Supreme Court

The defendant, Jason Nickerson, appealed his conviction on four counts of first-degree sexual assault, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-37-2, and one count of felony assault and battery, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-2.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and his motion for a new trial, claiming (1) that the state failed to prove that the defendant was the perpetrator of the alleged crimes, and (2) that the chain of custody of the evidence kit was not sufficiently established by the state and should therefore have been excluded.  The defendant also argued that, in violation of his constitutional rights and Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial justice erred in denying his motion to exclude the testimony of a forensic evidence analyst who testified at trial, and that the trial justice should have granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial on this basis.
   
The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in finding that Rule 16 had not been violated after determining that the state’s failure to produce certain documents was inadvertent and that the defendant suffered no resulting prejudice.  The Court also held that the trial justice correctly concluded that the defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated as a result of the inadvertent nondisclosure.  Finally, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice conducted the correct analyses and did not err in denying both the defendant’s motion for a new trial and the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The plaintiffs, Kenneth and Olivia Ingram, appealed from the entry of summary judgment in the Superior Court in favor of the defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank).  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial justice erred by converting the plaintiffs’ Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.  The plaintiffs also argued that, because of issues related to the validity of the assignment of the mortgage and the note, the Superior Court justice erred by concluding that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

 The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court justice properly converted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings to one for summary judgment.  Based primarily upon this Court’s recent opinions in Bucci v. Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, 68 A.3d 1069 (R.I. 2013) and Mruk v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 82 A.3d 527 (R.I. 2013), the Court also concluded the assignment of the mortgage was valid and that Deutsche Bank had the authority to foreclose on the plaintiffs’ property.

This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to a writ of certiorari filed by the petitioner, the City of Pawtucket, seeking review of a Superior Court judgment affirming a decision of a hearing committee that was convened to adjudicate disciplinary charges against the respondent, Pawtucket police officer Nichalas Laprade, in accordance with the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBOR), found in G.L. 1956 chapter 28.6 of title 42.
  
The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Superior Court was not properly invoked by a letter sent to the Presiding Justice requesting a continuance of the initial LEOBOR hearing date.  In addition, the Supreme Court held that the Presiding Justice exceeded her authority under § 42-28.6-5(b) by requiring the parties to treat the hearing as if it were actually held on an earlier date.  Based on these errors of law which occurred at the beginning of the LEOBOR proceedings, the Supreme Court deemed it unnecessary to reach additional issues raised on appeal.
  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Superior Court and vacated the decision of the hearing committee.  The case was remanded to the Superior Court with directions to further remand the matter to the hearing committee to conduct LEOBOR proceedings regarding the disciplinary charges filed against the respondent de novo. 

In this federal maritime action, Jody King, the plaintiff, raised claims for maintenance and cure; negligence under the federal Jones Act, as codified in 46 U.S.C. § 30104; and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness.  On June 1, 2011, following a trial in Washington County Superior Court, in which the plaintiff prevailed on his claim for maintenance and cure, but not on his claims for negligence and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness, the trial justice denied the motion for a new trial filed by the defendant, Huntress, Inc., with respect to the claim for maintenance and cure and granted the motion for a new trial filed by the plaintiff with respect to the claims for negligence and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness.  The defendant appealed that decision, contending that the trial justice erred in: (1) denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the claim of maintenance and cure because the trial justice, of his own accord, gave what the defendant considered to be an improper jury instruction with respect to “unearned wages;” (2) granting the plaintiff a new trial on the issues of negligence and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness because the trial justice (in the defendant’s view) “overlooked” and “misconstrued” testimony, resulting in a decision which was “clearly wrong;” and (3) applying Rhode Island’s prejudgment interest statute, as codified in G.L. 1956 § 9-21-10, as opposed to the principles of general federal maritime law pertaining to prejudgment interest.

The Court held: (1) that the trial justice’s unearned wages jury instruction, which was part of his instructions to the jury with respect to the plaintiff’s claim for maintenance and cure, was erroneous and resulted in prejudice to the defendant; (2) that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived material evidence in the course of granting the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on his claims for negligence under the Jones Act and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness; and (3) that the trial justice erred in applying Rhode Island’s prejudgment interest statute, rather than following federal maritime law and submitting the issue of prejudgment interest to the jury.  Accordingly, the Court remanded the case with instructions that a new trial be conducted solely with respect to the plaintiff’s claim for maintenance and cure.

The plaintiffs, Butterfly Realty and Dairyland, Inc. (collectively the plaintiffs), claimed a prescriptive easement over a commercial parking lot owned by the defendant, James Romanella & Sons, Inc.  In a prior decision, Butterfly Realty v. James Romanella & Sons, Inc., 45 A.3d 584 (R.I. 2012), the Supreme Court vacated a Superior Court judgment denying the plaintiffs’ claim and remanded the matter for further proceedings.  Upon remand, a Superior Court trial justice again found that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of clearly and convincingly proving all of the requisite elements for a prescriptive easement.  The plaintiffs appealed.
  
After carefully parsing the record, the Supreme Court upheld the trial justice’s determination that the plaintiffs had failed to show by strict proof that their use of the parking lot was hostile to the defendant.  The Court concluded that the record supported the trial justice’s reasonable inference that the plaintiffs’ use of the parking lot was permissive.  The Court additionally rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the trial justice had exceeded the scope of remand.  Thus, the Court affirmed the judgment.

The defendant, DiGregorio, Inc. (DiGregorio), appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Process Engineers & Constructors, Inc. (Process), granting the plaintiff’s claim for quantum meruit after a nonjury trial.  DiGregorio argued that the trial justice erred in finding that Process conferred a benefit on DiGregorio and that the trial justice erred in awarding Process’s back charges that were not proven to be fair and reasonable or due and owing.

The Supreme Court held that, for its quantum meruit claim, Process was required to prove only that it was not at fault for the loss; it did not need to prove who was at fault.  The Court was satisfied that competent evidence supported the trial justice’s finding that Process “was able to show that the additional costs in replacing the damaged pipe were not attributed to [p]laintiff’s own inefficiencies or job preparation.”  Additionally, the Court concluded that Process submitted evidence of the value of the services and DiGregorio put forth no evidence that Process’s charges were unreasonable.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court judgment.

The defendant, Antonio O. Whitfield, appealed from convictions of assault with a dangerous weapon (two counts) and simple assault (one count).  On appeal, the defendant argued that (1) the trial justice abused his discretion by allowing the state to impeach his credibility with fourteen prior criminal convictions and (2) the trial justice erred by denying defense counsel’s motion to pass the case after the prosecutor allegedly vouched for the credibility of two witnesses during his closing argument.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by allowing the state to impeach the defendant’s credibility with his prior criminal convictions.  Additionally, the Court held that, although a portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by refusing to pass the case.

In this putative class action, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), G.L. 1956 chapter 13.1 of title 6, and that the defendants were negligent by improperly collecting sales taxes on certain services purchased in conjunction with the sales of its computer products.  A justice of the Superior Court granted summary judgment on both counts in favor of the defendants.  On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants had a duty to properly calculate and collect sales tax and that the defendants’ collection of sales tax on service contracts constituted an unfair and deceptive trade practice under the DTPA.  Furthermore, they contend that the trial justice improperly concluded that Nicholas Long’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot.  In a separate appeal, consolidated for purposes of this opinion, the intervenor tax administrator argues that the Superior Court improperly struck his affirmative defenses.

 The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court justice’s rulings on the negligence count and the declaratory and injunctive relief claims.  The Court also affirmed the Superior Court justice’s order striking the tax administrator’s affirmative defenses.  However, the Court vacated the Superior Court justice’s ruling on the DTPA count and remanded the case to the Superior Court.

In these consolidated appeals, the respondent parents, Kathleen D. and Ronald D., appealed from a Family Court decree terminating their parental rights to their two children, Steven D. and Zachary D., for a second time.  On appeal to the Supreme Court, Ronald argued that the Family Court justice erred by finding that (1) he was an unfit parent; (2) that DCYF made reasonable efforts at reunification; and (3) that the termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children.  In addition, Kathleen argued that DCYF’s failure to provide interaction between her and the children’s foster parents should result in the Family Court decree being vacated.
     
The Supreme Court held that, although clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of Ronald’s parental rights in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(3)—that the children were unlikely to return to the parents’ care within a reasonable period of time—the Family Court justice did not err in finding that Ronald was an unfit parent in accordance with § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii)—for reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the child, including chronic substance abuse.  The Supreme Court also held that the Family Court justice did not err in finding that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify Ronald with the boys, or that the termination of Ronald’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.  As to the argument raised by Kathleen, the Supreme Court held that, because the reasonable efforts that DCYF must make are aimed at reunification, the department is not required to provide interaction between a biological parent and a foster parent.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court decree terminating the respondents’ parental rights.

The defendant, Darnell Hie, appealed from a November 17, 2011 judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of two counts of second-degree child molestation sexual assault pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 11-37-8.3.  On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred in refusing to declare a mistrial and in denying his motion for a new trial.

The Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial because any prejudice which may have resulted from the incident at issue was cured by the trial justice’s instructions to the jury.  The Court further held that the trial justice properly carried out his analysis of the defendant’s motion for a new trial and did not misconceive or overlook material evidence or otherwise commit clear error.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction and denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

The applicant, Roger T. Lamoureux, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court denying his application for postconviction relief pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1.  On appeal, the applicant contended that he was entitled to postconviction relief on the basis of what he perceived to be errors on the part of the trial justice and ineffective assistance of counsel.  The applicant further contended that the hearing justice committed clear error or abused his discretion in denying the application because the applicant was not given a proper evidentiary hearing at which he might submit evidence in support of his claims.
  
The Supreme Court held that the applicant’s claims relating to alleged errors committed by the trial justice were clearly barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  With respect to the applicant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective, the Court held that the applicant had not made the requisite showing that his trial attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as required by the first prong of the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  The Court also noted that, after the hearing justice granted the motion to withdraw filed by applicant’s attorney, the applicant was afforded two hearings at which he could have presented evidence in support of his postconviction relief claims, yet he failed to do so.
 
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Ernest Barone, appealed pro se from the Superior Court’s granting of a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, the State of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island Division of Taxation, which motion alleged that the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  In the Superior Court, the plaintiff had filed a complaint seeking declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief, in addition to reimbursement of sales taxes imposed and collected by the defendants on the plaintiff’s motor vehicle property taxes.  The Superior Court ruled: (1) that the District Court had exclusive jurisdiction over tax matters and related equitable and constitutional claims; and (2) that, because the gravamen of the instant case was a tax dispute, the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff’s claims.  On appeal, the plaintiff posited that the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction and that the remedy at law available to him was inadequate.
  
In rendering its decision, the Court considered the statutory provisions set forth in G.L. 1956 §§ 44-19-18; 44-19-25, G.L. 1956 §§ 8-8-3; 8-8-24 and the case of Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association of America v. State, 541 A.2d 69 (R.I. 1988).  The Court held that its prior holding in Owner-Operators that the District Court has exclusive jurisdiction over tax matters and the power to decide all related claims was wholly dispositive of the case.  The Court found no merit in the plaintiff’s contention that his remedy at law was inadequate.
  
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Quest Diagnostics, LLC, appealed from the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Pinnacle Consortium of Higher Education, a Vermont Reciprocal Risk Retention Group, and Genesis Insurance Company, in this insurance coverage dispute.  Quest argued that: (1) it was covered as an insured under the Pinnacle general liability policy; (2) it was covered under the professional liability coverage section of the Pinnacle policy; (3) it was covered under the Genesis excess policy; and (4) both Pinnacle and Genesis breached their duties to defend and waived their rights to deny coverage because they did not respond to the plaintiff’s demand for defense in a reasonably timely manner.
 
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding that the clear and unambiguous language of the Pinnacle policy extended coverage to additional insureds “but only to the extent the Named Insured has agreed to do so.”  The named insured, Brown University, had entered into a Professional Services Agreement with Quest, under which Quest would perform clinical laboratory testing at the Brown University health center.  The Professional Services Agreement required both parties to procure four types of insurance coverage: workers’ compensation insurance, general liability insurance, “All Risk” property insurance, and professional liability insurance.  Notably, the agreement obligated both to name the other party as an additional insured under their general liability policies; there was no requirement that they do so for any of the other types of insurance.  Because the Professional Services Agreement was the source of the agreement to extend general liability coverage to Quest as an additional insured, the Supreme Court held that there was no agreement that Brown would provide professional liability coverage to Quest.
  
The Supreme Court held that the language of the Professional Services Agreement and the Pinnacle policy was clear and unambiguous—although Quest was an additional insured under the general liability coverage, it was not an insured under the professional liability coverage.  Because the claims against Quest alleged professional negligence, they fell within the purview of professional liability insurance.  Accordingly, neither Pinnacle nor Genesis had a duty to defend or indemnify Quest in this action.

The plaintiffs, Kimberly S. Phelps and Thomas Phelps, individually and as co-administrators of the Estate of Ashley R. Phelps, brought suit against the defendants Leo R. Pelletier and Susan Pelletier, claiming that the defendants negligently allowed a guest at their son’s graduation party to operate an all-terrain vehicle in a reckless manner, resulting in the death of the plaintiffs’ daughter, Ashley.  The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted by a Superior Court justice, who determined that the defendants owed no duty to Ashley under principles of premises liability.  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that summary judgment was granted in error because a duty should have been recognized and imposed upon the defendants.
    
The Supreme Court held that, based on the facts presented in this case, the landowners owed no duty and therefore could not be held liable as a matter of law for injuries occurring to an individual outside of their property.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The applicant, Javier Merida, appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court denying his application for postconviction relief.  Merida was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation and one count of second-degree child molestation.  On appeal, he contended that he was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution.
 
After careful review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Merida’s application.  The Court held that trial counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient for any of the reasons raised by Merida.

