Supreme Court

The defendant, Daniel Doyle, appealed from a judgment of conviction following jury verdicts of guilty on eighteen counts of financial fraud offenses under the Rhode Island General Laws.  The case arose from the defendant’s long-term tenure as executive director of the Institute for International Sport, a Rhode Island nonprofit corporation that was well-known for hosting the “World Scholar-Athlete Games” during the 1990s and 2000s.  The defendant’s conviction included being found guilty of embezzling hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Institute for International Sport during his tenure as executive director.

The defendant raised eight issues on appeal, and the Supreme Court addressed each of them.  The Court held that none of the issues he raised had merit and that most were not properly preserved for appellate review.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The petitioner, Philip L. Thompson, Jr., petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review a December 4, 2017 final decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court which had the effect of denying him workers’ compensation benefits for his neck injury.  The Supreme Court granted Mr. Thompson’s petition on February 26, 2019 and issued a writ of certiorari.  Mr. Thompson argued before the Court that the Appellate Division erred in affirming the trial judge because the trial judge committed reversible error by: (1) stating that Dr. Thomas Rocco was not qualified to opine on an orthopedic issue due to the fact that he was a board certified general surgeon, not a board certified orthopedic surgeon; and (2) finding Dr. Rocco’s testimony to be inconsistent.

The Supreme Court held that, although the trial judge was in error in stating that Dr. Rocco was not qualified, the Appellate Division clearly considered Dr. Rocco’s testimony and weighed it in the course of reviewing the decision of the trial judge.  The Court further held that legally competent evidence existed to support the determination of the Appellate Division that the trial judge did not err in finding Dr. Rocco’s testimony to be inconsistent.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the final decree of the Appellate Division.

The respondents appealed from a Family Court decree terminating their parental rights to their infant daughter, Rylee A.  The Family Court justice found that DCYF proved by clear and convincing evidence that the respondents were unfit parents by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the child, in that they committed, or allowed to be committed, conduct toward their child of a cruel and abusive nature.  On appeal, the respondents argued that the Family Court justice erred in (1) admitting into evidence a medical report of the child and (2) concluding that DCYF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the respondents were unfit parents.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Family Court justice did not err in admitting the medical report into evidence because it qualified under the medical-diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule.  The Supreme Court also concluded that the Family Court justice did not overlook or misconceive evidence, and that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the Family Court justice’s determination that the respondents were unfit parents and that the termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of the child.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court decree terminating the respondents’ parental rights to their daughter, Rylee.

The plaintiff, Mauro Poletti, appealed from a December 21, 2018 Providence County Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Gonsalves-Pastore Realty, LLC, d/b/a Century 21 (Gonsalves-Pastore), pursuant to a grant of Gonsalves-Pastore’s motion for summary judgment.  On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the hearing justice erred in determining that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Gonsalves-Pastore owed plaintiff a duty based on a fiduciary relationship or as an employer of the person who allegedly committed the wrongful acts.

The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice properly granted summary judgment in favor of Gonsalves-Pastore on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether or not Gonsalves-Pastore owed plaintiff a duty.  Specifically, the Court held that the evidence in the record did not support the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties because there was no agreement for Gonsalves-Pastore to carry out plaintiff’s investment plan, and their relationship did not go beyond an ordinary business relationship.  The Court also held that Gonsalves-Pastore was not liable as an employer because, even assuming that the alleged wrongful actor were an employee, her acts of malfeasance were outside the scope of any such employment.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Joseph Lamontagne, was found guilty by a jury of first-degree robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon.  Before the start of the defendant’s trial, the state filed a motion in limine to prevent the defendant from introducing the prior convictions of the complaining witness.  The trial justice made a preliminary ruling that the defendant could introduce two of these convictions under Rule of Evidence 609.   The trial justice revisited this ruling during the trial and precluded the defendant from introducing the convictions.  Prior to the close of his case, the defendant sought to introduce photographs into evidence which were taken nearly two weeks after the robbery and assault and purported to show bruises he allegedly sustained during the incident that led to his arrest.  The state objected, and the trial justice sustained the state’s objection.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice abused her discretion by denying the admission of the convictions because, according to the defendant, the case hinged on the witness’s credibility and the convictions’ probative value outweighed its’ prejudicial effect.  The defendant further contended that the photographs should have been admitted because whether they supported his claim of self-defense was a matter of the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in excluding evidence of the complaining witness’s two prior convictions.  The Supreme Court also held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in excluding the photographs   Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s judgment of conviction.

