Supreme Court

Published Opinions 2022 - 2023 Term

  
  
  
Green Development, LLC a/k/a Wind Energy Development, LLC v. Town of Exeter et al., No. 20-244 (July 28, 2023)20-244.pdf20-244
The plaintiff, Green Development, LLC a/k/a Wind Energy Development, LLC (plaintiff) appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the defendant, the Town of Exeter (defendant or the town), which upheld the town’s decision to pause, and subsequently to amend, its zoning ordinance. The plaintiff argued on appeal that the trial justice erred in (1) upholding the town’s decision to enact an emergency moratorium ordinance, pausing the town’s review of the plaintiff’s solar-field projects; and (2) determining that the plaintiff’s submissions for its solar-field projects did not vest pursuant to Rhode Island law.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice properly determined that the plaintiff’s solar-field submissions did not vest pursuant to Rhode Island law and that the town permissibly enacted its moratorium ordinance.
State v. Junjie Li;  State v. Zhong Kuang, Nos. 21-153, 154 (July 27, 2023)Nos. 21-153, 154.pdfNos. 21-153, 154
In these cases consolidated for argument, the state appealed from two identical orders of the Superior Court granting the defendants’, Junjie Li and Zhong Kuang, motions to suppress evidence of approximately ninety-four (94) pounds of marijuana seized from Kuang’s vehicle during a traffic stop. On appeal, the state asserted that the trial justice erred in granting the defendants’ motions to suppress, contending that the police officer who conducted the traffic stop had reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop after detecting a slight odor of marijuana and observing nervous behavior on the part of the defendants.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court erred in determining that reasonable suspicion did not exist allowing the officer to prolong the stop. The Supreme Court also concluded that the odor of raw or fresh marijuana, without any indication of quantity, remains a factor to be considered in a totality of the circumstances, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity analysis, despite marijuana’s decriminalization and legalization. Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court erred in ruling that the police officer who conducted the stop did not possess reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop based on the totality of the circumstances and, consequently, erred in granting the defendants’ motions to suppress. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the orders of the Superior Court, and remanded the matters for further proceedings.
State v. Mitchell Savard, No. 20-229 (July 26, 2023)No. 20-229.pdfNo. 20-229
The defendant, Mitchell Savard, appealed from a judgment of conviction following a jury trial at which he was found guilty of operating a vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, death resulting; and operating a vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, personal injury resulting.  On appeal, Mr. Savard argued that the trial justice erred (1) in denying his motion for a new trial on the basis that the weight of the evidence did not support his conviction and (2) by admitting evidence from an electronic data recovery system obtained from one of the vehicles involved in the automobile collision.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice properly exercised her independent judgment, did not overlook or misconceive the testimony before her, and provided adequate reasons supporting her denial of Mr. Savard’s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence.  The Court further concluded that Mr. Savard failed to raise his evidentiary objection before the trial justice and, as a result, concluded that it was waived.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction of the Superior Court.
State v. Jerome Joseph; State v. Voguel Figaro, Nos. 21-164, 166 (July 20, 2023)Nos. 21-164, 166.pdfNos. 21-164, 166
The state appealed from two Superior Court orders granting motions to suppress filed by the defendants, Jerome Joseph and Voguel Figaro.  On appeal, the state argued that the hearing justice erred because: (1) the state police had reasonable suspicion to support detaining the defendants and allowing a police dog to perform a narcotics sniff, and (2) no evidence of racial bias existed.

The Supreme Court concluded that the hearing justice improperly interjected the issue of racial bias sua sponte.  The Supreme Court, however, held that the hearing justice’s decision was otherwise amply supported by the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing and, ultimately, that the state police did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support detaining the defendants beyond completion of the traffic infraction investigation.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Superior Court.
Jessica Marie Purcell v. Clay Johnson et al.; Clay Johnson in his capacity as Council Appointee to the Chariho Regional School Committee, et al.  v. Chariho Regional School Committee Nos. 2023-26, 28 (July 18, 2023)Nos. 2023-26, 28.pdfNos. 2023-26, 28
In these petitions in equity in the nature of quo warranto, Jessica Marie Purcell brought an action, seeking a determination by the Supreme Court that Clay Johnson be removed from the Chariho Regional School Committee and ordering the Town Council of the Town of Richmond to appoint Purcell to the School Committee member. Similarly, Johnson brought an action in quo warranto, seeking a determination that he rightfully retain his membership on the School Committee following his appointment to same by the Council.

Purcell maintained that the General Assembly expressly ratified the entire Charter in section 1 of the relevant public law, and further, that the Chariho Act and the Charter can be read congruently. Purcell argued that if the Chariho Act and the Charter are in conflict, the canons of statutory construction mandate that the Charter prevails because it is more specific than the Chariho Act and that it became effective and is more recent in time than the Chariho Act. Johnson’s most emphatic argument was that the vacancy provision of the Charter was not expressly ratified by the General Assembly, because the Chariho Act was not referenced in either section 1 or 2 of the public law ratifying the Charter and therefore, it did not attain the status of a state law.