In this wrongful death action, the plaintiffs, Maureen O’Connell and Paul Roberti, in their capacities as co-administrators of the Estate of Brendan M. O’Connell Roberti, appealed from a Superior Court order granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant, William Walmsley, following a jury trial in which Walmsley was found to be negligent.  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial justice erred in granting the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law because sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the jury’s finding that the defendant was negligent.
 
The Supreme Court held that the trial justice erred by granting the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law after the jury returned its verdict.  The Court concluded that sufficient evidence was presented at trial establishing the defendant’s intoxication, speed, and an inference of diminished reaction time from which the jury could infer negligence and conclude that the defendant’s failure to react was a contributing factor in the car collision which caused Brendan Roberti’s death.  Accordingly, the Court vacated that portion of the Superior Court order granting the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.

The state appealed from an order of the Superior Court granting the defendant’s motion to suppress virtually all of the evidence obtained by the Cranston Police Department during its investigation into the death of his girlfriend’s six-year-old son, Marco Nieves.  The Cranston police were dispatched to a Cranston apartment to investigate the sudden illness of the young child, during which time they discovered incriminating text messages on the cell phone of the defendant’s girlfriend implicating the defendant with respect to the boy’s injuries.  After the boy succumbed to his injuries and died, the defendant, Michael Patino, was charged with a single count of first-degree murder.  Prior to trial, the hearing justice suppressed the text messages, finding that the defendant had standing to challenge the search and that the search was in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.  The hearing justice also found that the defendant had made a preliminary showing that affidavits in support of several of the warrants obtained during the course of the investigation contained statements that were knowingly false or made with reckless disregard for the truth.  On appeal, the state argued that the defendant did not have standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages.

 The Supreme Court held that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages contained on his girlfriend’s phone and thus did not have standing to challenge the search and seizure.  The Supreme Court also held that the defendant did not have standing to challenge several of the at-issue warrants in the case.  The Supreme Court also held, however, that the defendant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in two of his own cell phones seized during the investigation and, further, that the state did not challenge the suppression of those phones.

 Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court order with respect to all of the phones and evidence that the defendant did not have proper standing to challenge; affirmed the order suppressing the defendant’s personal cell phones; and determined that the defendant did not have standing to raise several Franks challenges and that the challenges to which he did have proper standing were moot.

American Steel Coatings, LLC (American Steel) appealed from a December 7, 2011 order in which a justice of the Providence County Superior Court voided as usurious a “Loan Agreement, Promissory Note, and Mortgage” granted to American Steel by New England Development R.I., LLC and its owner, Lawrence C. LaBonte.  American Steel contended on appeal that the hearing justice erred when he determined that the “commercial loan commitment fee” contained in the loan agreement between the parties was to be considered interest because it did not fall within the parameters of G.L. 1956 § 6-26-2(c)(1) (which details fees that are not considered to be interest); American Steel further contended that the hearing justice also erred when he concluded that the loan agreement was not rendered non-usurious by the presence of a usury “savings clause.”

The Supreme Court held that under § 6-26-2(c)(1)(iv) a “[c]ommercial loan commitment * * * fee[]” is defined as a fee “to assure the availability of a specified amount of credit for a specified period of time;” the Court further held that the fee in the instant case did not fall within that definition.  As such, the Court concluded that the fee at issue was part of the interest being charged, rendering the loan agreement void as usurious.  The Court also reiterated its holding in NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital, LLC, 84 A.3d 800, 810 (R.I. 2014), that “usury savings clauses” are unenforceable.
 
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.

The applicant, Carlton Vose, filed a petition in opposition to the recommendation of the Supreme Court’s Committee on Character and Fitness that he be denied admission to the Rhode Island bar.  Specifically, the applicant asserted that the committee violated his due process rights and failed to support its conclusions with sufficient and proper evidence.
 
The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the committee.  The Court held that the committee’s findings regarding the applicant’s character were well-founded and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.  The Court noted that the hearing transcripts and the applicant’s written submissions revealed the applicant’s hostile attitude and lack of candor.  Further, the Court held that the committee had not impinged on the applicant’s due process rights because the applicant was provided with notice and multiple hearings during which he had the opportunity to present evidence to prove his good character.  Pursuant to Article II, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules of Admission of Attorneys and Others to Practice Law, the burden remained on the applicant throughout the proceedings to prove his good character by clear and convincing evidence.  Finally, the Court held that the committee was within its discretion to consider the findings of another state’s board of bar examiners in determining whether the applicant possessed the requisite character and fitness to be admitted to the bar in Rhode Island. 

The plaintiff Gregory Coogan (Coogan or plaintiff) appealed from a grant of summary judgment by the Superior Court in favor of the defendants, Cheryl Nelson and Mark Nelson, in this case arising out of a dog bite that occurred on the defendants’ property.  The plaintiff was bitten by the defendants’ dog when he was delivering a package to the defendants’ home in West Greenwich, Rhode Island.  The Superior Court held that the plaintiff had been bitten within the enclosure of the defendants’ property and that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants knew of the dog’s vicious propensities.
  
The Supreme Court concluded that a question of material fact remained as to whether the driveway of the defendants’ unfenced yard should be considered within the defendants’ enclosure for purposes of G.L. 1956 § 4-13-16, which provides that dog owners will be held strictly liable for any dog bites occurring while the dog was outside of the dog owner’s enclosure.  The Court also held that an incident report about the defendants’ dog having previously caused a deep scratch to the nose of the defendants’ son was enough evidence to raise a question of material fact as to the defendants’ knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensities.  The Court clarified that, for the purposes of the so-called “one-bite rule,” which states that, in order for a dog owner to be held liable for a dog bite occurring within the owner’s enclosure, the dog owner must have notice that the dog had vicious propensities, such notice may be based on the dog causing some “other injury” besides a bite.
  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction after a Superior Court jury found him guilty of one count of carrying a firearm in a motor vehicle without a license in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-47-8(a).  On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived material evidence and was otherwise clearly wrong in denying his motion for a new trial because, in his view, there was no evidence that he was aware that his codefendant was in possession of a gun until the gun was fired.

 The Supreme Court held that there was nothing in the record that could lead to the conclusion that the trial justice was clearly wrong or that he overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. 

The defendant, Brian Cavanaugh, appealed from an order of the Chief Judge of the Family Court affirming an order by a magistrate of the Family Court restraining and enjoining him from contacting his former wife, Rosanna Cavanaugh (the plaintiff).  On appeal, the defendant contended that the magistrate erred when she issued a civil restraining order because any remedy that might be afforded to a plaintiff under the pertinent statute requires, as a prerequisite, a finding of “domestic abuse;” and it was the defendant’s representation that the magistrate made an explicit finding on the record that the case did not involve domestic abuse.  It was the defendant’s further contention that, if the Court determined that the magistrate made “a positive finding of domestic abuse, such a finding was unfounded and unsupported” by anything in the record.

The Supreme Court held that, under the relevant statutory definitions, the defendant’s conduct constituted “domestic abuse.” The Supreme Court further held that the Chief Judge properly affirmed the magistrate’s order because it was within the magistrate’s authority to issue a civil restraining order after determining that, based on the evidence before her, such an order was necessary to protect the plaintiff from the defendant’s harassment.
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Family Court.

The defendants, Robert C. Lamoureux and Four Twenty Corporation (collectively, defendants), appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court granting a mandatory injunction in favor of the plaintiff, Rose Nulman Park Foundation (Foundation).  The Foundation owned property in Narragansett, Rhode Island, which was designated as Rose Nulman Park and was to be kept undeveloped and open to the public for recreational purposes.  The defendants, who owned a lot abutting onto the Foundation’s property, erroneously constructed a home entirely on the Foundation’s property rather than on their own lot.  The plaintiff filed the underlying complaint seeking a mandatory injunction to remove the home from its property.  The Superior Court granted the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.
  
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice had correctly stated and applied the applicable law in reaching his conclusion to grant injunctive relief.  The Court also agreed with the trial justice that, while he did not have to balance the equities, he did so properly when he found that the harm to the plaintiff and the public outweighed the hardships to which the defendants would be subject, in having to remove the house from the plaintiff’s property.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

This appeal resulted from an interpleader action brought by the Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association against multiple defendants for the purpose of determining the proper disposition of insurance proceeds, which were disbursed pursuant to an insurance policy covering mortgaged real property that was damaged by fire.  The former homeowner and borrower, Genoveva Santana-Sosa, appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the loan servicer, Bank of America, N.A.
  
 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.  While Santana-Sosa alleged that the lender improperly conducted foreclosure proceedings against the insured property, the Supreme Court held that the propriety of the foreclosure was not at issue in this interpleader action.  The Supreme Court further held that Santana-Sosa was not entitled to the insurance proceeds pursuant to the terms of the mortgage, because she had agreed to maintain fire insurance on the property with the lender named as a loss payee, the lender had exercised its statutory power of sale, and the amount of the insurance proceeds was less than the amount unpaid under the note. 

The defendant, Roger Watkins, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction, having been found guilty by a jury of six counts of first-degree sexual assault and four counts of second-degree sexual assault, for which he was sentenced to fifty years, with twenty-five years to serve and twenty-five years suspended, with probation.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in admitting evidence concerning prior acts of misconduct committed by the defendant against the complainant, allowing an examining physician to testify to statements made by the complainant during the course of her treatment, and denying his motion for a new trial.

 The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s prior acts of misconduct were properly admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence and were not unfairly prejudicial to the defendant.  The Supreme Court further held that, although there was not a sufficient foundation to admit the doctor’s testimony, the error was harmless in light of the large amount of inculpatory evidence properly admitted at trial.  Finally, the Court held that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive evidence in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

The defendant, Anibal Acevedo, appealed from a judgment of conviction of two counts of first-degree child molestation and three counts of second-degree child molestation.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred when she allowed the state to question the complaining witness on redirect examination about uncharged incidents of misconduct.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion.  The defendant had cross-examined the complaining witness about her statement to police, in which she said that the abuse had occurred “every other day.”  The trial justice allowed the state to attempt to rehabilitate the witness and correct the impression that the cross-examination may have left on the jury.  The trial justice considered the redirect examination with the attorneys and prevented the state from getting into the specifics of the uncharged incidents.  The misimpression that may have been left on the jury, plus the narrow scope of the testimony, led the Supreme Court to conclude that the trial justice had properly exercised her discretion in admitting the evidence.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The plaintiff Thomas H. McGovern, III appealed from the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Bank of America, N.A., BAC Home Loans, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and Celtic Roman Group, LLC.  The plaintiff had filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking to declare invalid a foreclosure sale conducted by Bank of America.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that summary judgment was improvidently granted because (1) the trial justice improperly placed the burden on him to prove that the loan was not in default; (2) the foreclosure sale was not lawfully noticed; and (3) there existed a genuine issue of material fact concerning the identity of the note-holder.

 After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court upheld the grant of summary judgment.  The Court concluded that the trial justice had articulated and applied the proper standard for analyzing a motion for summary judgment.  The Court additionally agreed with the trial justice’s conclusion that the foreclosure sale was lawfully noticed.  Lastly, the Court held that the plaintiff had failed to come forward with competent evidence to establish that there was a genuine issue of fact concerning the identity of the note-holder at the time of the sale.
  
 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court judgment. 

After a dispute arose between the plaintiff, a general contractor, and the defendant, a subcontractor, both parties submitted claims for damages to an arbitrator.  The plaintiff objected to the defendant’s claims, relying on the defendant’s previous execution of a waiver and release.  The arbitrator disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that the release barred the defendant’s claims.  Accordingly, the arbitrator proceeded to award the defendant damages.  The plaintiff sought to have the award vacated pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10-3-12.  A Superior Court trial justice granted the plaintiff’s motion to vacate, and the defendant appealed.

 On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice should have allowed the arbitrator’s award to stand.  In so holding, the Court emphasized that an arbitrator’s error of law or misconstruction of a contract does not suffice to vacate an award.  After reviewing the arbitrator’s decision, the Court specifically rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded relevant caselaw and the language of the release.  Thus, the Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Janet Coit, named in her official capacity as director of the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM), appealed from an order of the Superior Court in favor of the defendants, John, Alfred, and Anna Tillinghast, adopting the report of a master and ordering that the master’s findings be implemented.  The dispute arose from the operation of the Bowdish Lake Camping Area in Glocester and Burrillville and, more specifically, from the establishment in the early 1970s of five campsites located in Burrillville near Wilbur Pond.  To assist in resolving the contentious relationship between the parties, a justice of the Superior Court appointed a master to resolve the remaining issues stemming from a consent agreement signed by the parties in 1998.  Addressing the first dispute in the consent agreement, the trial justice ordered the master to prepare a report relating to the five campsites and make recommendations to the court, setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law, if required.  The court also ordered the master to submit an application to DEM to alter the wetlands around the campsites, which, after a review, DEM denied because the master had not fully explored alternative locations to the existing campsites.  The trial justice ultimately entered an order adopting the master’s report and directing that it be implemented.  DEM appealed.  At a pre-briefing conference, a single justice of the Supreme Court directed the parties to file supplemental memoranda addressing the issue of whether the trial justice’s order was interlocutory and therefore not appealable.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice’s order was interlocutory because it did not possess sufficient elements of finality to be properly before the Court.  Moreover, the order did not meet either statutory or decisional exceptions to make review proper at this time.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court denied and dismissed DEM’s appeal.

The juvenile respondent appealed from a judgment entered by the Family Court finding him delinquent for having committed assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-2.  On appeal, the respondent contended that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence and was otherwise clearly wrong in finding that the state had disproved his defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
 
 The Supreme Court held that there was nothing in the record that would lead to the conclusion that the trial justice was clearly wrong or that he overlooked or misconceived material evidence in rejecting the respondent’s defense of self-defense and his adjudication of the respondent as delinquent.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Family Court. 

The defendant, David R. Bober, appealed from a Family Court decision pending entry of final judgment in this divorce action on the grounds that: (1) the trial justice overlooked or misconceived the medical evidence relating to the plaintiff’s medical condition; (2) the trial justice erred by awarding alimony to the plaintiff that could “turn into ‘lifetime’ alimony”; (3) the trial justice overlooked or misconceived evidence in arriving at the property distribution award; and (4) the trial justice erred by retroactively applying a modification of child support in violation of G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.2.  The plaintiff, Gail M. Bober, cross-appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred by failing to award her: (1) attorney’s fees; (2) a sixty-percent share of the equity in a house that the defendant’s mother transferred to the defendant and his sister; and (3) lifelong medical coverage.  Further, she contended that the trial justice’s “sua sponte amended alimony award” was inequitable to her and contrary to previous holdings of this Court.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision pending entry of final judgment in all respects save one; the Court held that the trial justice’s amendment of the alimony award, in which he determined that Mrs. Bober would receive fifty percent of Mr. Bober’s pension upon the date he chose to retire, rather than upon his eligibility to retire, was inequitable.  The Court stated that a pension is akin to a forced savings account and, thus, pension benefits are marital property subject to equitable distribution.   The Court noted that, particularly in cases where a high degree of hostility is present, one spouse should not be allowed to deprive the other of his or her interest in a marital asset by invoking a condition wholly within his or her control—viz., the retirement date.

 The Supreme Court, mindful of the animosity present in this long and contentious divorce, directed the Family Court to enter an order directing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff one-half the value of his pension benefits at such time as he becomes eligible to receive his maximum pension benefits; such payments are to be made monthly; the defendant’s obligation to pay alimony will cease at that time.  Upon the defendant’s retirement, the plaintiff shall receive one-half of the defendant’s pension benefits pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order.

The defendants and counterclaimants, Stonebridge Equipment Leasing, LLC, New England Radiology & Lab Services, P.C., Muhammad M. Itani, and Bishar I. Hashem, appealed from a final judgment entered after summary judgment was granted for the plaintiffs, Siemens Financial Services, Inc. and Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc.  The defendants leased medical equipment from the plaintiffs but defaulted on those leases.  The defendants argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because of four factual disputes relating to their defenses and counterclaims, all of which were based on misrepresentations that allegedly induced the defendants into entering the leases.

The Supreme Court affirmed; none of the purported factual disputes prevented the proper granting of summary judgment.  First, the Court observed that some of the ostensible factual issues did not even relate to the misrepresentations alleged to have been made by the plaintiffs, but instead related to the plaintiffs’ purported failure to deliver contracted-for services, allegations that were not made in the defendants’ answers or counterclaims.  The Court also held that the defendants had failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding the accuracy of any alleged misrepresentations.  The Court additionally rejected the defendants’ contention that forecasts formed the basis of their misrepresentation defenses and counterclaims, as such estimates cannot underlie misrepresentation claims.  Moreover, the Court determined that the defendants had not shown a factual dispute about whether they had relied on the forecasts.  Finally, the Court held that the defendants’ counterclaim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, which was coterminous with the other counterclaims, suffered the same fate as those claims.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

In this interpleader action filed by Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association (RIJRA), Stanley Gurnick and Phoenix-Gurnick, RIGP (collectively, the Gurnicks) appealed from a grant of summary judgment by the Superior Court in favor of Navigant Credit Union (Navigant), deciding that Navigant was entitled to insurance funds under an insurance policy on a parcel of property in North Providence, Rhode Island.  The Gurnicks possessed the first mortgage on the property while Navigant had a second mortgage on the property.  The Navigant mortgage required the mortgagor to insure the mortgaged property against loss or damage and name Navigant as the loss payee under the policy, which the mortgagor duly did, obtaining insurance from RIJRA.  After the property sustained water damage that was insured by the RIJRA policy, RIJRA filed the instant interpleader action to determine who was entitled to the proceeds.

The Supreme Court held that an insurance policy is a contract between the insured and the insurer and does not run with the property insured.  The Court further concluded that, because the Gurnicks had not required the mortgagor to insure the property, the Gurnicks were not entitled to an equitable lien on the insurance proceeds.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. 

The defendant, Dr. Stuart Gitlow, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a Superior Court order denying his motion for summary judgment.  The Court granted the petition, directing the parties to address whether a physician who was hired by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to conduct an independent medical records review owed a duty of care to the subject of the review.  The FAA engaged the defendant to review the medical records of the plaintiff, Michael Woodruff, and to make a recommendation about the plaintiff’s fitness to have his medical certificate reinstated after he had voluntarily surrendered it.  Doctor Gitlow conducted his review and concluded that Woodruff fell within the FAA’s regulatory definition for substance dependence.  The FAA subsequently denied the plaintiff’s application for reinstatement, and Woodruff filed suit in Superior Court, alleging that Dr. Gitlow had been negligent.  In denying Dr. Gitlow’s motion for summary judgment, the trial justice concluded that the existence of a physician-patient relationship presented a material issue of fact and that the Restatement (Second) Torts § 552 (1977), entitled “Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others,” indicated that a duty could arise in this situation.

 The Supreme Court first held that there was no material issue of fact regarding any physician-patient relationship because the undisputed facts indicated that the parties had not established such a relationship.  Next, the Court held that the trial justice’s reliance on § 552 of the restatement was misplaced because Woodruff was not the intended beneficiary of the report and did not rely upon it to his detriment.  Finally, applying the factors outlined in Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987), the Court held that, in this case, Dr. Gitlow did not owe Woodruff a duty of reasonable care.

 Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case with its decision endorsed thereon.

The applicant, Amadeu Santos, appealed from the denial of his application for postconviction relief.  Santos’s application was filed approximately fourteen years after he pled nolo contendere to three counts of second-degree sexual assault.  Santos alleged in his application that the plea colloquy was insufficient pursuant to Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The hearing justice denied Santos’s application pursuant to the doctrine of laches.

 The Supreme Court affirmed the hearing justice’s denial of Santos’s application for postconviction relief.  The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion and was not clearly wrong in finding that the fourteen-year delay was unreasonable.   The Supreme Court noted that, in the fourteen years between Santos’s plea and the filing of his application, he had repeated contact with the judicial system in the form of fulfilling his obligations to register as a sex offender, appearing before the court in relation to his probation requirements, and making two motions for permission to travel, for which he had retained private counsel.

The plaintiff, Antonio P. Rosano, appealed from a final judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his complaint against the defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., EquiFirst Corporation, and Sutton Funding LLC c/o HomEq Servicing, under Rule 12(b)(6) and (7) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he stated a claim upon which relief could be granted and that he had joined all necessary parties.  The plaintiff did not name in his complaint the current title holder of the contested property, Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company.  In affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, the Supreme Court noted that it need only affirm on one of the two grounds raised to dispose of the appeal.  The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief was brought specifically under the provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 30 of title 9, and that § 9-30-11 requires that all persons who have or claim any interest must be joined.  Additionally, the Supreme Court held that Rule 19(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure is abundantly clear in requiring that a person subject to service of process shall be joined if complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or if the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action.  Because the plaintiff failed to join the current title holder of the contested property, Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, the Supreme Court held that the hearing justice’s dismissal of the action on Rule 12(b)(7) grounds was entirely appropriate.

The defendant, Pedro Marte, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction for possession with intent to deliver cocaine.  The defendant argued that the trial justice erred by not excluding evidence that the defendant was carrying cash at the time of his arrest and in denying him any remedy for the state’s late disclosure of that evidence.

 The Supreme Court noted that the late disclosure was not intentional, and that the trial justice had allowed a brief recess, during which the parties reached an agreement that the state would not ask how much money was found on the defendant at the time of his arrest.  Accordingly, because the fact that the defendant had an unspecified amount of cash on his person was not unfairly prejudicial, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction on one count of carrying a pistol without a license and one count of possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime of violence.
 
 On appeal, the defendant contended: (1) that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (2) that the trial justice violated his right to the assistance of counsel under the United States and Rhode Island constitutions by improperly restricting defense counsel’s closing argument.
 
 The Supreme Court held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, giving full credibility to its witnesses, and drawing all reasonable inferences consistent with the defendant's guilt, there was sufficient evidence submitted at trial to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Supreme Court also held that no limitation on closing argument occurred at the time of the state’s first objection to defense counsel’s closing argument and that the trial justice properly sustained the state’s other objection at issue on appeal.
  
 Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction.

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction after a Superior Court jury found her guilty of one count of voluntary manslaughter.  On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived material evidence and was otherwise clearly wrong in denying her motion for a new trial because, in her view, the state failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that she did not act in self-defense.

 The Supreme Court held that there was nothing in the record that would lead to the conclusion that the trial justice was clearly wrong or that she overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The plaintiffs, the Chariho Regional School District and the Cranston School Department, appealed from an October 19, 2010 judgment of the Providence County Superior Court dismissing their complaint, pursuant to which the plaintiffs had sought a writ of mandamus.  The plaintiffs contended that the hearing justice erred when, in applying Rule 12(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, he granted the motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint; those motions had been filed by Deborah Gist, the Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education of the State of Rhode Island (the Commissioner), and Frank T. Caprio, the then-General Treasurer of the State of Rhode Island (collectively the defendants).  They alleged that the hearing justice erred in finding: (1) that the Commissioner’s decision to deny the plaintiffs reimbursement for the salaries and benefits of certain officials in the plaintiffs’ vocational-technical schools was discretionary in nature, rather than ministerial; and (2) that the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law.

The Court held that, due to a conflict between certain Department of Education regulations and state statutes, the plaintiffs could not, under any set of facts, prove that they had a clear legal right to the funds in question, as was required for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court granting the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants.

The Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a National Grid (the NEC) and the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers (the Division), collectively the respondents, moved to quash a writ of certiorari issued by this Court on February 15, 2013.  The appellees contended that Power Survey Company’s (the petitioner’s) petition for a statutory writ of certiorari was not filed within seven days of the order of the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (the Commission) which was being challenged, as required in G.L. 1956 § 39-5-1.  Specifically, the respondents posited that, despite the fact that the petitioner claimed to be challenging an order of the Commission issued on February 1, 2013, it was in reality challenging an order of the Commission issued on November 9, 2012; and they further contended that the petitioner had missed the available seven day window within which to file a timely appeal of the November 9, 2012 order.
 
The Court held that, notwithstanding the petitioner’s contention that it was appealing from the February 1, 2013 order, the petitioner was in fact challenging the November 9, 2012 order.  Consequently, the Court held that the petition for a statutory writ of certiorari was not filed by the petitioner within seven days, as required by § 39-5-1, and therefore was not timely.  The Court further held that, even if it treated the petitioner’s petition for a statutory writ of certiorari as a petition for a common law writ of certiorari, it would deny such a petition because there were no “unusual hardship[s] or exceptional circumstances” in the instant case.
  
The Court granted the motions to quash filed by the NEC and the Division, quashed the February 15, 2013 writ of certiorari, and denied the petition for a common law writ of certiorari.

The plaintiff, the Joseph P. Notarianni Revocable Trust of January, 2007, appealed from a December 6, 2012 Kent County Superior Court judgment granting a motion to dismiss its trespass and ejectment action.  The motion to dismiss was filed by Joseph Paul Notarianni, Jr., Robert Notarianni, Christine Fink, Rebecca Balasco, and Thomas P. Notarianni (collectively the defendants).  The motion justice granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and that the plaintiff trust lacked the requisite standing to be a party in a landlord-tenant action.

The Court held that the Superior Court did have subject matter jurisdiction over the trespass and ejectment action pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-12-10.1.  It was the further holding of the Court that, due to the fact that no hearing was held and no findings of fact were made with respect to the issue of standing, the Court was unable to conduct a review.  Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of standing.

The state appealed from an order of the Superior Court granting the defendant’s motions to suppress and/or exclude evidence obtained by Pawtucket police detectives following the defendant’s arrest in the city of Providence.  The defendant Steven B. Morris (Morris or defendant) was indicted for two separate incidents of first-degree robbery committed in Pawtucket.  On appeal, the state argued that the hearing justice erred in deciding that evidence stemming from an extra-jurisdictional arrest was subject to the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
  
The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s arrest was unauthorized because it was made outside of the Pawtucket detectives’ jurisdiction.  The Court held, however, that exclusion of the evidence obtained from the defendant’s arrest was not required under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, relying on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008), that the Fourth Amendment did not require exclusion of evidence because of a violation of state law.  The Court further determined that the Pawtucket detectives’ actions in the instant case did not constitute such an egregious violation of their jurisdictional authority to justify application of the exclusionary rule.
  
Accordingly, the Court vacated the order of the Superior Court granting the defendant’s motions to suppress the evidence obtained from his arrest. 

The defendant, Mark Ceppi, appealed from a judgment of conviction on one count of domestic felony assault, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 11-5-2 and G.L. 1956 § 12-29-5, and one count of domestic simple assault, pursuant to § 11-5-3 and § 12-29-5, which judgment was entered on August 5, 2010, following a jury-waived trial in the Newport County Superior Court.  The defendant contended that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to dismiss a criminal information filed against him, which motion invoked Rule 9.1 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and G.L. 1956 § 12-12-1.7.  That criminal information contained two counts, on both of which the defendant was eventually convicted; he posited that the criminal information package was not sufficient to establish probable cause for either of the two counts.  He further contended that the trial justice made a number of evidentiary errors during the course of trial.  Those errors, according to the defendant, were as follows: (1) finding that certain portions of the testimony of Newport Det. Christopher Hayes were not hearsay and allowing improper bolstering of the testimony of Heather King (the complaining witness) by the testimony of Det. Hayes; (2) improperly allowing questioning of the defendant with respect to an alleged past incident of violence involving his former wife; (3) impermissibly restricting the defendant’s testimony with respect to Ms. King’s alleged intoxication; and (4) wrongly allowing Stephanie Bacon, the complaining witness’s twin sister, to testify with respect to the complaining witness’s injuries.

 The Court held that, if there was any deficiency in the criminal information, it was rendered harmless by the fact that, following a trial, the defendant was found guilty on both counts in the criminal information.  The Court further held that there were no evidentiary errors at trial which merited reversal.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction.

The applicant, David A. Roscoe, appealed a judgment of the Superior Court denying his postconviction-relief application.  In 1991, Roscoe received a thirty-year sentence, fifteen years of which were suspended, with probation, for a conviction the previous year for multiple counts of child molestation, assault and battery, and witness intimidation.  In 2004, after he had been released from incarceration, Roscoe was found to have violated the terms and conditions of his probation and received the fifteen years remaining from his 1991 sentence.

Roscoe then sought postconviction relief from his 1990 conviction, contending that the trial justice had been biased, that the attorney appointed to represent him had provided ineffective assistance, and that the evidence had been insufficient to convict.  An attorney was appointed to represent Roscoe in his postconviction-relief application, but the attorney was allowed to withdraw after he concluded that Roscoe’s claims had no merit.  On appeal, Roscoe argued that the trial justice should not have allowed the attorney to withdraw.

The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice followed the procedures set forth in Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130, 135 (R.I. 2000), and, therefore, properly allowed counsel to withdraw.  The Court further held that the hearing justice was not clearly erroneous in her determination that the grounds had no merit.  The Supreme Court also determined that the factual investigation into Roscoe’s claims was not insufficient.  Lastly, the Court held that after counsel withdrew in accordance with Shatney, Roscoe was allowed to proceed pro se and was not entitled to a second appointed attorney to represent him in the evidentiary hearing on the merits of his application.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault.
 
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice abused her discretion in denying his motion for a new trial because, in the defendant’s view, she overlooked and misconceived material evidence, specifically with respect to the testimony of the complaining witness; the defendant further asserted that the verdict failed to truly respond to the evidence and failed to do substantial justice between the parties.
  
 The Supreme Court held that there was nothing in the record that would lead it to conclude that the trial justice was clearly wrong or that she overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction.

David J. Alba (Alba) petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a decision of the Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary Education (board).  The board affirmed a decision of the Commissioner of Education which upheld the Cranston School Committee’s (committee) vote to nonrenew Alba’s employment contract.  The Court granted the petition so as to consider whether the committee had exceeded its statutory authority in nonrenewing Alba’s contract or had deprived Alba of the procedural protections to which he was entitled under the provisions of the School Administrators’ Rights Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 12.1 of title 16.

The Court held, after a thorough review of the record, that the committee acted within the scope of its statutory authority when it declined to renew Alba’s contract.  In light of the fact that Alba and his counsel walked out of the committee hearing without presenting any evidence, the Court also rejected Alba’s claim that the committee had deprived him of his right to a meaningful hearing.  In addition, the Court concluded that a comment made by one of the committee’s members in advance of the hearing did not require that committee member to recuse himself from participating in the hearing.

 Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the board’s decision.

Frederick Carrozza, Sr. and his living children (Phillip Carrozza, Freida Carrozza, and Laurie Carrozza-Conn) (collectively the counterclaim defendants) appealed from a judgment rendered by the Newport County Superior Court on December 17, 2010. The trial justice held the counterclaim defendants liable for slander of title, finding that notices of lis pendens were maliciously filed by the counterclaim defendants on the four properties at issue in the case. The counterclaim defendants contended that the trial justice erred: (1) when he held that Michael Voccola, in his capacity as executor of the estate of Frederick Carrozza, Jr., Angela Giguere, and Christine Giguere-Carrozza (collectively the counterclaimants) had met the required burden of proof to establish slander of title; (2) when he awarded compensatory damages based on the difference between the highest value of the properties attained during the period of time in which they were subject to the notices of lis pendens and the value of the properties when the notices of lis pendens were removed; (3) when he ruled that prejudgment interest should run from the date on which the notices of lis pendens were filed; (4) when he awarded punitive damages in the amount of $845,000 against Frederick Sr.; and (5) when he held Phillip, Freida, and Laurie liable for slander of title despite the fact that they were not parties to this civil action at the time that the notices of lis pendens were filed in 2002.

The Supreme Court held that: (1) the trial justice did not commit clear error or misconceive or overlook material evidence when he held Frederick Sr. liable for slander of title; (2) the trial justice properly computed compensatory damages by subtracting the value of the property on the date the notices of lis pendens were removed from the highest value of the properties attained during the time period in which they were subject to the notices of lis pendens; (3) prejudgment interest should be calculated starting from November 15, 2002, the date of the filing of the notices of lis pendens; (4) the trial justice did not misconceive any evidence in awarding punitive damages against Frederick Sr., but the punitive damages awarded were excessive; and (5) the trial justice properly found Phillip, Freida, and Laurie liable for slander of title.

Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in part and vacated the portion of that judgment awarding $845,000 in punitive damages. The Court reduced the punitive damages to $422,500 and remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions to enter judgment accordingly.

The respondent appealed from a Family Court decree terminating his parental rights with respect to his son.  On appeal, the respondent argued that the Family Court trial justice erred in finding that the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) had proven that (1) it made reasonable efforts to reunite him with his son; (2) there was no substantial possibility that his son could safely return to his care within a reasonable period of time; and (3) he was unfit by reason of imprisonment.

 After carefully reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence supported the trial justice’s findings that the child could not safely return to the respondent’s custody within a reasonable period of time and that respondent was unfit.  In addition, the Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence of record to support a determination that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunite the respondent with his son.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Family Court’s decree terminating the respondent’s parental rights.

The plaintiffs, Michael Moura and Margaret Moura, appealed a Superior Court entry of summary judgment against them and in favor of the defendants, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., Foreclosure Management Co., Vericrest Financial, Inc., Accredited REO Properties, LLC, and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee on behalf of the LSF MRA Pass-Through Trust.  The plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint in Superior Court seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.  In granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the trial justice declared that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Ricardo Ramirez appeals from a Superior Court judgment denying his application for postconviction relief.  On appeal, Ramirez argues that the hearing justice erred (1) by failing to make findings of fact pursuant to this Court’s holding in Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000); (2) by not allowing Ramirez an opportunity to be heard on the merits of his application before allowing the appointed attorney to withdraw; and (3) by declining to consider the applicant’s motion to reduce sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not follow the appropriate procedure as mandated in Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000), and that Ramirez was not provided with appointed counsel as required by G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-5.  The Court also concluded that, on remand, Ramirez should have the opportunity to present any available claims in this first application for postconviction relief, including that he was deprived of the assistance of counsel to pursue a Rule 35 motion.  Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case with directions to appoint counsel in accordance with § 10-9.1-5. 

The plaintiff, Maria Marble, suffered injuries when she was struck by a vehicle owned by the defendant, Hertz Corporation.  Hertz filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that it did not consent to the driver’s operation of the vehicle and that, alternatively, a federal statute, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, known as the Graves Amendment, precludes recovery against Hertz. A Superior Court justice granted Hertz’s motion.  The plaintiff appealed and argued that summary judgment was improperly granted.

The Supreme Court held that genuine issues of material fact make summary judgment inappropriate in this case.  Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for trial.

The defendant, Thomas Mercurio, appealed from his conviction on one count of resisting arrest.  On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial justice’s pretrial denial of his motion in limine seeking to preclude admission into evidence of his prior convictions.  The defendant also argued that the trial justice erred by permitting the prosecutor to impeach the defendant’s testimony on cross-examination by revealing that two of the defendant’s prior convictions were for assaults on police officers.
  
The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant had improperly “manufactured” the issue of the defendant’s respect for police officers and for law and order, in order to impeach the defendant with the exact nature of his earlier convictions.  The Court concluded that the defendant had not “opened the door” to the prosecutor’s broad questions about the defendant’s sentiments towards police officers in general.  In so holding, the Supreme Court contrasted the situation in the case at bar from those in State v. Rosario, 14 A.3d 206, 218 (R.I. 2011), where “[the] defendant [Rosario] chose to answer a question about his attitude towards one person * * * with an extremely broad and unqualified declaration about his respect for authority in general.”  Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the admission into evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions was not harmless.

The defendant, John Quaweay, appealed from the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  Following his conviction for various firearms offenses, Quaweay moved for a new trial based on allegedly new information that the United States Marshals Service visited the apartment of his former girlfriend sometime prior to trial.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erroneously concluded that such information did not constitute newly discovered evidence. 

 The Supreme Court held that the information which the defendant alleged to be newly discovered could have been obtained prior to trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence.  The Court therefore affirmed the trial justice’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial. 

These four consolidated appeals came before the Supreme Court following entries of final judgment in favor of four groups of defendants in this medical negligence action brought by the plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of their minor daughter, who was born with a genetic abnormality.  At issue in all four appeals is the application of G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14.1(1), an act which tolls the three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims when the injured party is a minor.  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that, pursuant to § 9-1-14.1(1), medical negligence claims may be brought on behalf of a minor at any time before the minor attains the age of majority, with an additional three years to bring suit on his or her own behalf after attaining the age of majority.  The plaintiffs also contend that parents must bring any derivative claims at the same time that a child’s claims are advanced.  Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the claims against the defendant laboratories Corning Incorporated and Quest Diagnostics, LLC, did not sound in medical malpractice and were therefore not subject to § 9-14.1-1(1).  The defendants Corning Incorporated, Quest Diagnostics, LLC, Rhode Island Hospital, Women & Infants Hospital, and each hospital’s associated medical professionals argued that the trial justice correctly dismissed the plaintiff parents’ derivative claims, but argued that the trial justice erred in interpreting § 9-1-14.1(1) to allow the child to bring an action on her own behalf upon attaining the age of majority.

The Supreme Court held that the claims against laboratories Corning Incorporated and Quest Diagnostics, LLC did not sound in medical malpractice and were therefore not subject to § 9-1-14.1(1), and vacated the Superior Court judgments entered in favor of those defendants.  The Court also concluded that cause had been shown concerning the appeals and cross-appeals filed by the plaintiffs and the defendants Rhode Island Hospital, Miriam Hospital, Women & Infants Hospital, and each hospital’s associated medical professionals, and directed that the questions raised therein be assigned to the Court’s full argument calendar.  

The defendant, Dana Gallop, appealed from a judgment of conviction of multiple charges arising out of a shooting outside the nightclub Passions in Providence.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred when he admitted an eyewitness’s out-of-court identification that the defendant argued was impermissibly suggestive.  The Supreme Court examined the photographic array that was displayed to the witness and held that it was not unnecessarily suggestive.  Therefore, the identification was admissible without the Supreme Court needing to consider whether the identification was independently reliable.

The defendant also argued that the state violated his constitutional rights by using its peremptory challenges to strike two minority venirepersons.  The Supreme Court held that the trial justice’s decisions to allow the challenges were not clearly erroneous.  Regarding the first potential juror, the Court considered the state’s proffered race-neutral reasons—the juror had earned a criminal-justice degree and was employed by a law firm in which one of the lawyers is a prominent criminal-defense attorney—and accepted the trial justice’s conclusion that they were not race-based.  For the second juror, the Supreme Court declined to engage in a comparative-juror analysis to determine whether the state’s race-neutral reasons were pretextual because that argument was not made to the trial justice.  Thus, the Court held that the defendant failed to meet his burden under the three-part test from Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The plaintiffs brought suit against the General Assembly and various individuals in their official capacities within the executive and legislative branches of the state government.  The plaintiffs challenged the legislatively enacted school funding formula, which, they alleged, failed to allocate adequate resources to less affluent communities in the state.  The plaintiffs maintained that said formula, together with a confluence of statutory mandates, Rhode Island Department of Education regulations, educational standards, and the low tax capacity of certain urban municipalities, operated to inhibit students in their respective cities from obtaining a quality education. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging violations of the Education Clause, article 12, section 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution, as well as of their substantive due process and equal protection rights.  The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint.

 The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint.  The Supreme Court determined that the facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaint were not sufficient to assert a claim upon which relief could be granted for a violation of the Education Clause.  The Supreme Court held that, while the Education Clause imposes a duty on the General Assembly to promote public education, the Clause also grants the General Assembly plenary power to determine the means of carrying out this mandate.    The Supreme Court further held that the repeal of the “Continuing Powers Clause,” article 6, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution, did not affect the Education Clause’s express grant of power to the General Assembly in the realm of education.  The Supreme Court also held that the plaintiffs’ claim presented a separation of powers issue, because the plaintiffs’ requested relief would require the court to impose its own judgment over that of the General Assembly in order to determine whether particular policies were beneficial to public education.

 The Supreme Court also held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a substantive due process claim, because the Rhode Island Constitution does not provide a fundamental right to education and because the plaintiffs did not allege facts to suggest that the education funding formula was arbitrary and capricious.

The defendant, Sandra Carney (Sandra), appeals an order of the Family Court in favor of the plaintiff, her former husband, Stephen Carney, Jr. (Stephen).  In November 2006, a justice of the Family Court entered final judgment on the divorce between the parties, ending their nearly-seventeen-year marriage.  The parties had entered into a marriage settlement agreement (MSA), which the Family Court approved and incorporated by reference, but not merged, into the final judgment.  As part of the MSA, Stephen agreed to convey his interest in the parties’ home, while Sandra agreed to refinance the property and assume responsibility for all associated costs.  As consideration for relinquishing his interest, paragraph seven of the MSA indicated Stephen would receive $100,000 as an equitable distribution in 2024.  Paragraph seven also included two conditions that could accelerate the timing of the payment and a formula for determining the amount Stephen would receive should the property be sold for less than $475,000.  After Sandra sold the property in 2011, the parties found themselves in Family Court.

After a hearing, a justice of the Family Court appeared to find the language of paragraph seven ambiguous and interpreted it to mean that when the agreement was executed, the parties intended that Sandra and the two children would remain in the marital domicile and that the property would not be sold during the minority of the children.  The trial justice then held that sale of the property prior to 2024 constituted a third condition that accelerated payment to Stephen.  Because the property was sold for less than $475,000, the trial justice also calculated the amount of Stephen’s equitable distribution.
  
The Supreme Court held that paragraph seven was ambiguous because the timing of the payment to Stephen in the event the property was sold prior to 2024 was susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.  The trial justice, however, did not make sufficient findings of fact to determine the intent of the parties; therefore, the Supreme Court remanded the case to allow the trial justice to make the appropriate findings related to the intent of the parties if the property were sold before 2024.

The Supreme Court also held that the trial justice erred in calculating the amount of Stephen’s equitable distribution because she had not included the final step in the formula.
Finally, the Supreme Court found that Sandra had not objected to the trial justice’s open-court assertion that the parties had agreed to share equally in the costs of “enrichment activities” outlined in the MSA, nor did she object when an order to that effect was entered.  Therefore, the Supreme Court held that Sandra had waived the issue.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the Family Court and remanded the case to the Family Court to allow the trial justice to make the requisite findings of fact.

The defendant appealed from the denial of its motion to dismiss a cross-appeal filed by the plaintiff.  The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s cross-appeal was untimely pursuant to Article I, Rule 4(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure and should, therefore, be dismissed.  The plaintiff contended that the cross-appeal was timely.
 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s cross-appeal.  The Supreme Court held that Rule 4(a) must be interpreted in a manner that provides a twenty-day appeal period triggered by an appeal that constitutes the first appeal adverse to a potential cross-appellant’s interests.  In the case at hand, the plaintiff’s cross-appeal was filed in response to an appeal filed by the defendant, which was the first appeal in this multi-party case that was adverse to the plaintiff’s interests.  The Supreme Court accordingly held that Rule 4(a) provided a twenty-day appeal period triggered by the defendant’s appeal, during which the plaintiff was entitled to file a notice of cross-appeal in response. 

The plaintiff appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendants.  The plaintiff and the defendants were parties to a service contract, in which the plaintiff agreed to provide livery services for the transportation of human remains.  The plaintiff challenged the trial justice’s findings that the contract was not exclusive and that the defendants’ unilateral termination of the contract did not constitute a breach.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

 The Supreme Court held that the defendants did not breach the contract when they began using their own personnel for livery services in addition to the services provided by the plaintiff, because the contractual language did not form an exclusive agreement.  The Supreme Court further held that the contract’s termination clause allowed the defendants to terminate the agreement upon a finding of unsatisfactory performance.  The Supreme Court also held that this language did not render the agreement illusory because the defendants retained some obligation under the agreement and were statutorily required to exercise good faith in the performance of their contractual relationship with the plaintiff.  Finally, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in her factual findings and credibility determinations when finding that the defendants had acted in good faith.

The defendant, Jose L. Barrientos, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction declaring him to be in violation of the terms of his probation and sentencing him to five years of his previously suspended sentence.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the hearing justice erred because the evidence before him was insufficient to support his findings. In particular, the defendant argued that the state’s failure to provide testimony from a toxicologist regarding the identity of the substance seized from him—a substance that a field test revealed to be an opium derivative—was fatal to the state’s case.  In affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, the Supreme Court noted that the quantum of proof required to support a finding of probation violation is minimal.  Because a hearing justice need only be reasonably satisfied that an alleged violator has failed to keep the peace or be of good behavior, the Supreme Court held that the hearing justice was well warranted in reaching his determination that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation.

The plaintiffs, Wilfredo Nunez and Janette Campos, appealed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Company.  The plaintiffs filed a claim with their insurance company, Merrimack Mutual, for damage sustained when the oil line to their hot water heater corroded, leaking oil and damaging their basement.  Merrimack denied the claim and the plaintiffs filed suit in Superior Court claiming breach of contract.  The trial justice granted Merrimack Mutual’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the clear and unambiguous language of the insurance policy did not cover damage caused by corrosion.  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the damage was covered by a pollution exclusion clause in the policy.  The plaintiffs also argued that because the loss was unexpected from their perspective, it was covered under the policy.

 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding that the clear and unambiguous language of the insurance policy did not provide coverage for the type of loss incurred by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff, National Refrigeration, Inc., appealed from a Superior Court judgment granting the motion of defendants Capital Properties, Inc. and Capitol Cove, LLC for final judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure in a mechanics’ lien action.  The plaintiff, acting as subcontractor to Providence Builders, LLC, performed work on a property that was owned by Capital Properties and leased by Capitol Cove.  When a dispute arose regarding payment, the plaintiff sought to enforce a mechanics’ lien against the owner, the lessee and the builder.  The lien was dismissed after the parties posted a $400,000 bond, pursuant to the provisions of G.L. 1956 § 34-28-17.  Capital Properties and Capital Cove then requested, and were granted, an entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b).

 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the owner, lessee, and the surety on the bond were all directly liable for the relief sought under the mechanics’ lien statute, and because the plaintiff complied with the requirements of the lien statute, judgment should be awarded in its favor.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding that a mechanics’ lien proceeding is an action in rem and that, once a bond is posted, it stands as security for the plaintiff’s claim and the property is no longer encumbered.  Therefore the claim against the owner and lessee was properly dismissed.

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of two counts of second-degree sexual assault.
  
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice abused his discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial. The defendant specifically argued that reasonable minds could not differ regarding the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in this case and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who sexually assaulted the complainant.
 
 The Supreme Court held that there was nothing in the record that would lead it to conclude that the trial justice was clearly wrong or that he overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Markus Matthews, appealed from his conviction on a single count of first-degree robbery.  On appeal, the defendant argued that his conviction should be vacated because (1) he was charged with two counts of first-degree robbery in violation of double jeopardy principles; (2) the admission of a recorded statement of a witness violated Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause; (3) certain testimony should not have been admitted as an adoptive admission of the defendant; and (4) the trial justice erred by denying his motion for a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the defendant waived his double jeopardy argument by failing to raise the issue by motion prior to trial as required by Rule 12(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure; nevertheless, even if the argument was not waived, the Court noted that the conviction of a single count of first-degree robbery does not violate double jeopardy.  Additionally, the Court held that the admission of a recorded statement of a witness did not violate Rule 801(d)(1)(A) or the Confrontation Clause, the adoptive admission testimony was properly admitted, and the trial justice did not err by denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the conviction.

The defendant, Kayborn Brown, appealed from a judgment of conviction stemming from two incidents on August 4, 2008, in Central Falls and on August 6, 2008, in Providence.  Following these incidents, the defendant was charged with ten offenses.  After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty for the murder of Jorge Restrepo in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-23-1, first-degree robbery in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-39-1, conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-1-6, carrying a pistol without a license in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-47-8(a), and reckless driving in violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-4.  The defendant had been charged with five other counts; three of which were dismissed through Rule 48(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, and two were disposed of after the trial justice granted the defendant’s motion to acquit pursuant to Rule 29 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.

On appeal, the defendant pressed five arguments.  First, he contended that the trial justice erred when he refused to sever the counts related to the August 4 incident from the August 6 offenses  because, the defendant alleged, those counts had been misjoined and should have been severed as a matter of law under Rule 8(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Next, the defendant maintained that, assuming the counts were properly joined under Rule 8(a), the trial justice nevertheless abused his discretion in refusing to sever pursuant to Rule 14 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Third, Brown argued that the trial justice impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial when he excluded a police sketch of the alleged murderer.  Fourth, the defendant claimed that the trial justice erred when he allowed the state to introduce three photographs taken during an autopsy performed on the victim.  Finally, the defendant asserted that the trial justice abused his discretion when he denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice had not abused his discretion when he found the counts had not been misjoined because Rule 8(a) favors joinder and because the offenses charged in the indictment were of a sufficiently similar character and were connected together to justify joinder.  Secondly, the Court held that the trial justice did not err when he denied the defendant’s motion to sever under Rule 14 because the defendant had not suffered additional prejudice by the admission into evidence of an unusual red firearm recovered after the August 6 incident that would have likely been mutually admissible at separate trials.

Next, the Supreme Court held that the defendant’s right to a fair trial had not been impaired when the trial justice refused to enter into evidence a police sketch and did not allow a police sketch artist to testify.  The Court held that the sketch artist would not have been able to authenticate the sketch because the declarant was not available at the trial.  Fourth, the Court held that the trial justice did not impede the defendant’s right to a fair trial when he allowed into evidence three autopsy photographs, to which the defendant had objected, because the photographs were at least marginally relevant and not enormously prejudicial to the defendant.  Finally, the Court held that the trial justice had not erred when he refused the defendant’s motion for a new trial because the trial justice reviewed the evidence, weighed the credibility of the witnesses, and made plain that he did not disagree with the jury’s verdict.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The plaintiff, Donald Panarello, appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court following a bench trial.  In her lengthy decision, the trial justice held that the defendant, the State of Rhode Island Department of Corrections (DOC), had not discriminated against the plaintiff due to his military status in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301 through 4335, or the parallel state statute entitled “Employment Rights of Members of Armed Forces,” G.L. 1956 chapter 11 of title 30, when it decided not to promote him on three occasions.  The plaintiff contended: (1) that, while the trial justice had correctly articulated the burden-shifting method of proof applicable in employment discrimination cases under the USERRA, she incorrectly applied it; and (2) that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived evidence that the plaintiff considered to be relevant, material, and supportive of his “prima facie” case of employment discrimination.
For actions under the USERRA and the parallel state statute, the Supreme Court adopted a two-part burden-shifting paradigm, articulated in the 2007 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the case of Velázquez-García v. Horizon Lines of Puerto Rico, 473 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2007).  The Court further held that the trial justice properly applied that two-part burden-shifting paradigm and did not overlook or misconceive material evidence. 
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial justice’s judgment in favor of the DOC.

These consolidated cases came before the Supreme Court on cross-appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies under G.L. 1956 § 44-5-26 and denying the defendants’ request for sanctions against the plaintiffs.  This is one of several cases in which the plaintiffs were challenging sewer assessments levied by the Town of Coventry.  The plaintiffs were also requesting injunctive relief to prevent a tax sale on their properties from proceeding.
  
In the first of these cases, the plaintiffs claimed that the hearing justice erred in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss because the appeal process in § 44-5-26 was not applicable to sewer assessments.  In their cross-appeal, the defendants contended that their request for sanctions against the plaintiffs should have been granted by the hearing justice because of the plaintiffs’ various duplicative filings.
 
The Supreme Court concluded that the sewer assessments at issue were not taxes and, therefore, were not governed by the appellate procedures of chapter 5 of title 44.  The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were required to follow the procedure set forth in § 19 of the Coventry sewer enabling act, P.L. 1997, ch. 330, in order to challenge their sewer assessments.  The Supreme Court further held that the hearing justice had not abused his discretion in denying the defendants’ request for sanctions.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court as to the defendants’ motion to dismiss and affirmed the judgment as to sanctions.

In this automobile negligence action, the plaintiff Kris Ellinwood, his wife, and three children appealed from the Superior Court’s grants of summary judgment in favor of the defendant Scott B. Cohen.  The plaintiff, a patrolman with the East Providence Police Department, was struck by a vehicle driven by a third party while responding to an automobile accident involving the defendant.  The Superior Court concluded that the “public-safety officer’s rule” barred the plaintiff’s negligence claim.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the public-safety officer’s rule was inapplicable because the defendant failed to warn him that glare from the morning sun was impairing the vision of approaching motorists.
   
 The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court properly applied the public-safety officer’s rule.  The Court reasoned that a police officer responding to a roadside emergency could reasonably anticipate the risk of being struck by another vehicle.  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that a motorist who has just been in an accident on a public roadway has a legal duty to warn a responding police officer of the possible dangers of sun glare.
   
 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment.

The state, through the Town of Little Compton, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a District Court decision that dismissed a charge of driving under the influence against the defendant, David Simmons.  Police officers from Little Compton located Simmons in Tiverton and transported him back to the scene of an automobile accident in which the defendant had been involved in Little Compton.  The defendant subsequently failed field-sobriety tests and was arrested.  The hearing judge dismissed the charges after she found that the police had effectively placed the defendant under arrest in Tiverton, which exceeded their authority because the arrest was outside their jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court granted the petition to consider whether the interaction in Tiverton between the defendant and the Little Compton police officers amounted to an arrest.

After a review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the defendant had not been arrested in Tiverton, after weighing the factors outlined in State v. Bailey, 417 A.2d 915, 917 (R.I. 1980).  Specifically, the Court held that even though the defendant’s freedom of movement had been curtailed, Simmons had not been subjected to any degree of force by law enforcement and had voluntarily accompanied the police back to Little Compton.  The Court concluded that a reasonable person in like circumstances would have felt free to leave.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case with its decision endorsed thereon.

The defendant, the Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court that was entered on November 8, 2010, following a bench trial.  The trial justice found in favor of the plaintiff Peter W. Russo holding that the defendant had violated the Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), G.L. 1956 chapter 50 of title 28, when it placed the plaintiff on administrative leave with pay and required that he undergo an independent medical examination (IME).  The defendant contended on appeal that the trial justice erred in finding: (1) that paid administrative leave and the requirement to undergo an IME constituted a “discharge, threat[], or * * * discriminat[ion]” under the WPA; (2) that the plaintiff had reported violations of a “law or regulation or rule promulgated under the law of [Rhode Island]” (which is one of the preconditions for obtaining relief under the WPA); (3) that there was a causal connection between the plaintiff’s reports at issue in the case and his placement on paid administrative leave; and (4) that the defendant did not have “legitimate nonretaliatory” grounds to place the plaintiff on paid administrative leave and require that he undergo an IME.

The Supreme Court held that placing an employee on paid administrative leave with the requirement that he or she undergo an IME, as happened in this case, did not constitute an action which “discharge[d], threaten[ed], or otherwise discriminate[d]” against the employee in violation of the WPA.  Accordingly, the Court vacated the decision of the Superior Court and held that the defendant did not violate the WPA.

The defendant, Nayquan Gadson, appealed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction for second-degree robbery.  On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred: (1) in failing to dismiss the second-degree robbery charge in view of what the defendant contends was a “not guilty” finding by the jury on the lesser included offense of larceny from the person; (2) in denying the defendant’s motion to sever Count Six, which charged a codefendant (and him alone) with carrying a handgun without a license; and (3) in denying the defendant’s motion in limine seeking to “preclude the State from submitting or referring to: * * * any alleged connection between Gadson and the firearm used by [another person] to commit the robbery.”

The Supreme Court held that the defendant waived his right to have the Court consider his argument that the trial justice erred in failing to dismiss the second-degree robbery charge against him and his argument that the trial justice erred in denying his motion in limine.  The Supreme Court further held that the codefendant was properly joined in the indictment with the defendant under Rule 8 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant’s motion pursuant to Rule 14 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure to sever Count Six against the codefendant from the trial of both of the defendants on Counts One through Five.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction.

The plaintiff, Paul Savoie, appealed from a judgment in favor of the defendants, Langdon Wilby and Tammy Emmett.  The plaintiff and the defendants were members of the board of directors of a Vermont corporation formed for the purpose of reconstructing and operating a defunct racetrack in the Town of Pownal, Vermont.  The plaintiff invested $350,000 in the venture before the project was ultimately abandoned due to issues surrounding the corporation’s ability to obtain a racetrack license.  The plaintiff brought claims against the defendants for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and fraud.  After a bench trial in Superior Court, the trial justice entered judgment for the defendants on all counts.

 On appeal, the plaintiff presented three arguments.  First, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred by failing to address the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants fraudulently induced him to invest in the corporation.  Second, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred by failing to hold the defendants accountable for their breach of fiduciary duties.  Third, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice made clear errors of fact, drew unreasonable inferences from the evidence, and overlooked and misconceived material evidence when he concluded that the plaintiff knew of, and was partially responsible for, the defendants’ mismanagement of the corporation.
 
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.  The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did address the plaintiff’s fraud claim, and that the trial justice appropriately found no evidence of an intention to misrepresent or defraud.  The Supreme Court further held that the trial justice did not find that the defendants breached any fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiff, and that the trial justice’s findings on this issue were not clearly erroneous.  Finally, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence, nor were his factual findings clearly erroneous, with regard to the plaintiff’s knowledge of and participation in the mismanagement of the corporation.

The defendant Moorland Farm Condominium Association (the association) appealed a judgment of the Superior Court that concluded that assessments to pay for repairs to decks attached to certain condominium units were illegal.  Condominium owners sued to avoid paying special assessments allocated to the repairs of decks in the condominium development.  The trial justice concluded that the decks were parts of the individual units rather than common areas and that therefore the repairs must be paid by the individual unit owners.

On appeal, the association first argued that the trial justice erred by allowing the case to proceed despite the absence of the unit owners who would bear the responsibility of paying for the repairs if the decks were not considered common areas.  The association additionally assailed the trial justice’s determination that the decks were not common areas and his decision to exclude an affidavit from an expert witness.  Finally, the defendant contended that the trial justice should have granted its motion for relief from judgment, filed according to Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the motion did not warrant sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.  The declaratory-judgment act requires joinder of all parties who have an interest that may be affected by the declaration.  The plaintiffs did not join as parties to the lawsuit the owners of condominium units who would need to pay the reallocated assessments should the original assessments be declared illegal.  This was fatal to the action.

Accordingly, the Court declined to review the trial justice’s decision regarding whether the decks were common areas, whether to exclude the expert affidavit, or whether to grant the defendant relief from the judgment.  The Supreme Court determined, however, that the issue of the Rule 11 sanctions was reviewable and held that those sanctions were improper.

The defendants, Christopher Cariello and James Cariello, appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court granting the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial and/or additur, after a jury trial in this negligence action.  On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial justice erroneously substituted his own judgment for that of the jury in considering the facts of the case and that he erred in granting the motion for a new trial on the basis of the inadequacy of damages.
  
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice engaged in the proper analysis in considering the motion for a new trial and that his findings were supported by sufficient evidence in the record.  The Supreme Court also held that the trial justice was not clearly wrong in his determination that the jury’s award of damages was inadequate.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Carmella Bucci, appealed entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC, Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC d/b/a Regine Pontiac GMC, and Hurd Chevrolet, Inc.  The defendant fired the plaintiff at the age of seventy-two after the defendant had employed her three times over a period of five years.  The plaintiff filed claims of age and disability discrimination claiming that the defendant had unlawfully fired her.  In granting the defendant’s motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court declared that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the defendants had not engaged in unlawful age or disability discrimination.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in applying the three-step framework as outlined in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which this Court adopted in Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 484 A.2d 893, 898 (R.I. 1984).  Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in finding that the defendant had met its burden of production in providing legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging her and that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the reasons given for her termination were pretextual.

The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s claim of disability discrimination was not properly before the Court because the plaintiff did not develop this aspect of her appeal in the submitted brief.

The Supreme Court also held that because the defendant’s burden was limited to one of production and not persuasion under the second step of McDonnell-Douglas, the defendant had met this burden by proffering several legitimate reasons for the plaintiff’s discharge that were not discriminatory.  Finally, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had not shown that the defendant’s reasons for the plaintiff’s termination were pretextual.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Reynalda Weeks, appealed from an order of the Providence County Superior Court entered on January 30, 2012, staying her employment discrimination case (brought pursuant to the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA), G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42, and the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), G.L. 1956 chapter 5 of title 28) in that court and ordering that the “matter * * * be resolved through binding arbitration as required by the governing Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties.” On appeal, plaintiff contended that the hearing justice erred when she granted defendant’s motion to stay because the collective bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision did not preclude the plaintiff from asserting her statutorily created rights (under the RICRA and the FEPA) in a judicial forum.

The Supreme Court held that the right to a judicial forum for claims brought specifically under the RICRA or the FEPA may be waived in a collective bargaining agreement only if that waiver is clear and unmistakable; the Court further held that the collective bargaining agreement in the instant case did not contain such a clear and unmistakable waiver. Consequently, the Court vacated the order of the Superior Court and held that the collective bargaining agreement did not require the plaintiff’s RICRA and FEPA claims to be arbitrated.

The applicant, Alexander Rose, appealed from a Superior Court judgment denying his application for postconviction relief.  Rose previously pled nolo contendere to one count of first-degree child molestation and received a twenty-year sentence, with eight years to serve and twelve years suspended with probation.  In a post-conviction relief application filed in October 2010, Rose argued that he was no longer subject to the custody of his probation officer because he had successfully completed his period of probation.  The hearing justice denied Rose’s application, reasoning that Rose’s probationary period did not end until March 2014.
 
 On appeal, Rose argued that his “good-time” credits and credit for pre-trial confinement should have accelerated the end date of his probationary period.  After careful consideration, the Supreme Court rejected Rose’s arguments.  The Court held that Rose’s credits for good time were properly applied to reduce his term of incarceration but could not be used to reduce the overall length of his sentence below the mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years.  The Court likewise held that the amount of time that Rose spent confined while awaiting trial was correctly credited towards his eight-year term of incarceration but did not make his twenty-year sentence retroactive.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.   

The plaintiff, Barbara C. Cayer, was injured after the car she was driving was rear-ended by a van driven by the defendant Nelson Ovalles.  Cayer filed suit against Ovalles, his wife, and the defendant Cox Rhode Island Telecom, LLC d/b/a Cox Communications (Cox).  At the time of the accident, Ovalles was acting as a cable technician on behalf of Cox and M&M Communications, Inc. (M&M), a contractor for Cox.  Cox obtained summary judgment after a Superior Court justice determined that Ovalles was not an employee of Cox.  The plaintiff then attempted to amend her complaint to add claims against M&M.  A different justice of the Superior Court denied that motion on the basis that the claims against M&M were untimely and did not relate back under Rule 15 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.  Cayer appealed both decisions.

The Supreme Court held that summary judgment was proper because it was clear that Ovalles was not an employee of Cox.  The installation agreement between Cox and M&M specifically renounced any employer-employee relationship with M&M’s technicians.  Additionally, the facts indicated that Cox had no control over Ovalles’s method of performance.

The Supreme Court denied and dismissed the appeal of the denial of the plaintiff’s motion to amend.  The order was interlocutory, and none of the statutory or decisional exceptions applied to make review proper at this time.

The defendant, Potomac Realty Capital, LLC, appealed from the Superior Court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, NV One, LLC, Nicholas E. Cambio, and Vincent A. Cambio.  The defendant asserted that the trial justice erred when he granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on liability for violation of the usury statute, G.L. 1956 § 6-26-2, by declaring the usury savings clause of the parties’ loan agreement unenforceable.  Neither party disputed that the interest rate was usurious; thus, the case turned on the enforceability of the usury savings clause.  The defendant argued that the Supreme Court should give effect to the clause and enforce the contract.

The enforceability of usury savings clauses was an issue of first impression in Rhode Island.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding that such clauses are against the state’s well-established policy of preventing usurious transactions.

One of the plaintiffs, Bluelinx Corporation, appealed from a Superior Court order granting the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and conditionally granting the motion for a new trial brought by the remaining defendants, Project Hope/Projecto Esperanza, Inc. and the Diocesan Bureau of Social Service.  The plaintiff brought this action seeking contribution for payments made to an individual who was struck by a vehicle owned by the plaintiff and operated by its employee, James W. Brown, while participating in a fundraising walk sponsored by the defendants.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that although the defendants initially did not have a duty to provide for the safety of the participants, the defendants assumed a duty of care after taking steps to control traffic on the street where the participant was struck.  The plaintiff also argued that whether this duty was extinguished or breached was a question for the jury.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court granting the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law.  Because the Court concluded that, as a matter of law, there was no cognizable duty of care owed by the defendants in this case, the Court declined to address the trial justice’s decision conditionally granting a new trial.

The defendant, Jethro Rolle, appealed from the Superior Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss a charge of second-degree sexual assault on double jeopardy grounds following the granting of a mistrial at the defendant’s behest.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred when he concluded that the prosecutor’s conduct at trial, which amounted to a violation of the rules of discovery, was not done with the intent to provoke a mistrial.
 
 The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in concluding that the prosecutor lacked the specific intent to goad the defendant into moving to pass the case.  After thoroughly examining the record, the Court concluded that there was ample support for the trial justice’s finding that the prosecutor was not seeking to abort a rapidly derailing trial.  The Court therefore affirmed the trial justice’s decision.

The defendants, Peter and Joyce Brennan, appealed from a judgment entered by the Superior Court in favor of the plaintiff, Donna Banville, in this boundary dispute between neighbors. On appeal, the Brennans argued that the trial justice erred in finding that the doctrine of acquiescence applied to establish the dividing line between the two lots.  The Brennans also argued that the trial justice erred in awarding damages to Banville based on the diminution in the fair market value of her real property as a result of the alleged encroachment by the Brennans.
 
The Supreme Court held that the trial justice had not overlooked or misconceived material evidence in determining the location of the boundary line between the parties’ respective lots.  The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence in the record supported the trial justice’s finding as to the establishment of the boundary line and his award of damages to the plaintiff.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs, William Chhun and Joli Chhim, appealed from a Superior Court judgment granting the motion to dismiss of the defendants, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., Domestic Bank, Aurora Loan Services, LLC, and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company.  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the Superior Court justice erroneously held that they did not have standing to challenge the assignment of their mortgage and that he improperly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Based on its recent holding in Mruk v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., No. 2012-282-A., slip op. at 13 (R.I., filed Dec. 19, 2013), the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the assignment of their mortgage.  Additionally, the Court held that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts in the complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.  Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The defendant, Raymond Clements, appealed from a judgment of conviction for two counts of murder, one count of arson, and one count of conspiracy.  Clements contended that the trial justice erred when he allowed evidence of a robbery committed during the day before the overnight murders, gave the jury a faulty instruction as to the proper use of that evidence, and denied a motion to pass the case.  The Supreme Court held that the evidence’s admission under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, if error, was harmless.  The Court additionally held that the admission of the evidence did not violate Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.

The Court further held that the defendant’s objections to the jury instructions were not preserved, as he did not object to any of the three instructions that the trial justice gave the jury regarding the use of the robbery evidence.  Finally, the Court held that the denial of the motion to pass the case was not an abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction of the following offenses stemming from a shooting: two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon; two counts of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence; one count of carrying a handgun on his person without a license; and one count of discharging a firearm within a compact area.
 
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice abused his discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. The defendant specifically argued that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived material evidence and failed to draw the appropriate inferences from the evidence presented because the testimony of two of the key witnesses at trial—Ramon Jimenez and John Nazario—was not credible.  The defendant further asserted that the verdict was against the fair preponderance of the evidence and failed to do substantial justice between the parties.

 The Supreme Court held that there was nothing in the record that would lead it to conclude that the trial justice was clearly wrong or that he overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction. 

The defendant, Linda A. Diamante, appealed from the Superior Court’s denial of a motion to seal her judicial records.  In Superior Court, the defendant moved to seal the record of a charge of felony assault with a dangerous weapon that was dismissed.  The trial justice denied the motion because the defendant opted to plead nolo contendere to a second charge in the same criminal case, and G.L. 1956 § 12-1-12.1(a) requires an individual to be “exonerated of all counts in a criminal case” as a precondition to having his or her record sealed.  The defendant contended that the trial justice’s denial of her motion was in error because, in her view, § 12-1-12(a) and § 12-1-12.1(a) are in conflict and, according to the defendant, § 12-1-12(a) mandates the sealing of her record.

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s denial, holding that the defendant’s record could not be sealed because the plain language of § 12-1-12.1(a) conditioned the sealing of a court record on a defendant being exonerated on “all counts” in a criminal case.  (Emphasis added.)  The Court further held that no conflict existed between § 12-1-12(a) and § 12-1-12.1(a) because § 12-1-12(a), when addressing the sealing of court records, provided that a court record shall be sealed if doing so is “consistent with § 12-1-12.1.”