In 2012, the defendant City of Providence passed an ordinance suspending the annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) to the pension benefits for retired members of the Providence police and fire departments (the 2012 Pension Ordinance); the suspension would be in place until the then-underfunded pension fund achieved a 70 percent funding level.  The City’s consultants projected that the pension fund could reach a 70 percent funding level in 2036.  Retiree groups and union groups initiated litigation to bar enforcement of the new ordinance.  After engaging in court-ordered mediation, most retirees agreed to a settlement which allowed for a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefit.  Several dozen plaintiffs opted out of the settlement agreement, however, and instead pursued their civil claims through the litigation process.  The opt-out plaintiffs’ claims for violation of the Takings Clause and promissory estoppel were dismissed on the City’s motion for summary judgment.  The plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and violation of the Contract Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions went to trial.  After a lengthy bench trial, the trial justice ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had not proven their claims, and entered judgment in favor of the City on all counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint.
 
The plaintiffs appealed from the final judgment, arguing that the trial justice erred by finding in favor of the City on their Contract Clause claim and by granting summary judgment prior to trial in favor of the City on their claims for violation of the Takings Clause and for promissory estoppel.  The plaintiffs also argued that some of them were absolutely immunized from any changes to their COLAs because of prior judicial adjudications.

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment with respect to each plaintiff who had also been a plaintiff in prior litigation regarding their COLA benefits which had ended with either a consent judgment or an individual settlement agreement, or who had been a plaintiff in Arena v. City of Providence, 919 A.2d 379 (R.I. 2007).  The Supreme Court held that the 2012 Pension Ordinance was unenforceable as to these plaintiffs because it represented a violation of the separation of powers provision in article 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution.

With respect to the remaining plaintiffs’ challenge to the 2012 Pension Ordinance based on their argument that the suspension of their COLA benefit was a violation of the Contract Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions, the Court held that the COLA suspension was not temporary in nature and therefore not reasonable or necessary.  Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a determination of a reasonable length of time for the COLA suspension to remain in effect.
 
In addition, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims under the Takings Clause and for promissory estoppel. 

In 2011, the defendant City of Providence passed an ordinance that would terminate City-paid health care benefits for retirees from the Providence police department and fire department who were eligible for federal Medicare benefits (the 2011 Medicare Ordinance).  A group of retirees and two unions initiated litigation to bar enforcement of the new ordinance.  After engaging in court-ordered mediation, most retirees agreed to a settlement in which the retirees would enroll in Medicare upon achieving the age of eligibility and the City would pay for certain costs associated with Medicare coverage, including penalties incurred from late enrollment in various Medicare supplemental programs such as Parts B and D.  Several dozen retirees opted out of the settlement agreement, however, and instead pursued their civil claims through the litigation process.  The opt-out plaintiffs’ claims for violation of the Takings Clause and for promissory estoppel were dismissed on the City’s motion for summary judgment.  The plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and violation of the Contract Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions went to trial.  After a lengthy bench trial, the trial justice ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had not proved their claims, and entered judgment in favor of the City on all counts of plaintiffs’ complaints.
 
The plaintiffs appealed from the final judgment, arguing that the trial justice erred by dismissing their claim for breach of contract, dismissing their claim for violation of the Contract Clauses of the Rhode Island and United States Constitutions, granting summary judgment in favor of the City on their claim that the 2011 Medicare Ordinance violated the Takings Clauses of the Rhode Island and United States Constitutions, and granting the City’s motion for summary judgment regarding their claim for promissory estoppel.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with respect to the claims for breach of contract, violation of the Takings Clause, and promissory estoppel.  With respect to the plaintiffs’ claim for unconstitutional impairment of contract, the Court concluded that the trial justice erred in two critical findings: (1) that the City did not impair its contractual obligation to plaintiffs covered by CBAs or IAAs, and (2) that the City presented sufficient credible evidence that no more moderate course was available to address the City’s financial condition.  Accordingly, the Court vacated the part of the judgment finding in favor of the City on the plaintiff’s claim for violation of the Contract Clause and remanded to the Superior Court for the trial justice to enter judgment consistent with the “specific provisions pertaining to the Medicare Ordinance” as set forth in the Final and Consent Judgment entered on April 12, 2013.

