| Shilo D. Horsman, individually, and in her capacity of as administratrix of the Estate of Eric Horsman and as parent and guardian of Jack Horsman, Matthew Horsman, and Mason Horsman v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America et al. | 7/30/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-30T04:00:00Z | 2025-0247-Appeal. | The plaintiff, Shilo D. Horsman, individually, and in her capacity of as administratrix of the Estate of Eric Horsman (the decedent) and as parent and guardian of Jack Horsman, Matthew Horsman, and Mason Horsman, appealed from a Superior Court entry of judgment in favor of the defendants, Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (Travelers) and Phalanx Engineering, Inc. (Phalanx). Before this Court, the plaintiff argued that the decedent should be considered the individual Named Insured, for the purposes of underinsured motorist insurance under Phalanx’s commercial auto insurance policy because (1) the decedent was a corporate officer of Phalanx and was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, (2) Travelers waived its right to contest the decedent’s status as an individual Named Insured because, according to the plaintiff, this reason was not offered in Travelers’ pre-suit denial letters, (3) the “Limit of Insurance” provision in the Policy which capped the maximum payment for UIM coverage rendered the stacking benefit illusory, and (4) intra-policy stacking is required pursuant to the Rhode Island Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Statute, G.L. 1956 § 27-7-2.1(i).
The Supreme Court concluded that the fact that the decedent was an employee of Phalanx and acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident was not dispositive as to his entitlement to stack UIM benefits. The Court also determined that Travelers sufficiently cited its reasons for rejecting the plaintiff’s demand to stack in its denial letters and thus did not waive its right to contest the stacking benefit or that the decedent was not an individual Named Insured. Additionally, the Court concluded that the Policy’s “Limit of Insurance” provision did not render coverage illusory. Lastly, the Court concluded that, as it addressed in Finch v. Centennial Insurance Company, 650 A.2d 495 (R.I. 1994), § 27-7-2.1(i) is inapplicable to commercial fleet policies. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |
| Yohaira Galindez v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority et al. | 7/30/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-30T04:00:00Z | 2024-0219-Appeal. | In this negligence action, the plaintiff, Yohaira Galindez, appealed from a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA). Galindez alleged that in 2016 she had sustained injuries while riding a RIPTA bus due to the driver’s negligent operation of the vehicle. Before the Supreme Court, Galindez set forth eleven assignments of error, arguing that the trial justice erred in: six evidentiary rulings; allowing RIPTA to amend its answer at the eleventh hour; dismissing a juror; rendering a prejudicial answer to a question from the jury; giving an improper jury instruction; and improperly denying her motion for new trial. The Court affirmed the judgment, deeming several issues waived and those properly preserved without merit. |
| Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association v. Brenda Ricci et al. | 7/30/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-30T04:00:00Z | 2023-0251-Appeal. and 2024-0246-Appeal. | The defendants, Brenda and Ernest Ricci, appealed from a final judgment of the Superior Court entered following a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association, on the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action and on all counts contained in the Riccis’ counterclaims. The defendants also appealed from the denial of the Riccis’ motions for a new trial. The Supreme Court found no errors with respect to the trial justice’s rulings throughout the pretrial and trial stages. The Supreme Court also affirmed the trial justice’s decision denying the defendants’ motions for a new trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and the trial justice’s denial of the motions for a new trial. |
| Myles Standish Associates, LP, et al. v. The City of Providence by and through the City of Providence Board of Licenses et al. | 7/29/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-29T04:00:00Z | 2025-0223-Appeal. | Myles Standish Associates, LP (Myles Standish) appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the defendants, the City of Providence, members of the City of Providence Board of Licenses, and interested party George Potsidis d/b/a Estiatorio Fili, Inc. following a decision on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Myles Standish argued that the trial justice misinterpreted the plain text of article 13, section 4 of the Rhode Island Constitution by concluding that the General Assembly permissibly enacted Public Laws 2023, chs. 387 and 388, codified at G.L. 1956 § 3 7 19(d)(63), in the absence of local voter approval. The Supreme Court concluded that the General Assembly violated article 13, section 4 of the Rhode Island Constitution when it enacted § 3-7-19(d)(63) in the absence of local voter approval. Accordingly, it vacated judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Myles Standish. |
| Carol Williams, Individually, and for and on Behalf of the Estate and the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Anthony David Williams, et al. v. Avco Corporation | 7/29/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-29T04:00:00Z | 2024-0144-Appeal. | The plaintiffs, Carol Williams, individually, and on behalf of the estate and the wrongful death beneficiaries of decedent Anthony David Williams, and William Gregory Young and Debra Anne Thigpen, individually, and on behalf of the estate and wrongful death beneficiaries of decedent William Clayton Young, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Avco Corporation. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the Superior Court erred in limiting the scope of discovery relative to their claims under the misrepresentation exception of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA). The plaintiffs also argued that the Superior Court erred in entering summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ remaining theories of liability premised on GARA’s rolling provision. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court did not err in limiting the scope of discovery relative to § 2(b)(1), reasoning that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint failed to plead with the requisite specificity to invoke GARA’s misrepresentation exception. Additionally, the Supreme Court concluded that, absent causation, plaintiffs failed to establish that GARA’s rolling provision applied. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. |
| Patrick M. Hogan v. Amanda H. Wong | 7/22/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-22T04:00:00Z | 2024-0377-Appeal. | The plaintiff, Patrick M. Hogan, appealed from an October 7, 2024 order of the Family Court affirming a decision of the general magistrate that had awarded certain marital assets to the defendant, Amanda H. Wong, in this divorce action. Before this Court, the plaintiff contended that the Family Court erred (1) in “valuing certain marital assets as of the date of separation rather than the date of divorce;” and (2) in “fail[ing] to consider unvested stock options and RSUs as an asset to be divided.”
The Supreme Court held that compelling circumstances existed which permitted the Family Court to value certain marital assets as of the date of separation rather than the date of divorce and that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in assigning to the defendant the stock options and RSUs that were unvested as of the date of separation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Family Court. |
| Cassandra Constantino v. Zsolt Orban | 7/17/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-17T04:00:00Z | 2025-0082-Appeal. | In this divorce action, the defendant, Zsolt Orban, appealed pro se from a Family Court decision pending the entry of final judgment. Orban challenged the distribution of several marital assets and the trial justice’s award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff, Cassandra Constantino. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in his determinations regarding the equitable division and award of attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court. |
| State v. Quelon Page | 7/16/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-16T04:00:00Z | 2025-0050-C.A. | The defendant, Quelon Page, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction following a trial at which the jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit an assault with a dangerous weapon, discharge of a firearm when committing a crime of violence resulting in death, and carrying a pistol or revolver without a license or permit. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the verdict was against the fair preponderance of the evidence and the trial justice’s decision “failed to point to any evidence that showed [the defendant] was the shooter.” The Supreme Court held that the trial justice erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial because she failed to articulate a sufficient rationale in support of her conclusion that reasonable minds could differ as to the defendant’s culpability for the charged offenses. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the trial justice’s decision denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial and remanded the matter for a new hearing on the motion for a new trial. |
| Terrel Barros v. State of Rhode Island | 7/16/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-16T04:00:00Z | 2023-0308-M.P. | The Supreme Court granted the state’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review a Superior Court judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Terrel Barros, on his application for postconviction relief. Before the Court, the state argued that the hearing justice erred in sustaining Mr. Barros’s claims and granting his application for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court granting Mr. Barros’s application for postconviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence and remanded the record of the case to the Superior Court. |
| State v. Noel Ignacio Moronta | 7/15/2026 4:00:00 AM;2026-07-15T04:00:00Z | 2025-0083-C.A. | Noel Ignacio Moronta appealed from a judgment of conviction and commitment following a bench trial at which he was found guilty of failing to report a death with the intention of concealing a crime, to wit, possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, and a number of other crimes relating to possession and intent to deliver fentanyl, xylazine, and cocaine. On appeal, Mr. Moronta argued that police officers entered an apartment without a warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances and that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of the warrantless search. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice erred in denying Mr. Moronta’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated his conviction and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new trial. |