The defendant, Mustapha Bojang, appealed from two convictions of first-degree child molestation sexual assault.  The defendant argued that the trial justice committed three errors that require this Court to vacate those convictions: (1) the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress statements made to police during a post-arrest interrogation; (2) the refusal to allow cross-examination of the complainant about a false accusation of physical abuse by the complainant against her mother; and (3) the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

 The Court affirmed the trial justice’s denial of the motion for a new trial and held that the limitation on cross-examination was not error.  However, the Court remanded the case to the Superior Court in order for the trial justice to make additional findings of fact and credibility determinations concerning the voluntariness of the defendant’s confessions.

The defendant, Gabriel Santiago, appealed from a conviction for second-degree child molestation sexual assault.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred when she allowed the complaining witness to testify that the defendant’s body part was hard when she touched it.  The witness was able to recall this fact after having her recollection refreshed.  The defendant’s contention was that the state’s supplemental discovery responses indicated that the complaining witness did not remember whether the body part was hard and that her recollection could not be refreshed.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in finding that no discovery violation had occurred.  When a witness’s recollection is refreshed, the witness’s in-court testimony, and not the memorandum used to refresh that recollection, is evidence.  Thus, the fact that the witness’s recollection was not refreshed before trial did not mean that the witness’s recollection could not be refreshed at trial.  The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the conviction.

The defendant, Paul Fleck, appealed from a judgment of conviction for one count of simple domestic assault in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-3 and G.L. 1956 § 12-29-5.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred when she denied both his motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and his motion for new trial under Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure because the weight of the evidence that Fleck and the complaining witness were in a substantive dating relationship as defined under § 12-29-2 was insufficient to support a conviction.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice was not clearly wrong when she denied the motion for new trial. The trial justice reviewed all of the evidence presented, weighed the credibility of the witnesses, and said that she agreed with the verdict.  The Court further held that the Rule 29 motion was not preserved for appellate review but that, even if it had been, the Court would not have reached the issue because the Court affirmed the denial of the Rule 33 motion.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Christian Buchanan, appealed from a judgment of conviction of three counts of second-degree and one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault.  On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial justice abused her discretion in refusing to exclude all evidence of uncharged acts of molestation in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.  The defendant also argued that the trial justice erred in denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for a new trial, claiming that the evidence failed to prove that the crimes occurred at the location or within the time frame listed in the bill of particulars.  Finally, the defendant claimed that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on comments made by the prosecutor, which he contended were unduly prejudicial.
      
After careful review, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant failed to properly preserve the evidentiary issue on appeal by failing to object to the proffered testimony.  The Court also held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial or motion for judgment of acquittal.  Lastly, the Supreme Court concluded that because the defendant did not object to the trial justice’s limiting instructions after the inappropriate comments, the defendant failed to properly preserve the issue on appeal.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The plaintiff, Christopher Reynolds, appealed the granting of a motion for summary judgment by the Superior Court.  Reynolds defaulted on a mortgage loan.  He twice filed bankruptcy petitions, and each time Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank) obtained relief from the automatic stay to pursue foreclosure.  Deutsche Bank filed its second motion for relief from the stay after a foreclosure sale had taken place.  The plaintiff later filed a Superior Court action seeking a declaration that the foreclosure sale was void.  Summary judgment was granted based on res judicata, and the plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the elements of res judicata were satisfied.  The same parties litigated the issue of the propriety of the assignment of the mortgage when Deutsche Bank filed motions for relief from the stay, the second of which came after the foreclosure sale occurred.  In granting that second motion, the bankruptcy judge said that the completed sale was “valid.”  The bankruptcy concluded without appeal, so the order was final.

The judgment was affirmed.

The defendant, the State of Rhode Island, appealed from the entry of partial summary judgment in the Superior Court, holding that the plaintiff, the Narragansett Indian Tribe (Tribe), had standing to pursue its constitutional challenge to the 2011 Casino Act, G.L. 1956 § 42-61.2-1, as enacted by P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 25, § 2, which proposed the establishment of casino table games at the Twin River gambling facility.  On appeal, the state argued that the Tribe had not suffered an injury in fact from the Casino Act so as to give it standing and, further, that the hearing justice erred in finding that the public interest exception to standing applied.
  
The Supreme Court held that the Tribe had suffered an injury in fact because of the removal of some 200 video lottery terminal (VLT) machines from the Twin River establishment in order to accommodate the new table games as the Tribe is entitled to receive a percentage of the revenue from the VLT machines.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment that the Tribe had standing to pursue its cross-appeal of the judgment of the Superior Court on the merits of its claims challenging the constitutionality of the Casino Act.

The petitioner, Steven Iadevaia, appealed from a Superior Court judgment affirming a decision by the respondent, the Town of Scituate Zoning Board of Review, which denied the petitioner’s application for a building permit and dimensional variance.  On appeal, the petitioner argued that the trial justice erred when she affirmed the zoning board’s decision interpreting a frontage requirement in the Scituate Zoning Ordinance.  Further, the petitioner argued that, assuming the Scituate Zoning Ordinance did require frontage, his property had always consisted of two separate lots that had never merged and that, therefore, he was entitled to a dimensional variance for the nonconforming lot.  Finally, the petitioner argued that the trial justice erred when she invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel to preclude the petitioner from advancing the argument that his property had always existed as two separate, discrete lots.

 The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court judgment, holding that the trial justice overlooked substantial evidence in the record indicating that the petitioner owned two separate lots that never merged.  The Supreme Court also held that the trial justice erred by invoking judicial estoppel to prevent the petitioner from arguing that his property had always consisted of two lots.  Finally, the Court determined that the Scituate Zoning Ordinance did not contain a frontage requirement for the petitioner’s residential district and declined to read such a requirement into the ordinance.  The Court remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions to remand the case to the respondent, the Scituate Zoning Board of Review, to treat the unimproved lot as a separate lot and not apply a frontage requirement to the petitioner’s application for a building permit.
 

The plaintiff, Steven T. Burton, appealed a Superior Court decision in favor of the defendant, State of Rhode Island.  The seventeen-year-old plaintiff was injured while exploring the reputedly haunted site of the former Ladd Center.  Rather than encountering ghosts, the plaintiff and his companions discovered four glass bottles containing a clear liquid that was later revealed to be sulfuric acid.  As the plaintiff was attempting to exit a building on the property, one of the bottles broke, splashing him with its contents and severely burning him.
 
Conceding his status as a trespasser, the plaintiff sought recovery from the State of Rhode Island under the doctrine of attractive nuisance.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding that, because the plaintiff was old enough to appreciate the risk of breaking into an abandoned building and of transporting a substance which he admitted he had reason to believe was hazardous, the doctrine of attractive nuisance was inapplicable to this case.  Therefore, because the plaintiff was a trespasser whom the state did not discover in peril, as is required to establish a duty of care, the state owed him no such duty.

The plaintiff, Walter J. Mruk, Jr., appealed from the entry of summary judgment in the Superior Court in favor of defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), IndyMac Mortgage Services (IndyMac), OneWest Bank, FSB (OneWest), and Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA).  On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in holding that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The plaintiff also argued that the assignment of his mortgage from MERS to FNMA was not valid and that the foreclosure sale was not proper.
  
The Supreme Court held that homeowners in Rhode Island have standing to challenge an invalid, ineffective, or void assignment of a mortgage on their homes.  The Supreme Court rejected all of plaintiff’s other arguments on the merits based on its holding in Bucci v. Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, 68 A.3d 1069 (R.I. 2013), and concluded that the assignment of the mortgage was valid and that FNMA had the authority to foreclose on Mruk’s property.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court as to standing but affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court on all other claims.

The defendant, Paul Castriotta, appealed from an order of the Superior Court that denied his motion to vacate judgment and sentence.  The defendant alleged that his nolo contendere plea to second-degree child-molestation charges should be set aside because his attorney did not inform him that his attorney had a personal conflict in continuing to represent the defendant.  The attorney disclosed to the defendant that someone close to him had been the victim of a sexual assault similar in nature to the charges to which the defendant had admitted.  On appeal, the defendant argues that he was not adequately represented.

The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s appeal is not properly before the Court.  Under Rule 32(d) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, once the trial justice has imposed sentence, any issue that relates to the validity of the plea can be addressed only through postconviction relief.  Regardless, the Court noted that the alleged sexual assault that caused the attorney’s conflict did not occur until after the defendant had pleaded.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order.

Gelci Reverdes, who testified as an eyewitness in the 1998 murder trial of the applicant Jorge M. DePina, appealed from a Superior Court order denying her motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum seeking discovery of her medical, psychiatric, and psychological health care records.  On appeal, Reverdes argued (1) that the trial justice abused his discretion by denying the motion to quash, because the requesting party failed to show a particularized need for the information or that the information was relevant to the proceedings, and (2) that the trial justice failed to determine that the need for disclosure outweighed Reverdes’ privacy interests.
    
After a careful review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice erred in denying the motion to quash without first conducting the interest-weighing analysis required by the Rhode Island Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act, G.L. 1956 § 5-37.3-6.1(d), (e).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded the case to the Superior Court to make additional findings consistent with § 5-37.3-6.1(d), (e).

The defendant, Jaylon Baker, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon, carrying a pistol without a license, and using a firearm while committing a crime of violence.  The trial justice’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial provided the sole predicate of the appeal.  The defendant argued that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived material evidence when denying his motion for a new trial.  Specifically, the defendant asserted that the trial justice erred by accepting the testimony of the complaining witness (a police officer) over that of the defendant, because the complaining witness’s testimony was not credible and was not supported by the physical evidence.  The Supreme Court determined that the trial justice articulated adequate grounds for denying the defendant’s motion and did not overlook or misconceive material evidence when making his decision.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction.

The plaintiff appealed from a Superior Court order granting summary judgment for the defendants.  The plaintiff challenged the trial justice’s rulings that the plaintiff’s deceased ex-husband created a valid custodial trust with regard to his life insurance proceeds and that this custodial trust did not violate a property settlement agreement executed by the plaintiff and the decedent in conjunction with their divorce.  The plaintiff argued that the decedent did not create a legally cognizable trust because the property settlement agreement required him to maintain his life insurance policy for the benefit of his minor children, and because his written declaration of trust did not comply with the statutory requirements for creating a custodial trust pursuant to the Rhode Island Uniform Custodial Trust Act.

 The Supreme Court held that the decedent did create a valid custodial trust and that this trust did not violate the terms of the property settlement agreement.  Specifically, the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “in substance” in G.L. 1956 §§ 18-13-3(a), 18-13-18(b)(4), and held that this phrase does not require a verbatim recitation of the statute’s suggested language for the creation of a valid custodial trust.  The Supreme Court also held that the property settlement agreement was not ambiguous, and that its terms allowed the decedent to channel the insurance funds to his children by way of a custodial trust.

The plaintiff, Dennis Martin, as administrator of the estate of his mother, Camella L. Martin, appealed from a judgment entered by the Superior Court in favor of defendant, Michael Coyne, after a jury trial in an automobile accident negligence action.  The plaintiff also appealed from a denial of plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial.  On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in granting defendant’s motion in limine to exclude a document entitled “Notice of Injury—Proof of Loss” which Mrs. Martin had filled out and submitted to Allstate Insurance Company in which she gave a brief description of how the accident occurred.  The plaintiff contended that the document should have been admitted pursuant to the business records exception of Rule 803(6) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.  The plaintiff also argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial because the jury verdict was inconsistent with the evidence.
  
The Supreme Court rejected plaintiff’s argument, holding that the trial justice had not abused his discretion in excluding the document because it had not been properly authenticated as required by Rule 803(6).  The Court also held that the trial justice had not erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Robert Raso, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction declaring him to be in violation of the terms of his probation and sentencing him to serve twenty-five years of his previously imposed sentence. The defendant argued that the complaining witnesses’s testimony was inconsistent and not credible and that, therefore, the hearing justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding a violation.

 The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, holding that the hearing justice had adequately explained the reasoning behind her credibility findings.  Further, the Court held that there was more than sufficient evidence adduced at the violation hearing to support the hearing justice’s credibility assessments and findings. 

The defendant, Charles Mitchell, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction of two counts of first-degree child molestation and five counts of second-degree child molestation.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice abused his discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant’s other bad acts under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.  Second, the defendant challenged the trial justice’s denial of his motion for a new trial.  Finally, he ascribed error to the trial justice’s denial of his request for the appointment of new counsel prior to sentencing.

 The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting evidence that the defendant had allegedly molested the complainant’s sister.  In addition, the Court determined that the trial justice followed the proper procedure in ruling on the defendant’s motion for a new trial and did not overlook or misconceive material evidence.  Lastly, the Court concluded that the trial justice appropriately balanced the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice and the public’s interest in the expeditious administration of justice.  Thus, the Court upheld the trial justice’s denial of the defendant’s request for new counsel.
   
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment.

In this negligence action, resulting from an automobile collision, the defendant, Mario Rosario, appealed from a Superior Court judgment granting a new trial to the plaintiff, Eloisa Gomes.  After a seven-day trial, a jury found that Gomes had failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Rosario was negligent.  The trial justice, however, granted the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, finding that the jury’s assignment of “no liability to the defendant demonstrates that this court’s instructions were not clear or properly understood or applied by the jury in this case.”

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in granting the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment. 

The plaintiff, George E. Morabit, appealed from the Superior Court’s grant of judgments as a matter of law in favor of the defendant, Dennis Hoag.  The plaintiff sought damages for the defendant’s alleged destruction of a stone wall and removal of trees from his property.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in: (1) precluding the testimony of his expert witness on the subject of historic stone walls; and (2) not allowing the jury to consider his evidence of damages for the removed trees.

After a careful review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice committed reversible error by not allowing the plaintiff’s expert to testify on the subject of stone walls.  The trial justice applied an overly stringent standard for the admission of expert testimony.  Even assuming that historic stone walls are a novel field of study, there were sufficient indicia of reliability to allow the jury to consider the expert’s opinions.

