Opinions, Decisions, and Orders

 

 

The Providence Community Health Centers, Inc. v. Neal Dupuis, in his capacity as Tax Assessor for the City of Warwick6/5/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-06-05T04:00:00Z2024-0287-Appeal.The plaintiff, The Providence Community Health Centers, Inc. (PCHC or plaintiff), appealed from a Superior Court judgment entered in favor of the defendant, Neal Dupuis, in his capacity as Tax Assessor for the City of Warwick (the tax assessor or defendant), following the grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. At issue was whether G.L. 1956 § 44-3-3(a)(70) granted the plaintiff a specific exemption for its property, or if § 44-3-3(a)(12) provided the plaintiff with a general exemption. The Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of § 44-3-3(a)(70) unambiguously granted PCHC a tax exemption limited to its real property located in Providence; it also concluded that § 44-3-3(a)(12) was ambiguous, as applied to the facts of this case, and must be resolved in favor of the taxing authority. The judgment of the Superior Court was therefore affirmed.
In the Matter of Steven D. DiLibero6/5/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-06-05T04:00:00Z2025-0076-M.P.
Raymond Desrochers et al. v. Luigi Micheli III6/4/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-06-04T04:00:00Z2025-0185-Appeal. and 2025-0186-Appeal.The plaintiffs, Raymond Desrochers and Debra Desrochers, appealed in this adverse possession case from a final judgment that was largely, but not entirely, entered in favor of the defendant, Luigi Micheli III. The plaintiffs objected to the trial justice’s finding that they failed to prove adverse possession as to one specific portion of the disputed area. On appeal, the plaintiffs contended, inter alia, that the trial justice erred in ruling that they failed to satisfy the hostility element of their adverse possession claim with respect to the portion of the disputed area which he found they did not adversely possess. The defendant cross-appealed from the entry of final judgment. The defendant contended that, with respect to the portion of land that the trial justice found plaintiffs had adversely possessed, the trial justice erred by failing to find that plaintiffs had not proven the element of hostility. He further argued that plaintiffs did not establish through clear and convincing evidence a sufficiently accurate description of the land which they claim to own through adverse possession. The Supreme Court held that further fact-finding would be necessary for the trial court to be able to determine whether the plaintiffs had proven by clear and convincing evidence the element of hostility of their claim for adverse possession. Additionally, the Court held that the plaintiffs had established the disputed area with reasonable accuracy by clear and convincing evidence as to the disputed area that existed along the previous tree line. However, the Court remanded the case for a factual determination as to the location of the disputed area beyond the previous tree line. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Superior Court.
David Hurd, Trustee of the Amended and Restated David C. Hurd Trust Dated February 3, 1999 v. H & H Real Estate, LLC, d/b/a Hogan Associates, et al.6/3/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-06-03T04:00:00Z2025-0055-Appeal.The plaintiff, David Hurd, Trustee of the Amended and Restated David C. Hurd Trust Dated February 3, 1999, appealed from a Superior Court judgment entered in favor of the defendants, H & H Real Estate, LLC, d/b/a Hogan Associates, and Kevan Campbell, following the grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred in ruling that he was required to present expert testimony to prove that the defendants owed him a cognizable duty of care. The Supreme Court concluded that expert testimony is generally required to establish the applicable standard of care in a negligence action against a real estate professional, because the day-to-day duties of such professionals are beyond the common knowledge of laypeople. The judgment of the Superior Court was therefore affirmed.
Julie DeOliveira et al. v. Greg Trecaso et al.6/3/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-06-03T04:00:00Z2024-0066-Appeal. and 2024-0072-Appeal.The plaintiffs, Julie and Maxine DeOliveira (plaintiffs), appealed from a final judgment entered following a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, Star Insurance Company (Star), on their action alleging negligence on the part of Greg Trecaso, Star’s insured, for a motor vehicle accident that occurred on Interstate 95 South in March 2010. The defendant filed a cross-appeal alleging error in the trial justice’s decision to deny its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not abuse its discretion with respect to plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections or with respect to a question of authentication of satellite photographs, and did not commit an error of law with regard to jury instructions or the phrasing of the verdict sheet. Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s decision denying plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. Because the Court so concluded, it did not reach the merits of Star’s cross-appeal.
LandingPartners LLC v. Shiva, LLC, et al.6/3/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-06-03T04:00:00Z2025-0130-Appeal.
Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Magistrate Selection Committee6/3/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-06-03T04:00:00Z2026-08
In re E.G.S6/1/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-06-01T04:00:00Z2024-0023-Appeal. and 2024-0024-Appeal.The juvenile respondent, E.G.S., appealed from two Family Court orders finding him to be delinquent on two counts of first-degree child molestation in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-37-8.1. On appeal, the respondent argued that the trial justice erred (1) in finding him competent to stand trial and (2) in ordering him to register as a sex offender for fifteen years. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in finding respondent competent to stand trial or in imposing the maximum sex offender registration period of fifteen years. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Family Court.
State v. Nelson Carreiro6/1/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-06-01T04:00:00Z2023-0288-C.A.The defendant, Nelson Carreiro, appealed from a judgment of conviction on two counts of first-degree child molestation. On appeal, he argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police because (1) he was in custody at the time the statements were made; (2) he did not reinitiate conversation with the police after he invoked his right to counsel; and (3) even if he did reinitiate the conversation, the state failed to prove that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The defendant further submitted that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on count one, because the state failed to prove a specific instance of penetration beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. The Court further affirmed the trial justice’s denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to count one. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
Nicole Solas v. South Kingstown School Committee5/29/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-05-29T04:00:00Z2025-0006-Appeal.The plaintiff, Nicole Solas, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, the South Kingstown School Committee. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Black, Indigenous, and People of Color Advisory Board (the Board) was not holding open meetings in violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), G.L. 1956 § 42-46-3. The plaintiff relied on this Court’s holding in Solas v. Emergency Council Hiring of the State, 774 A.2d 820 (R.I. 2001), to argue that the Board was a “public body” and, therefore, was required to open its meetings to the public, pursuant to the act. The Supreme Court concluded that its holding in Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Board Council on Elementary and Secondary Education, 151 A.3d 301 (R.I. 2016), controlled the outcome of the case and that the Board was not a public body subject to the OMA. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.