The plaintiffs, a retired firefighter and two retired police officers, had reached settlements with the City of Providence in 2004, regarding the cost of living adjustments (COLAs) provided for in their respective collective bargaining agreements. The settlements were embodied as consent judgments in the Superior Court. Thereafter, the City enacted an ordinance that suspended the plaintiffs’ COLAs, and the plaintiffs sued to enforce the consent judgments and hold the City in contempt of the same. Both the City and the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for the City and denied summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs appealed.

Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that a consent judgment cannot “be overruled or otherwise modified by city ordinance[.]” Thus, the plaintiffs contended, the hearing justice erred when she found that the ordinance modified the plaintiffs’ rights under the consent judgments and that such finding violated separation of powers principles. The City countered that separation of powers principles would have been violated if the Superior Court had found the City in contempt because, according to the City, courts cannot restrain municipal bodies from exercising their legislative powers. The Supreme Court held that, to the extent that the ordinance
purported to nullify the consent judgments, it violated separation-of-powers principles embodied in the Rhode Island constitution. The Supreme Court therefore held that the hearing justice erred
in granting the City’s cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to these plaintiffs and vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The defendant, Edilsar Alvarado, appealed from a judgment of conviction on two counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault.  The defendant asserted that the trial justice erred (1) in denying his motion to suppress his statements made to the police; (2) in denying his motion for a mistrial, based on a claimed Rule 16 discovery violation; and (3) in denying his Rule 29(b) motion to dismiss the two counts of first-degree child molestation. 

The Supreme Court held that the defendant had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to being interviewed by police.  The Court also held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial, because any prejudice suffered by the defendant was cured by a five-day continuance of the trial.  Finally, the Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant’s Rule 29(b) motion to dismiss because the trial justice properly assessed the complaining witness’s credibility.  Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The plaintiffs, Dionisio Polanco and his wife Alexandra Lozada-Polanco, individually and on behalf of their five minor children, appealed from an April 10, 2018 final judgment of the Providence County Superior Court for the defendants, James J. Lombardi, III, in his capacity as Treasurer of the City of Providence, and Officer Michael Camardo, on all counts in the plaintiffs’ complaint.  The final judgment followed a February 28, 2018 bench decision and an April 10, 2018 order of the Superior Court granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations had run before the plaintiffs filed their complaint.  On appeal, the plaintiffs made the following contentions with respect to the running of the statute of limitations in this case: (1) the discovery rule should be applied when, as the plaintiffs purport occurred in the instant case, “an innocent plaintiff is convicted of a crime because of a police officer’s egregiously negligent failure to record or report exculpatory evidence, and the plaintiff did not know, and could not have known, the existence of that exculpatory evidence;” (2) “[f]rom when Mr. Polanco was convicted through when his conviction was vacated, the Exoneration Rule prevented Plaintiffs-Appellants from bringing this claim, and the statute of limitations on negligence claims arising from his conviction were tolled;” (3) “[b]ecause Officer Camardo made actual misrepresentations that concealed his egregious negligence, G.L. 1956 § 9-1-20 delayed accrual of this claim;” and (4) the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled given the particular facts of this case.

The Supreme Court held that the causes of action at issue accrued when Mr. Polanco was arraigned in his criminal case and that this civil case was therefore filed outside the applicable three-year statute of limitations.  It further held that the statute of limitations was not tolled by: (1) the discovery rule; (2) Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); (3) the exoneration rule; (4) § 9-1-20; or (5) the principles of equitable tolling.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The appellant-mother, Svetoslava Petrova, appealed from a Family Court order denying, without prejudice, her motion to intervene, as well as her motion to vacate or, in the alternative, to revoke guardianship regarding her daughter, Indiana.  On appeal, she argued that her due process rights were violated because she was never served with process for the guardianship petition, that she was therefore never made a party to the Family Court proceedings and, consequently, that the guardianship order was void, ab initio.  She further argued that, because she never gave written consent, the guardianship petition was granted in violation of statutory law.  Specifically, she contended that the Family Court justice erred by construing the applicable statute, G.L. § 40-11-12, to require the consent of only the parent last having custody (in this case, the father, Eric Millan).  In the alternative, Petrova argued that because she was a parent “previously having custody of the child[,]” the guardianship should not have been granted without her consent.  An evidentiary hearing was not conducted.

The Supreme Court held, after careful review, that Petrova’s due process rights were not violated because service of process of a guardianship petition is not statutorily-mandated, and that her consent to the guardianship was not required because consent may be given by one or both parents previously having custody.  As such, the Court held that the hearing justice properly granted the guardianship petition.  Additionally, the Supreme Court set forth a framework for the Family Court’s consideration of a motion for revocation of the guardianship in the event Petrova may elect to file such a motion. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Family Court.

The plaintiff, John Vicente, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Pinto’s Auto & Truck Repair, LLC.  Vicente alleged that Pinto’s did not repair his 2004 Freightliner Columbia properly and filed suit alleging negligence, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.  Vicente filed an expert disclosure naming an individual who had not agreed to serve as the plaintiff’s expert, nor was he qualified to serve as an expert.  The defendant moved to strike the expert disclosure and for summary judgment, alleging that, without an expert, the plaintiff could not establish the standard of care and breach thereof.  The hearing justice found that an expert was required and gave the plaintiff an additional thirty days to file affidavits or deposition transcripts from a new expert to show that there was a genuine issue of material fact.  After plaintiff failed to file the same, the hearing justice granted summary judgment in the defendant’s favor.  The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice properly granted summary judgment because the plaintiff did not bring forth any admissible evidence to show a dispute of material fact.  Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, the City of Cranston, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendants, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Daniel Nuey, and the Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island.  In his decision, the trial justice ordered the City to arbitrate the grievance that the Union had filed on behalf of Nuey, after the trial justice found that Nuey had not retired from his position as a Cranston police officer and thus remained a member of the bargaining unit.  On appeal, the City argued that the Retirement Board retired Nuey as a matter of law as soon as it granted his application for an ordinary disability retirement.  In the City’s view, at that moment, Nuey had retired and was no longer a member of the collective bargaining unit.

The Supreme Court held that the ERSRI Retirement Board did not possess the authority to unilaterally retire a municipal police officer.  Instead, a police officer retires after the Retirement Board determines his eligibility and that officer ceases his employment.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The respondent appealed from a decree terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Adele B., who was born on March 28, 2013.  On appeal, the respondent argued that the Family Court justice erred by failing to recuse herself from the trial after she ordered the filing of the petition to terminate the respondent’s parental rights at issue in the case.  The respondent also argued that the Family Court justice erred in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent was an unfit parent and erred by concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that it was in Adele’s best interests for the respondent’s parental rights to be terminated.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court justice’s denial of the respondent’s motion to recuse, holding that, based on the case’s extensive record, the Family Court justice’s order that DCYF file a TPR petition in the circumstances of the case did not jeopardize her ability to render a fair decision.  The Supreme Court next affirmed the Family Court justice’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent is an unfit parent.  The Supreme Court agreed with the Family Court justice’s findings that the respondent’s ongoing relationship Adele’s father, who the respondent’s case plans strictly prohibited contact with because of his history of domestic violence, made her an unfit parent to Adele.  Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court justice’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that it was in the best interests of Adele for the respondent’s parental rights to be terminated.  The Supreme Court determined that there was legally competent evidence to support the Family Court justice’s findings and that respondent has never demonstrated that she is capable of caring for Adele on her own and has never legally been permitted to do so.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Family Court terminating the respondent’s parental rights with respect to Adele.

This case concerns an appeal by the state from a Superior Court order suppressing the DNA results of a buccal swab taken from the defendant, Malcolm Querido, pursuant to a valid search warrant, while he was incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Institutions.  On appeal, the state argued that the trial justice erred because the state was not required to return to court to seek to hold the defendant in contempt for refusing to comply with a valid search warrant, and that the use of force in executing the search warrant was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
  
The Supreme Court held that the state was not required to return to court to seek a contempt order, and that the defendant had no right to refuse to comply with the search warrant.  The Supreme Court also held that the use of force in seizing a DNA sample from the defendant was reasonable.  As such, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court order and remanded the case to the Superior Court with directions to issue an order denying the motion to suppress.

The plaintiffs, Leslie and Marie B. Dominguez, appealed from the denial of their motion for a new trial following a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, Wilfredo Rosa Otero.  On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial justice’s decision should be reversed because the unrefuted testimony and evidence at trial showed that the defendant was at least partially liable for negligently causing an automobile collision between the vehicles driven by Leslie Dominguez and defendant.  The plaintiffs also contended that the trial justice contradicted his own finding that plaintiffs’ testimonies were more credible when he ultimately affirmed the jury’s verdict.


The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in concluding that, based on the conflicting evidence at trial, reasonable minds could differ as to whether the defendant was liable.  The Court also held that the trial justice conducted the proper analysis for deciding a motion for a new trial.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial justice’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial.

The plaintiff, Timothy Frazier, appealed from a Superior Court judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in holding that the statute of limitations barred his claim for personal injuries that arose from a fall on the property of the defendant’s insured.

The Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant. The Court held that the savings statute, G.L. 1956 § 9-1-22, was applicable to the plaintiff’s claim because the defendant was not a stranger to the original action against its insured. Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.

The applicant, Roger Graham, appealed from a judgment denying his application for postconviction relief.  The applicant asserted that the hearing justice erred in ruling that (1) the testimony of Corey Day was not newly discovered evidence, (2) the trial court did not impermissibly amend the indictment, and (3) a sentence of imprisonment for discharging a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence could be imposed consecutively to a sentence of life without parole.

The Supreme Court first held that the hearing justice was neither clearly wrong nor did he overlook or misconceive the evidence when he determined that the testimony of Corey Day was not newly discovered evidence.  Next, the Supreme Court held that the applicant’s contentions that the trial justice impermissibly amended the indictment and erred in imposing his sentence were barred by res judicata, and were nonetheless meritless.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. 

The plaintiff, Robin Nelson, appealed from the judgment granting summary judgment in favor of her homeowner’s insurance carrier, Allstate Insurance Company, on her claim that Allstate breached its contract with her when it refused to cover the water damage in her basement caused by her defective water heater.  The hearing justice concluded that the plaintiff’s homeowner’s insurance policy did not cover the damage the plaintiff sustained in her basement.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the policy did cover the water damage in her basement because this type of damage was not explicitly excluded by the unambiguous language of the policy.

The Supreme Court held that the language in the plaintiff’s homeowner’s insurance policy was unambiguous and the plain language did not include water damage caused by a malfunctioning appliance as one of the sudden and accidental physical losses that were explicitly covered by the policy.  The Court also held that, even without a specific exclusion, the damage caused by the plaintiff’s malfunctioning water heater was clearly not one of the hazards articulated in the policy language.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Joseph I. Lamontagne, appealed from an order adjudicating him in criminal contempt, contending that his exclamations during his criminal sentencing did not warrant a finding of contempt and that the sentence imposed for contempt violated the constitution.
 
The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion when she found that the defendant’s actions constituted criminal contempt.  However, the Court agreed with the defendant that the sentence imposed for contempt was unconstitutional.  Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the Superior Court for resentencing, or for a trial as to the contempt charge.  

In this case of first impression, the plaintiff, Cesar Woel, appealed from a Superior Court order dismissing his complaint against the defendants, Christiana Trust, as Trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2017-17, and Selene Finance (collectively defendants), and declaring that a foreclosure sale of the plaintiff’s property was valid.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred because the defendants failed to provide him with proper notice of default as required by the terms of the mortgage.

The Supreme Court held that strict compliance with the notice requirements contained in the mortgage was a condition precedent to a valid foreclosure sale.  The Court also held that the defendants failed to strictly comply with the notice requirements contained in the mortgage because the notice failed to inform the plaintiff of the right to reinstate the mortgage after acceleration.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court deemed the foreclosure sale to be void and therefore vacated the order of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Anthony Parrillo, appealed from a judgment of conviction following a jury-waived trial on one count of felony assault and one count of simple assault, in violation of G.L. 1956 §§ 11-5-2 and 11-5-3.  The defendant advanced four arguments on appeal.  First, the defendant argued that he was deprived of his right to trial by a neutral and detached arbiter.  Second, the defendant argued that the trial justice’s finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each count constituted an impermissible pyramiding of inferences.  Third, the defendant argued that he was deprived of his right to fair notice of the crime for which he was convicted and prejudiced by the timing of the introduction of a theory of aiding and abetting by the state.  Finally, the defendant argued that, in accordance with State v. Pepper, 103 R.I. 310, 237 A.2d 330 (1968), if none of the errors standing alone warranted reversal, the cumulative effect of the errors leads to reversible error.

The Supreme Court held that the defendant did not preserve the issue regarding the trial justice’s impartiality because he never questioned the trial justice’s impartiality when it was appropriate to do so at trial.  Next, the Court held that the trial justice did not engage in an impermissible pyramiding of inferences, because the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence presented at trial was consistent with defendant’s guilt.  The Court further held that defendant was not deprived of his right to fair notice of the crime for which he was convicted and that he was not prejudiced by the state’s advancing of an aiding and abetting theory of liability.  The Court reiterated that aiding and abetting is a theory of liability, not a separate offense, and noted that the defendant was given ample opportunity by the trial justice to mitigate any perceived prejudice.  Finally, the Court held that the cumulative effect doctrine was not available in the defendant’s case, because the trial justice’s independent rulings were not erroneous.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The petitioners, ACP Land, LLC and Green Development, Inc. d/b/a Wind Energy Development, LLC, filed a statutory petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari with this Court seeking review of a November 27, 2017 order of the Public Utilities Commission (the PUC).  A writ of certiorari was thereafter issued.  The PUC order at issue, in relevant part, approved the interconnection tax that National Grid (NG) charged petitioners to interconnect to NG’s distribution system and then passed on to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as contributions in aid of construction.  The petitioners asked this Court to declare the PUC order “illegal and unreasonable” for purportedly failing to follow a specific IRS Ruling—IRS Notice 2016-36—and failing to hold NG to its burden of proof.  The petitioners further argued that the PUC order nullified a settlement in the case.

The Supreme Court held that the PUC order was not illegal and unreasonable; it concluded that the PUC did not err in concluding that NG was reasonable in believing that it continued to owe the tax at issue to the IRS and was, as such, reasonable in passing that tax on to the petitioners.  The Court further held that the PUC order at issue comported with a prior settlement in the case.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the PUC order.

The plaintiff, Michael Colpitts, appealed from a November 8, 2018 judgment of the Providence County Superior Court in favor of the defendant, W.B. Mason Co., Inc. (W.B. Mason).  The plaintiff alleged that W.B. Mason had violated the Rhode Island employer drug testing statute, G.L. 1956 § 28-6.5-1(a)(1), when, on March 5, 2018, the company required him to take a drug test, purportedly without reasonable grounds, and ultimately terminated him for his refusal to do so.  On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the issue was whether or not the trial justice erred in “finding that WB Mason Co[.], Inc. had reasonable grounds [pursuant to § 28-6.5-1(a)(1)] to believe, based on specific aspects of [Mr. Colpitts’s] performance and specific documented observations, concerning Michael Colpitts[’s] appearance, behavior and speech, that he might have been under the influence of a controlled substance.”

The Supreme Court held that, based on the testimony elicited at trial, the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in determining that, on the basis of contemporaneous observations of Mr. Colpitts’s appearance, behavior, and speech, W.B. Mason had reasonable grounds on which to believe that Mr. Colpitts was under the influence of a controlled substance and to request that he undergo a drug test.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
                     

The Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee transmitted three reports to the Supreme Court concerning three separate matters pursuant to Rule 7(c)(ii)(p) of the Committee’s Rules of Procedure.  In those reports, the Committee concluded that William Paplauskas, Daniel Balkun, Balkun Title & Closing, Inc., and SouthCoast Title and Escrow, Inc. (collectively Respondents) each had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  The Committee found that the Respondents had engaged in several aspects of residential real estate transactions which, in the Committee’s view, constituted the practice of law.  The Committee recommended that the Court declare the following activities to be the unauthorized practice of law: (1) conducting a residential real estate closing; (2) examining a title for marketability; (3) drafting a deed; (4) drafting a residency affidavit; and (5) drafting a durable power of attorney.

The Supreme Court concluded that a non-attorney may conduct a real estate closing, draft a residency affidavit, and draft a limited durable power of attorney provided that those actions are done in conjunction with the issuance of title insurance for the property being conveyed.  However, the Court held that a title examination must be conducted by an attorney.  It further was of the opinion that the deed must be drafted by an attorney or the draft of the deed must be reviewed by an attorney.

The plaintiffs, Federal Hill Capital, LLC, an investment real estate company, and four college students who were, at the time suit was filed, renting a home from Federal Hill Capital in the Elmhurst neighborhood of the City of Providence, brought an action seeking a declaration that a recently-enacted zoning ordinance restricting the number of unrelated college students who may live together in non-owner-occupied homes in certain areas of Providence was unconstitutional.  The Superior Court determined that the least searching constitutional standard was the appropriate level under which to examine the statute and concluded that the zoning ordinance was constitutional under that standard.  Thus, the Superior Court concluded that the zoning ordinance did not offend the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Rhode Island Constitution.  The Supreme Court agreed and therefore affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiffs, Providence Teachers’ Union Local 958, AFT, AFL-CIO, and Jennifer Leyden, appealed from an order of the Superior Court denying their motion to vacate an arbitration award and granting the motion of the defendant, the City of Providence, to confirm the same award. The union argues that the hearing justice erred in deciding that a teacher was a retired employee once the retirement board determined that she was entitled to an ordinary disability pension.

The Supreme Court held that a teacher is not a retired employee once the retirement board determined that she was entitled to an ordinary disability pension. The Court held that nothing in chapter 16 of title 16 nor chapter 8 of title 36 of the general laws grants the retirement board the authority to retire a teacher or the power to sever the employment relationship between a teacher and the school department. Instead, the Court held that these statutes grant the retirement board the authority to, among other things, determine a covered employee’s eligibility and to pay a pension to the eligible employee. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions to enter an order vacating the arbitrator’s award.

The defendant, Eric Mensah, appealed from a judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court, arguing that the trial justice erred by admitting evidence under Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b) and by denying his motion for a new trial in the child molestation sexual assault of his then-eight-year-old daughter.  The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s objection to the state’s motion in limine to admit the Rule 404(b) evidence was insufficient to preserve his argument for appeal, and, thus, the Court held that issue was waived under its well-established raise-or-waive rule.  Additionally, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial on both weight and sufficiency grounds.  The Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence of penetration to uphold the defendant’s conviction, and, thus, this case was distinguishable from In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774 (R.I. 2016).  Furthermore, although the trial justice disagreed with the jury’s verdict with regard to the weight of the evidence, she properly found that reasonable minds could differ with her conclusion, and, thus, she properly upheld the verdict.

The defendants appealed from an entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.  The defendants argued that the hearing justice erred when he determined that the plaintiffs’ lot had an easement appurtenant to travel across all of the defendants’ properties to access Seaweed Beach because the plaintiffs did not have a “legal means” to access Seaweed Beach.
   
The Supreme Court held that the defendants had demonstrated a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs had a right to cross over any of the defendants’ properties to reach the Seaweed Beach easement.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a proper determination of whether or not the plaintiffs have a right to cross over any of the defendants’ properties to reach the Seaweed Beach easement.    

The plaintiff, Michael Crenshaw, appealed from a January 7, 2019 judgment entered in the Providence County Superior Court in favor of the defendants, the State of Rhode Island and Lieutenant Scott Raynes (State Defendants) and the Community College of Rhode Island, the Council on Postsecondary Education, and Captain Timothy Poulin (CCRI Defendants), pursuant to a grant of both the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and the CCRI Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings based on Rule 12(c). The plaintiff also appealed from a December 21, 2018 order denying his motion to amend his complaint.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred in dismissing his claim under G.L. 1956 § 28-50-3 of the Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (the Act) because, in the plaintiff’s view, the statute does not limit protection to reports of the particular employer relative to which the Act’s protection is sought. The plaintiff also argued that the hearing justice erred in denying his motion to amend his complaint as to the allegations supporting his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis that it was barred by the statute of limitations and, therefore, futile.

The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice correctly determined that the plaintiff failed to state a valid claim under the Act because the activity occurred while Mr. Crenshaw was not employed by the defendants and involved violations of law allegedly committed by a previous employer—an entity that had no nexus with CCRI. The Court also held that the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint as futile because his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment and the order of the Superior Court.