With regard to the plaintiff’s second assignment of error, the Court held that the trial justice had improperly granted the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.  The trial justice invaded the province of the jury by making findings of fact and weighing the plaintiff’s evidence of damages.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

The defendant, Lawrence Clay, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction, having been found guilty of kidnapping of a minor and reckless driving, and sentenced to sixty years with thirty years to serve and thirty years suspended, with probation. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in admitting testimony about a prior alleged sexual assault perpetrated by the defendant.  Further, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

 The Supreme Court determined that the evidence of the alleged sexual assault presented at trial related to one continuous event and was necessary in order for the jury to hear a complete and coherent rendition of what transpired relative to the kidnapping and reckless driving charges.  The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court judgment, holding that the evidence of the alleged sexual assault was not admitted merely to show the defendant’s bad character or propensity and was thus admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.

 The Supreme Court also affirmed the Superior Court judgment denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, determining that the trial justice carefully considered all of the consistencies and inconsistencies in the evidence as well as the credibility of the witnesses.

The defendant, Harold T. Drew, appealed from a Superior Court order denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  The defendant was convicted in 2004 on one count of first-degree murder, one count of discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, and three counts of entering a dwelling with the intent to commit a larceny therein.
 
After his conviction, the defendant became aware of a narrative written by a detective from the Swansea Police Department prior to the defendant’s trial.  The narrative was written in connection with an investigation of breaking-and-entering crimes that occurred in Massachusetts.  The defendant filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the narrative disclosed new, material evidence concerning a cooperation agreement between the Swansea Police Department, the Rhode Island State Police, and a prominent state’s witness in the defendant’s murder trial.  The defendant also argued that the narrative evidenced the state’s failure to disclose information in violation of his constitutional due-process rights.  The trial justice conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that the narrative did not present new evidence and that the evidence was merely cumulative and impeaching.
 
 The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.  The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive relevant and material evidence when ruling on the defendant’s motion.  The Supreme Court further held that the defendant’s constitutional due-process rights were not violated because the state did not fail to disclose information.

The plaintiff, John C. O’Donnell, III, appealed from a Family Court order directing him to comply with a provision in a divorce settlement agreement that required him to maintain health insurance for the defendant, Anne A. O’Donnell.  On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that because there was no written marital settlement agreement, there was no meeting of the minds sufficient to form an enforceable agreement.  The plaintiff argued that a stenographic record of an oral agreement reached in open court is not sufficient to form a nonmodifiable marital settlement agreement.

After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the Family Court justice did not err or abuse her discretion in finding that the parties recited and assented to the terms of their agreement in open court, and that the parties intended and agreed that the transcript of that agreement would serve as their marital settlement agreement.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court order. 

The plaintiff, Cynthia Caluori, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Dexter Credit Union, denying her claim for an easement over Dexter’s property.  Mrs. Caluori had sought a declaratory judgment that an easement by prescription and an easement by implication existed that gave her the right to use a paved driveway on the northern border of her property.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in finding that, because she had previously acknowledged the defendant’s superior title and because her use of the driveway was open but not notorious, she had failed to prove the existence of a prescriptive easement.  Further, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in holding that she had not established an implied easement.

 The Supreme Court held that the trial justice erred by relying solely on the original warranty deed, as well as a notice of intent to dispute which was not offered in evidence, to defeat the plaintiff’s claim of hostility and claim of right.  Further, the Supreme Court held that, under the facts of this case, there was no distinction between the requirements of open and notorious use and because the plaintiff had proven her use of the disputed parcel was open, it follows that the use was notorious.  The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the Superior Court judgment that held that Ms. Caluori had not established notorious use, and it directed the Superior Court on remand to make further findings regarding the element of hostility.

Finally, the Supreme Court held that there was no implied easement because Mrs. Caluori had not clearly and convincingly proven that the disputed property was “reasonably necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property” at the time of severance. Vaillancourt v. Motta, 986 A.2d 985, 987 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Wiesel v. Smira, 49 R.I. 246, 250, 142 A. 148, 150 (1928)).

The defendant, Emanuel Baptista, appealed from a judgment of conviction after a jury trial declaring him guilty of two counts of first-degree child molestation and two counts of first- degree child abuse on a child under the age of five.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial by having overlooked and misconstrued material and relevant evidence.  The defendant also claimed the trial justice erred because the jury verdict failed to do substantial justice between the parties.
  
After a thorough review of the record and the trial justice’s articulated reasoning in refusing to grant a new trial, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice independently weighed the testimony, evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, and did not overlook or misconstrue material evidence.  The Supreme Court also held that the trial justice did not need to examine the verdict for substantial justice because she agreed with the jury’s verdict of guilty.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Kendall Whitaker, appealed from a judgment of conviction for (1) murder, (2) robbery, (3) assault with a dangerous weapon, (4) carrying a handgun without a license, (5) using a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, (6) discharging a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and (7) committing a crime of violence while armed and having available a firearm.  Whitaker argued that the trial justice committed error when she denied his motion for new trial, gave the jury confusing or improper instructions, denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, instructed the jury that the defendant was in custody without alerting the defendant that she was contemplating such an instruction, allowed too many leading questions by the state, and failed to record bench conferences.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice’s analysis in her denial of the motion for new trial reveals specific factual findings that indicate that she found truth in some witnesses’ testimony despite her stated concern about the credibility of most of the witnesses.  The Court held that the jury instructions were warranted by the evidence, were not confusing, and accurately set forth the state’s burden of proof.  The motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied because the state’s theory did not require impermissibly pyramiding inferences.

The Court determined that the trial justice should not have informed the jury that the defendant was in custody without following the procedure set forth in State v. Fenner, 503 A.2d 518 (R.I. 1986), but held that, based on the content of the instruction and the lack of an objection or motion to pass, reversible error had not occurred.

Finally, the Supreme Court held that the use of leading questions was not beyond the bounds allowed in a trial justice’s discretion and that the defendant failed to indicate what was said at unrecorded bench conferences, to what he objected, and how he was prejudiced, thereby precluding relief based on that argument.

The Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Donald Young, appealed from a judgment of conviction for (1) the murder of Kasean Benton in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-23-1, (2) conspiring to murder in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-1-6, (3) discharging a firearm during the commission of a violent crime resulting in the death of another in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-47-3.2, (4) assault with a dangerous weapon on Dukuly Torell Soko in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-2, (5) conspiring with others to assault Soko with intent to murder in violation of § 11-1-6, (6) discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence in violation of § 11-47-3.2, and (7) possession of an unlicensed firearm in violation of § 11-47-8(a).  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred when he admitted evidence of gang affiliation and the earlier stabbing of one of the victims and testimony about an unsolved homicide.  The defendant further argued that his constitutional right against double jeopardy was violated because count 4, assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to murder, merged with count 6, discharging a firearm while in the commission of a crime of violence.
 
The Supreme Court held that the defendant had failed to preserve the issue about the admission of evidence and had waived that issue on appeal.  The Supreme Court further held that there was no double-jeopardy violation because this Court had previously determined in State v. Marsich, 10 A.3d 435, 442 (R.I. 2010), that the General Assembly clearly intended that consecutive sentences be imposed for certain crimes of violence committed by use of a firearm.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Aurora Loan Services, LLC, appealed from a grant of summary judgment by the Superior Court in favor of the plaintiff, Option One Mortgage Corporation (Option One), holding that the mortgage held by Option One was superior to the mortgage held by Aurora.  On appeal, Aurora argued that the trial justice was in error in concluding that a reference to a prior deed in the Option One Mortgage description was sufficient to put a subsequent mortgage holder on notice to make further inquiry as to the exact property encumbered by the Option One Mortgage.
 
The Supreme Court rejected Aurora’s argument, relying on its prior decision in In re Barnacle, 623 A.2d 445 (R.I. 1993).  The Court held that the reference to a prior deed in the Option One Mortgage, in addition to the tax assessor’s plat and lot number and street address, were sufficient to put a subsequent mortgage holder on constructive notice of the lot being encumbered by the Option One Mortgage.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Option One.

The defendant, Victor M. Lopez, appealed from a Superior Court conviction for breaking and entering and for felony assault with a dangerous weapon.  On appeal, he argued that the trial justice erred in (1) denying his motion for a new trial; (2) not permitting defense counsel to question potential jurors about eyewitness testimony during voir dire; and (3) denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of felony assault.
  
The Supreme Court held that the trial justice had not erred and had not overlooked or misconceived material evidence in denying Lopez’s motion for a new trial.  The Court also held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in curtailing during voir dire defense counsel’s questioning of potential jurors as to eyewitness testimony.  Finally, the Court held that the trial justice had not erred in denying the motion for a judgment of acquittal because the evidence supported the conviction of felony assault. 

The defendant, Brian Mlyniec, appealed from the order of the Superior Court denying his motion to reduce sentence under Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The defendant alleged that his sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder of Kelly Anderson, which involved aggravated battery, was inappropriate because he was capable of rehabilitation.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the hearing justice abused his discretion in denying the motion to reduce the sentence.

The Supreme Court concluded that the hearing justice identified several circumstances to justify the defendant’s sentence including the severity and brutality of the crime and the defendant’s persistent refusal to take responsibility for Ms. Anderson’s murder.  The Court held that the sentence was neither without justification nor grossly disparate from other sentences generally imposed for similar offenses.

 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment.

The respondent appealed from a Family Court decree terminating his parental rights with respect to his daughters.  On appeal, the respondent argued that the Family Court trial justice erred in finding that: (1) the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) made reasonable efforts to reunite his family; (2) there was no substantial possibility that the children could safely return to his care within a reasonable period of time; and (3) he had abandoned his daughters.

 The Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s decree terminating the respondent’s parental rights.  The Court concluded that the evidence of record showed that DCYF had offered the respondent services aimed at correcting the reasons the children had been placed in care, but the respondent refused to cooperate with DCYF.  Accordingly, the Court held that there was ample evidence to support the trial justice’s finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of DCYF’s reasonable efforts to reunite the respondent with his daughters.  The Court further held that, in light of the respondent’s failure to complete the requirements of his case plans, there was no error in the trial justice’s finding that the children could not safely return to the respondent’s custody within a reasonable period of time. 
           
 The Supreme Court declined to pass on the respondent’s additional allegation of error.

The applicant, Anthony Perkins, appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court denying his postconviction-relief application.  Perkins had previously pled nolo contendere to two counts of second-degree child molestation, and he applied for postconviction relief based on his assertion that his counsel erroneously advised him that a plea was necessary to prevent the state from attempting to revoke his probation stemming from an earlier robbery conviction.  Perkins argued that the advice was erroneous because the robbery conviction was entered after the acts underlying the molestation charges.  On appeal, Perkins contends that the trial justice erred when he denied the application.

The Supreme Court held that there was no basis to conclude that the trial justice committed error when he found that the applicant had never received the advice that he contended was erroneous.  The Court further held that, even if such advice had been given to him, the applicant could not show the prejudice required to prevail on his claim because the sentence he received pursuant to his plea agreement was more favorable than the sentence he could have received had he been convicted after a trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

In these consolidated appeals, the plaintiff, Peter Wyso appealed a Superior Court entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Full Moon Tide LLC and Strings & Things, Inc. and Deborah and Frederick Howarth.  While vacationing on Block Island, the plaintiff fell and suffered injuries on a deteriorated sidewalk in front of 104 Water Street.  The plaintiff filed a negligence claim against the tenants and owners of property abutting a public sidewalk at 104 Water Street in New Shoreham claiming that the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty of care.  The plaintiff made no argument that the defendants were in any way responsible for the condition of the sidewalk.  In granting the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court declared that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the defendants owed the plaintiff no duty of care for the condition of the sidewalk.  The plaintiff argued that this Court can find a duty of care based on the five-factor ad hoc approach we took in Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987).  The plaintiff also contended that a New Shoreham municipal ordinance, which establishes that owners, or agents of owners, of property abutting public sidewalks have a duty to maintain sidewalks in good order and repair, creates a duty of care that runs to individual passersby.

The Supreme Court held that the ad hoc duty of care approach in Banks was not applicable to this case because the defendants did not possess or control the sidewalk.  The Supreme Court also held that consistent with previous jurisprudence, the municipal ordinance in question only established a duty of care to the town of New Shoreham, not to individuals.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment.

The applicant, Eddie M. Linde, appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court denying his application for postconviction relief.  Linde was convicted of second-degree murder and related firearms offenses.  Before this Court, he contended that (1) the mandatory consecutive life sentence imposed under G.L. 1956 § 11-47-3.2 for discharging a firearm while committing a crime was unconstitutional; (2) the conviction and sentence for second-degree murder and discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence resulting in death violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Rhode Island Constitution; and that (3) trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because (a) he failed to argue that the applicant was so intoxicated that he was incapable of knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waiving his right to remain silent; and (b) he failed to present a manslaughter defense based on diminished capacity at the plea-bargaining stage and again, at trial.
  
 After careful review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Linde’s application.  The Court held that Linde’s convictions and sentences did not violate either double jeopardy principles or cruel and unusual punishment proscriptions of the state and federal constitutions.  Additionally, the Court held that Linde’s trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective because a diminished capacity defense would have conflicted with trial strategy and his client’s wishes.

The plaintiff, Jeanne E. Johnson, appealed from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, QBAR Associates, concerning an action filed seeking to vacate a final decree foreclosing the plaintiff’s right to redeem property after a tax sale.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the notices of the petition to foreclose were inadequate because both referred to a tax sale and tax deed from the tax collector of the Town of Cumberland, rather than the North Cumberland Fire District.  The plaintiff also argued that a final decree barring her right of redemption could not have entered without a default having first entered against her.
      
After a careful review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that, under the facts of the case, the plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of the final decree was properly limited to the grounds enunciated in G.L. 1956 § 44-9-24.  The Court determined that there was no indication that the plaintiff received inadequate notice of the petition or was otherwise deprived of due process in the foreclosure proceedings.  The Court also held that, pursuant to § 44-9-30, a default need not enter prior to entry of a final decree foreclosing upon the right of redemption.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.