proceedings, which concerned the settlement agreement. The Family Court decrees incorporated the settlement agreement, appointed a Commissioner to execute the settlement agreement if one of the Stratoberdhas refused to do so, and directed that the Stratoberdhas evenly divide the net proceeds from the sale of the marital domicile and any additional settlement funds received as a result of the Superior Court action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the Family Court decrees are final and that the Superior Court’s reliance thereon may not be challenged in connection with the ministerial act of approving the settlement agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court. |
| State v. Jose Lantigua | 7/3/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-03T04:00:00Z | 2024-0014-C.A. | The defendant, Jose Lantigua, appealed from a November 22, 2023 judgment of conviction and commitment on one count of first-degree child molestation and one count of second-degree child molestation following a jury trial held in the Providence County Superior Court. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred in allowing a medical expert to “impermissibly bolster” the complaining witness’s testimony.
The Supreme Court held that the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appellate review and that it was therefore deemed to have been waived. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. |
| Verizon New England Inc. v. Neena S. Savage, in her capacity as Tax Administrator for the State of Rhode Island | 7/3/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-03T04:00:00Z | 2023-0221-M.P. | This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the plaintiff, Verizon New England Inc., seeking review of a District Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Neena S. Savage, in her capacity as Tax Administrator for the State of Rhode Island. The parties’ dispute concerned the interpretation of the term “accumulated depreciation” as used in G.L. 1956 § 44 13 13, which governs taxation of the tangible personal property of “telegraph, cable, and telecommunications corporations and express corporations” operating in Rhode Island. Before the Supreme Court, Verizon argued that the District Court erred in holding that depreciation under § 44-13-13 excludes functional and economic obsolescence because the plain and ordinary meaning of depreciation generally includes obsolescence. The Supreme Court concluded that the term “accumulated depreciation” was unambiguous and was intended to mean financial accounting depreciation. As such, Verizon’s functional and economic obsolescence figures were appropriately excluded from the computation of depreciation under § 44 13 13. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. |
| Dino J. Guilmette v. PHH Mortgage Services FKA Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC et al. | 7/2/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-02T04:00:00Z | 2024-0208-Appeal. | The plaintiff, Dino J. Guilmette, appealed a judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the defendants, PHH Mortgage Corporation d/b/a PHH Mortgage Services, successor to Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-3 (collectively, defendants), following the grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff argued that, after the sale of the plaintiff’s property, the defendants miscalculated the shared appreciation amount owed under the shared appreciation modification, an agreement modifying the plaintiff’s mortgage, because of an ambiguity in the agreement. The Supreme Court concluded that the modification agreement was unambiguous because it contained an appreciation disclosure that illustrated how the shared appreciation amount would be calculated in the event of a sale of the subject property. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendants. |
| State v. Andrew McLean | 7/2/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-02T04:00:00Z | 2024-0048-C.A. | The defendant, Andrew McLean, appealed from a Superior Court order that denied his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred by failing to recuse himself from ruling on the defendant’s Rule 35 motion and also by denying the Rule 35 motion itself. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties and concluded that the trial justice did not err in not recusing himself from hearing the defendant’s Rule 35 motion or in denying that motion itself. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court. |
| State v. Jaythan Hang | 7/2/2025 4:00:00 AM;2025-07-02T04:00:00Z | 2023-0236-C.A. | The defendant, Jaythan Hang (defendant), appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction following a trial at which the jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree, conspiracy, two counts of felony assault, discharge of a firearm when committing a crime of violence, and four other firearms offenses. Before this Court, the defendant asserted that the trial justice abused her discretion (1) in denying a pretrial motion for severance; (2) in erroneously admitting evidence of prior bad acts and crime in the community under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; (3) in erroneously admitting two statements as statements against interest pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; and (4) in allowing improper lay opinion testimony pursuant to Rule 701 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; and that the trial justice clearly erred (5) in denying a motion for a new trial on the conspiracy count.
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice appropriately considered the defendant’s concerns for prejudice and weighed them against the need for judicial efficiency, and therefore she did not abuse her discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for severance. The Supreme Court determined that the following issues were waived: defendant’s argument concerning statements against interest pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3), his argument as to a portion of the prior bad-acts evidence admitted under Rule 404(b), and his argument that the trial justice allowed an improper lay opinion testimony pursuant to Rule 701. As to the prior bad-acts evidence that the defendant properly preserved on appeal, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in admitting the evidence for the state’s proffered purpose of showing common scheme or plan and access to firearms. Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice conducted the appropriate analyses on the defendant’s motion for a new trial, and that she did not otherwise clearly err.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |