Supreme Court

As a result of a fatal motor-vehicle incident, a delinquency petition was filed against C.R. in the Family Court.  After C.R. pled nolo contendere to two charges of driving so as to endanger, resulting in death, the decedent’s parents filed a motion in the Family Court, seeking access to the transcript of the proceeding at which C.R. was certified and sentenced.  The Chief Judge of the Family Court (Chief Judge) denied the motion and the decedent’s parents filed this appeal.  The Supreme Court overlooked two procedural issues casting doubt on the propriety of this appeal.  On the merits, the Supreme Court concluded that the Chief Judge did not abuse his discretion in denying access to the transcript of the proceeding where C.R. was certified and sentenced.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s order.

The defendant, Eleticia Garcia, appealed from a Superior Court judgment by default in favor of the plaintiff, Ponagansett 2 LLC, d/b/a Peter Bibby Heating & Air, to enforce a mechanics’ lien against the defendant and for attorneys’ fees.  After the defendant did not respond to the plaintiff’s complaint to enforce the mechanics’ lien, a clerk of the Superior Court entered default in favor of the plaintiff.  After a hearing to determine the amount of the plaintiff’s damages, the Superior Court entered default judgment against the defendant and awarded the plaintiff $20,000, plus interest, and attorneys’ fees of $12,310.27.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the mechanics’ lien was unenforceable and that the hearing justice committed reversible error by not only awarding the amount prayed for in the plaintiff’s complaint but also excluding the admission of certain evidence as a full exhibit.  The Supreme Court held that it was unable to consider the defendant’s first argument because the Superior Court had already entered default in the plaintiff’s favor.  The Supreme Court further held that the hearing justice did not err with respect to the issues raised by the defendant that were properly before the Court.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

These appeals arose out of a dispute between the Town of Richmond (the town) and a group of developers (the plaintiffs).  Following a hearing on the town’s motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for violations of substantive due process, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective business advantages, civil liability for crimes and offenses pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-1-2, and a civil violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute pursuant to G.L. 1956 chapter 15 of title 7.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the hearing justice committed four errors: (1) in ruling that the plaintiffs failed to state claims for crimes and offenses (count four) and civil RICO (count five); (2) in determining that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for tortious interference (counts two and three); (3) in failing to apply the Supreme Court’s prior holdings that the public duty doctrine does not apply to intentional torts; and (4) in finding that the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the voluntary payment doctrine.

The town cross-appealed, claiming defective and insufficient notice and arguing that the three-year statute of limitations barred all of the plaintiffs’ claims, not just the claims for violations of substantive due process and tortious interference.  The town additionally argued that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and that the town, as a government entity, could not be held liable under § 9 1-2 or civil RICO.  The plaintiffs contested these arguments.

The Supreme Court held that the three-year statute of limitations applied to the plaintiffs’ claims for civil liability for crimes and for civil RICO because the claims were claims in tort; therefore, those claims were time-barred.  The Court further determined that the continuing tort doctrine did not apply to the plaintiffs’ claims for tortious interference and that, therefore, those claims were also time barred.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Victor Tavares (defendant or Tavares), was convicted by a jury on two counts of first-degree sexual assault in violation of G.L. 1956 §§ 11-37-2 and 11-37-3, and one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree sexual assault in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-1-6. Tavares raised twelve issues for the Supreme Court’s review. Several issues raised by Tavares were either not preserved in the Superior Court or inadequately developed on appeal. As such, consideration of those issues was waived.

The Court did consider Tavares’s allegations that: (1) the General Assembly did not have the constitutional authority to enact the criminal laws upon which defendant was convicted; (2) certain Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure were not followed; (3) the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the state from prosecuting the defendant; (4) the rule of consistency barred the state from prosecuting the defendant for conspiracy to commit first-degree sexual assault; and (5) the voir dire of certain jurors was improperly conducted in open court. With respect to those issues, the law was well settled and did not support Tavares’s allegations of error. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The petitioner, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), appealed an order of the Family Court finding it in contempt of an order to place the child, N.D., in a residential facility that is appropriate for her level of need.  DCYF argued that it could not be held in contempt because it was unable to comply with the Family Court order, and it asserted that the Family Court improperly rejected its inability defense.  The Family Court reasoned that DCYF was able to comply because it had demonstrated its ability to develop an appropriate residential facility for boys; therefore, it should not have been able to claim an inability to develop one for girls, like N.D.  The Family Court further reasoned that that DCYF could not rely upon its inability to provide N.D. with an appropriate residential facility when it had a statutory obligation to do so.  The Supreme Court vacated the Family Court’s finding of contempt because, although DCYF has a statutory obligation to provide facilities for children under its care, the issue of whether DCYF had complied with its statutory obligations was not before the hearing justice.  Instead, the issue was whether DCYF was literally able to comply with the Family Court’s order as of the contempt hearing date.  DCYF demonstrated that it was unable to comply because, despite DCYF’s reasonable efforts to find a placement, facility staffing concerns, low discharge rates, and an increase in mental-health issues among adolescents during the COVID-19 pandemic created a “perfect storm” for reduced capacity at all appropriate facilities. 

The petitioner, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), appealed an order of the Family Court finding it in contempt of an order to place a child, N.B., at St. Mary’s Home for Children (St. Mary’s).  On appeal, DCYF submitted that the hearing justice committed a variety of errors.  First, DCYF argued that the hearing justice abused his discretion by finding that it had not exercised reasonable efforts to place N.B., and thus it was an error to order the child’s placement at St. Mary’s because the evidence demonstrated that N.B. could not be placed at that facility and DCYF had made substantial efforts to place her there and at other appropriate facilities.  Second, DCYF challenged the hearing justice’s finding that it had failed to demonstrate that it was not possible to comply with the placement order as the department had put forth testimony and evidence of its efforts to place her in an appropriate level of care, and that no placement was available.  And lastly, DCYF challenged the hearing justice’s decision to impose a contempt sanction for the benefit of N.B.
 
The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Family Court because DCYF cultivated reasonable efforts to place the child in an appropriate level of care, but no such placement was available either in-state or out of state due in part to a lack of availability and staffing shortages related to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, and based on the child’s noncompliance with her insulin regimen.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the order of the Family Court and held that the hearing justice abused his discretion in finding that DCYF failed to use reasonable efforts to place N.B. at St. Mary’s. 

The plaintiff, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB DBA Christiana Trust as Trustee for HLSS Mortgage Master Trust, by PennyMac Loan Services, LLC, as its attorney-in-fact (collectively, plaintiff), appealed from a Superior Court decision granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Power Realty, RIGP a/k/a Power Realty Group, RIGP; Douglas H. Smith, Only in His Capacity as Partner of Power Realty, RIGP; and TMC Keywest LLC (collectively, defendants) in the plaintiff’s action to challenge the adequacy of notice of a prior petition to foreclose the right of redemption from a title conveyed by a tax collector’s deed.

The Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it received inadequate notice of the foreclosure proceedings in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, PennyMac Loan Services, LLC (plaintiff), appealed from a Superior Court decision granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants Coventry Fire District;  Roosevelt Associates, RIGP; Linda Murray, Only in Her Capacity as Partner of Roosevelt Associates, RIGP; Coventry Fire District 5-19, RIGP; Douglas Smith, Only in His Capacity as Partner of Coventry Fire District      5-19, RIGP; Clarke Road Associates, RIGP; Title Investment Co., RIGP; and Stephen Smith, Only in His Capacity as Partner of Clarke Road Associates, RIGP and Title Investment Co., RIGP (collectively, defendants); in the plaintiff’s action to challenge (1) the adequacy of notice of a prior petition to foreclose the right of redemption from a title conveyed by a tax collector’s deed pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 44-9-24; and (2) the prior tax sale, as well as subsequent conveyances of property previously owned by the plaintiff, as voidable transfers pursuant to G.L. 1956 chapter 16 of title 6, the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act.

The Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it received inadequate notice of the foreclosure proceedings in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, that the defendants were otherwise entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and affirmed the amended judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Gregory DeJean (Dr. DeJean), appealed from a final order and judgment of the Superior Court following a nonjury trial, granting plaintiffs’—Thomas Knudsen, Trustee, and Ciara Ladnier and Edward Knudsen, Trustees—claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.  Doctor DeJean argued that the trial justice erred by interpreting an ambiguous restrictive covenant in favor of a more restrictive use, granting injunctive relief that gave plaintiffs a windfall, and rejecting Dr. DeJean’s laches defense. 

The Supreme Court held that although the trial justice made a finding of ambiguity, it was apparent that this purported “ambiguity” was the restrictive covenant’s failure to provide for a remedy to address the parties’ dispute.  By contrast, the trial justice found the terms of the restrictive covenant clear and determined that Dr. DeJean had violated paragraph ten of the restrictive covenant by permitting the unbridled growth of his landscaping.  Interpreting paragraph ten de novo, the Supreme Court determined that the plain language of the restrictive covenant unambiguously prohibits changes to the natural condition of the properties without the agreement of the property owners.  The Court further determined that the examples listed in paragraph ten plainly indicated that changes to the natural condition of the property encompassed changes to the trees, shrubs, plants, fields, loam, soil, and stone fences.  Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s finding that Dr. DeJean violated paragraph ten.  Given that Dr. DeJean violated a 1989 restrictive covenant prohibiting him from making changes to the natural condition of the property, the Supreme Court determined that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial justice to order injunctive relief that would achieve the same effect of the landscaping that existed in 1989.  Further, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Dr. DeJean’s laches defense because he offered no explanation as to why the trial justice’s acceptance of plaintiffs’ proffered reasons for delaying litigation were clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. 

The plaintiff appealed from an order granting partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants on three counts of a complaint consisting of twenty-two counts.  The plaintiff argued on appeal that the hearing justice erred in granting partial summary judgment (1) because there remained genuine issues of material fact in dispute; (2) because his ruling that the plaintiff had not proffered competent evidence to support her civil conspiracy claim was erroneous; and (3) because the Doe defendants were improperly dismissed.  The defendants cross-appealed from the entry of partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the hearing justice erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for the entry of partial final judgment because he failed to make an express determination that there was no just reason for delay. 

The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice erred in entering final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), and it therefore vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.  For that reason, the Court did not reach the issues raised in the plaintiff’s appeal. 

The plaintiff, Nancy Robayo, appealed from a Family Court decision granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Luis Robayo, and denying the plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment, her motion to adjudge the defendant in contempt, and her amended motion for relief from judgment.  Following the parties’ final judgment of divorce in 2018, the plaintiff filed several motions contending that, pursuant to the parties’ marital settlement agreement, she was entitled to a 50 percent share of prospective survivor benefits in the defendant’s federal civilian pension.  Although her initial motion sought relief from judgment on the grounds that the parties were mutually mistaken as to the existence of such benefits, she also filed motions arguing that she was entitled to a share of the benefits under the terms of her marital settlement agreement with the defendant.  In response, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, in which he stated there were no facts suggesting evidence of mutual mistake, and he also challenged the plaintiff’s other arguments.  The Family Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motions.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the plain language of the marital settlement agreement entitled her to a share of any survivor benefits in the defendant’s federal civilian pension.  In the alternative, she argued that the terms of the agreement, if ambiguous, should be construed against the defendant and in her favor.  Finally, she contended that the trial justice took judicial notice of the defense counsel’s litigation experience and erred in so doing.

The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, under the terms of the agreement, was not entitled to any survivor benefits in the defendant’s federal civilian pension.  This holding was based on what the Court determined to be the most equitable construction of the agreement.  The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s judicial-notice argument.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Family Court.

The defendant, Mark Chez, appealed from his conviction by a jury in the Providence County Superior Court of one count of carrying a pistol without a license in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-47-8(a).  The defendant contended before this Court that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal and his motion for a new trial.

The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not err when she denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  In view of that conclusion, it was not necessary for the Court to reach the defendant’s Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff appealed from a final order of the Superior Court, granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants.  The plaintiff contended that (1) the hearing justice erred in determining that the doctrine of res judicata applied; (2) the hearing justice erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s 2020 complaint for failure to timely serve defendants; (3) the District Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s equitable claims in the eviction proceedings; and (4) the amount of compensatory damages sought by the plaintiff exceeded the $10,000 statutory maximum for District Court jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not err in finding that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  Regarding the 2020 complaint, the Court concluded that no notice of appeal was filed pertaining to that issue and therefore no arguments relating to it were properly before the Court.  Lastly, the Court determined that the District Court had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s equitable claims and that the statutory maximum set forth in G.L. 1956 § 8-8-3(c) had no bearing on the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this landlord-tenant case.

The plaintiff, Ambrose C. Mendes, Jr. (plaintiff or Mr. Mendes), challenged an order and judgment of the Superior Court that approved two Providence Probate Court accountings and closed the estate of his late father, Ambrose Mendes, Sr., as well as a subsequent order that granted the defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees.  Mr. Mendes argued that the trial justice improperly denied him his right to a jury trial.

The Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff validly settled this matter on the record and affirmed the Superior Court’s order and judgment approving the Providence Probate Court accountings and closing Mr. Mendes’s father’s estate but vacated the trial justice’s post-docketing order awarding the defendant attorneys’ fees.

This appeal arose from a property dispute concerning a private road located in South Kingstown, Rhode Island.  The plaintiffs challenged the denial of their request for injunctive relief and their claims for adverse possession, and argued that the trial justice erred in her application of an injunctive analysis to their trespass claims because they were effectively ousted by the defendants’ obstructions and thus, the plaintiffs argued they sufficiently proved their adverse possession claims.  The Court affirmed the trial justice’s decision because the plaintiffs did not present credible evidence of trespass or obstructions in the private road, and accordingly, the trial justice did not misapply the law, misconstrue evidence, or clearly err.  The Court further held that the trial justice did not err in denying the plaintiffs’ claims for adverse possession. 

The defendant, the Town of North Providence (the town), by and through its Interim Director of Finance, Maria Vallee, appealed from the Superior Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Angelo Riccitelli, a former firefighter employed by the town who retired after sustaining a work-related injury.  Summary judgment turned on the meaning of the term “monthly net pay” within a provision of the collective bargaining agreement between the town and Riccitelli’s former union. 

Before this Court, the town argued that the hearing justice erred in granting summary judgment because: (1) the hearing justice did not consider the town’s proffered extrinsic evidence; (2) Riccitelli’s motion was improperly framed; (3) Riccitelli failed to show the absence of any issue of material fact; and (4) the provision of the collective bargaining agreement at issue was ambiguous.

The Supreme Court concluded that, because Riccitelli never provided the full text of the collective bargaining agreement, which was necessary to any finding that the term “monthly net pay” unambiguously supported his position, he failed to carry his initial burden of showing an absence of issues of material fact.  His motion for summary judgment should have been denied on that basis. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.

In this child-custody dispute between the defendant, James W.A. Jackson, and the plaintiff, Kelly K. Fitzgerald, the defendant appealed an order declaring that the Rhode Island Family Court has jurisdiction over the matter.  The defendant raised numerous issues in support of his appeal; at its root, he disputed the Rhode Island Family Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter and personal jurisdiction over him.

The Supreme Court held that the Rhode Island Family Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case and that the defendant waived the issue of personal jurisdiction by consenting to jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court further held that the hearing justice erred in not ruling on the defendant’s emergency motion for temporary orders.  As to the defendant’s suggestion that future evidentiary hearings should be held via WebEx rather than in person because he resides in Australia, the Supreme Court stated that, where possible, reasonable accommodations should be made for a noncitizen defendant in a global custody dispute.  The Court additionally concluded that the defendant’s remaining arguments were unavailing.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Family Court.

The plaintiff, Steven Serenska, appealed from a Superior Court order granting motions to dismiss filed by the defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and several other defendants in connection with the adequacy of a notice of default on a mortgage.  The operative complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, along with compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys’ fees.  On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the hearing justice erred by misconstruing his argument and by failing to recognize that the mortgage agreement contained an ambiguity.  The Supreme Court concluded that the hearing justice correctly determined that there was no ambiguity and that the notice of default strictly complied with the requirements set forth in the mortgage.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.

The appellant, Julie Longtin, appealed from a September 9, 2022 order of the Superior Court denying her motion based on Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, in which she sought relief from a June 30, 2022 order that denied her proof of claim in a receivership proceeding on the grounds that she lacked standing.  Ms. Longtin contended before this Court that the hearing justice erred in denying her Rule 60(b) motion because (1) the hearing justice overlooked and misconceived the evidence and (2) because the hearing justice “misapplied” the statute at issue (G.L. 1956 § 34 49 3), construing it in a manner that resulted in “an absurd result.” 

The Supreme Court concluded that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion when he denied the appellant’s Rule 60(b) motion.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court denying the Rule 60(b) motion.

The defendants, Mellissa Gosset and Verity Gosset, appealed from a Superior Court decision in favor of the plaintiff, The Bank of New York Mellon f/k/a The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the certificateholders of CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2006 31CB, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006 31CB.  The Superior Court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and for leave to conduct a foreclosure sale on a property encumbered by a mortgage that the defendants signed with their late father and codefendant, Ronald A. Gosset, who died after the plaintiff filed its initial complaint.  All three defendants signed the mortgage, which secured a promissory note that Ronald, but not his daughters, signed in exchange for a loan.  In granting the plaintiff’s motion, the trial justice found that the plaintiff, which was the present holder of the note, presented uncontested evidence that the mortgage was in default because Ronald had failed to make payments on the loan as required by the terms of the note.

The defendants made three arguments on appeal.  First, the defendants argued that the Superior Court decision, which was in the form of a revised judgment and order instead of a final judgment, was appealable.  Second, the defendants alleged that the Superior Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the case against Ronald because no personal representative had been appointed for him after his death.  And third, the defendants contended that the Superior Court erred in finding that Mellissa and Verity were in default on the mortgage.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court decision was appealable under a recognized exception to the final-judgment rule.  The Court rejected, however, the defendants’ remaining arguments and concluded that the plaintiff had indeed presented uncontested evidence that it was entitled to conduct a foreclosure sale on the property.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Laurie Cronan, appealed from a decision pending entry of final judgment entered by the general magistrate of the Family Court.  On appeal, the defendant submitted that the general magistrate was not authorized to preside over the contested divorce trial of her and the plaintiff, John Cronan.  The defendant additionally contended that the general magistrate erred in several respects on the merits of his decision.

The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s arguments as to the general magistrate’s authority to preside over a contested divorce trial were waived.  The Supreme Court also addressed the claims of error as to the merits of the general magistrate’s decision pending entry of final judgment.  The Supreme Court held that the general magistrate did not err in any aspect of the equitable distribution of the marital assets, nor did he abuse his discretion in determining that the plaintiff met his burden of establishing the value of his premarital assets.  Finally, the Supreme Court held that the general magistrate did not err in denying the defendant’s claim for alimony.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court.

In these consolidated cases arising from a head-on automobile collision between Lauren Barnes and Nancy Hodys, Barnes filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a Superior Court order denying her motion to modify the scheduling order and prohibiting her from either replacing a particular expert witness or disclosing any additional witnesses in the fields of toxicology, pharmacology, or other similar specialty.

Before this Court, Barnes argued that the hearing justice abused his discretion because: (1) replacement of the expert would not prejudice Hodys; (2) Barnes had a meritorious explanation for seeking to replace the expert, specifically his medical unavailability; (3) the hearing justice’s brief decision on the motion failed to provide any rationale for the ruling; and (4) preventing Barnes from disclosing a new expert would deprive her of a fair trial.

The Supreme Court concluded that the hearing justice’s decision did not provide sufficient analysis to allow for appellate review.  Accordingly, the Court quashed the order of the Superior Court and remanded with instructions to conduct a meaningful analysis of the issues raised.

The plaintiff, Clara Martins, appealed from a Superior Court decision granting summary judgment in favor of the intervenor, Isabel DaPina Costa. The plaintiff had filed in Superior Court a complaint seeking to amend her son’s death certificate, which, according to the plaintiff, incorrectly named the intervenor as his spouse. The complaint was filed more than ten years after the death certificate was filed. In granting the intervenor’s motion for summary judgment, the hearing justice found that the plaintiff’s claim was barred under the applicable statute of limitations, codified at G.L. 1956 § 9-1-13(a), which states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise specially provided, all civil actions shall be commenced within ten (10) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after.”

On appeal, the plaintiff abandoned the arguments she made in Superior Court regarding the application of § 9-1-13(a) and argued instead that the statute did not apply because her complaint was not a civil action. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff’s argument was not raised in Superior Court and was therefore waived. The Court noted, however, that even if the plaintiff had not waived her argument on appeal, § 9-1-13(a) would have applied to her claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Clint Cox, appealed a Superior Court judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs, Mark Quillen and Dawn Quillen.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the Superior Court’s decision overlooked and misconceived material evidence when assessing whether the plaintiffs breached the Purchase and Sales Agreement for sale of the property located at 114 Montauk Road in Narragansett, Rhode Island.  The defendant contended that the plaintiffs should not have been entitled to specific performance because the trial justice erred in finding that the plaintiffs were at all times “ready, willing, and able” to close on the sale.  After reviewing the record, the Court concluded that the trial justice was not clearly erroneous when she determined that the plaintiffs were “ready, willing, and able” to close on the sale.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Somayina Odiah, appealed from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court.  The defendant was found guilty on one count of indecent solicitation of a child in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-37-8.8, which provided that “[a] person is guilty of indecent solicitation of a child if he or she knowingly solicits another person under eighteen (18) years of age or one whom he or she believes is a person under eighteen (18) years of age for the purpose of engaging in an act of prostitution or in any act in violation of chapter 9, 34, or 37 of this title.”  Among the offenses referenced within the statute concerning the indecent solicitation of a child is G.L. 1956 § 11-37-6, which provided that “[a] person is guilty of third degree sexual assault if he or she is over the age of eighteen (18) years and engaged in sexual penetration with another person over the age of fourteen (14) years and under the age of consent, sixteen (16) years of age.”

The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion to dismiss since the evidence established that the defendant solicited the fictitious complainant to engage in sexual penetration and the fictitious complainant had indicated to the defendant on multiple occasions that she was fourteen years old.  The Court held that a person reaches his or her next year in age at the first moment of the day prior to the anniversary date of his or her birth.  As such, sufficient evidence was presented that the fictitious complainant was “over the age of fourteen (14) years,” and the trial justice properly denied the motion to dismiss. 

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The plaintiff, Jordan Nissensohn, Administrator of the Estate of Michael Nissensohn, appealed from a final judgment of the Superior Court granting the motion for summary judgment of the defendants, University Medical Group (UMG), Alan Epstein, M.D., and Steven Sepe, M.D.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Superior Court erred by finding that: (1) the plaintiff did not engage in protected conduct under the Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (RIWPA), G.L. 1956 chapter 50 of title 28; (2) Dr. Epstein and UMG’s allegedly defamatory statements were substantially true or untimely; (3) the plaintiff’s teaching duties were voluntary; (4) the plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim was preempted by the Payment of Wages Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 14 of title 28; (5) the plaintiff failed to establish his claim for tortious interference with contractual relations; (6) Dr. Epstein’s alleged interference was not causally connected to the plaintiff’s failure to set up a new practice; and (7) the plaintiff did not provide sufficient nonhearsay evidence to support his conversion claim.

The Supreme Court determined that: the plaintiff did not engage in RIWPA-protected conduct because he did not report a violation of the law; the plaintiff’s defamation claims abated upon his death; Dr. Epstein’s promise to pay the plaintiff additional teaching money was not supported by consideration; the plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim based upon UMG’s failure to pay him for patient care was untimely under the Payment of Wages Act; the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support each element of his tortious interference claims; and the plaintiff waived any argument that his conversion claim was supported by nonhearsay evidence.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.  

The appellant challenged an order of the Superior Court dismissing her probate appeal in favor of the appellee. The appellant contended that the hearing justice erred in concluding that her appeal was not timely because the thirtieth day for filing fell on a Saturday, whereas she should have had until the next day that was not a weekend or holiday to file her appeal. After review the Supreme Court vacated the order of the Superior Court because under the clear and unambiguous language of G.L. 1956 § 33-23-1(a)(2), appellant was entitled to thirty days to file her probate appeal and the hearing justice’s decision afforded her only twenty-nine days.

The defendant, Brian Walls (defendant or Mr. Walls), challenged an order of the Superior Court granting a motion for a preliminary injunction in favor of his former employer, the plaintiff, Griggs & Browne Pest Control Co., Inc. (plaintiff).  Mr. Walls argued that the trial justice erred in enforcing a noncompetition agreement between the parties because, he contended, the plaintiff improperly modified the terms of his employment contract, and also sought review of his trial counsel’s representation below.

The Supreme Court determined that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in granting the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and affirmed the order of the Superior Court.

In this eviction action, the plaintiff appealed from a Superior Court order granting her possession of the premises but dismissing her claim for use and occupancy charges and for money damages caused by the defendant during her tenancy.  The plaintiff contended that the trial justice abused his discretion in dismissing her claim for damages, denying her motion to vacate a consent order, and failing to rule on her motion for an extension of time.  The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court because the plaintiff failed to provide transcripts and thus, the Court could not determine if the trial justice abused his discretion.

The defendant, Manuel Ojeda, appealed a Family Court order allowing the plaintiff, Jaimie Dawson, to relocate permanently to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with the minor child born as a result of their relationship.  On appeal, defendant contended the Family Court’s decision overlooked and misconceived material evidence when assessing the relocation.  The Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s decision, which properly considered the factors set forth in Dupré v. Dupré, 857 A.2d 242, 257 (R.I. 2004), and determined that the child’s best interests were served by relocating with his mother, the plaintiff, permanently to Massachusetts.