The Supreme Court determined that the General Assembly expressly ratified the entire Charter. The Supreme Court concluded that the Charter was more specific than the Chariho Act. Accordingly, Johnson’s petition was denied and Purcell’s petition was granted. The Court held that Purcell is legally entitled to the office of Chariho Regional School Committee member.
Enrique Sosa v. City of Woonsocket, No. 21-332 (July 14, 2023)No. 21-332.pdfNo. 21-332
The defendant, the City of Woonsocket (the city), appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Enrique Sosa, declaring that the city terminated the plaintiff’s employment from the Woonsocket Police Department in violation of G.L. 1956 § 42-28.6-4 of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBOR).  On appeal, the city asserted that the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief in the matter because the plaintiff failed to join all interested parties.  The city further argued that the plaintiff’s admission to sufficient facts in a Massachusetts District Court equated to a plea of no contest to a felony under § 42 28.6-13(i) of LEOBOR, justifying immediate termination of his employment.

The Supreme Court concluded that Superior Court had the authority to proceed in the matter because the body of the plaintiff’s complaint properly named the City of Woonsocket as the defendant.  The Supreme Court held that the Presiding Justice correctly found that, because Rhode Island has no functional equivalent, the plaintiff’s admission to sufficient facts continued without a finding in Massachusetts did not qualify as a plea of guilty or no contest pursuant to § 42-28.6-13(i).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.


Apex Oil Company, Inc., individually and as Assignee of Glencore, Ltd. v. State of Rhode Island, acting by and through Division of Taxation, Nos. 21-116, 117 (July 14, 2023)Nos. 21-116, 117.pdfNos. 21-116, 117
The plaintiff, Apex Oil Company, Inc. (Apex), filed a petition of certiorari seeking review of an order of the Sixth Division District Court dismissing two actions that challenge the State of Rhode Island Division of Taxation’s denial of Apex’s claim for a refund of $4,280,039.44 paid for Motor Fuel Tax assessed on the purchase and sale of 300,000 barrels of oil.  Apex claimed that (1) it had standing because it suffered an injury in fact and also was the beneficiary of express statutory authority granting standing to seek a refund of the Motor Fuel Tax; (2) the trial judge erred in concluding that res judicata barred its appeal; and (3) the doctrine of administrative finality did not apply to bar its claims.

The Supreme Court concluded that Apex had suffered an injury in fact and thus had standing to pursue its claims.  The Court explained that Apex had suffered a substantial economic injury in excess of $4 million.  This injury, the Court opined, was concrete, particularized, and actual, not conjectural or hypothetical.  The Court also determined that Apex’s injury was caused by the Division because it was traceable to the action of the Division—namely, the Division’s decision to deny Apex a motor fuel distributor registration certificate and then impose the Motor Fuel Tax.

The Court also concluded that the trial judge erred in dismissing Apex’s claims based upon the doctrine of res judicata.  The Court explained that the parties to the settlement agreement and the parties in the instant action were not the same, nor were they in privity, because Glencore and Apex did not share a commonality of interests.  Specifically, the Court noted that, at the time of the settlement agreement, Glencore had no incentive to challenge the tax as Apex was required to reimburse it pursuant to the terms of their contract. 

Lastly, the Court concluded that the doctrine of administrative finality did not apply because the doctrine requires that the initial application for tax relief be denied.  Furthermore, the Court explained, Glencore’s initial request for relief sought only penalty and interest abatement while Apex’s request for relief sought a refund of the tax.  Therefore, the two requests were not the same or substantially similar.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the order of the District Court. 


Gunvor USA, LLC v. State of Rhode Island, acting by and through Division of Taxation, No. 21-165 (July 14, 2023)No. 21-165.pdfNo. 21-165
The plaintiff, Gunvor USA, LLC (Gunvor), filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a decision by the Sixth Division District Court granting the motion to dismiss of the defendant, the State of Rhode Island, acting by and through the Division of Taxation (the Division).  The plaintiff claimed that it was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to bringing suit against the Division. 

The Supreme Court concluded that Gunvor was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies given the inflexibility of the Division’s position throughout the proceedings in Apex Oil Company, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island, Nos. 2021 116 M.P., 2021-117-M.P. (Apex), and the tax administrator’s adoption of that position, that only the entity that paid the tax directly to the Division had standing.  The Court explained that the outcome of the Apex case made it transparently clear that under the identical factual circumstances of this case, Gunvor’s application for a refund of the Motor Fuel Tax would not be granted.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the order of the District Court. 
State v. James Robinson, No. 21-93 (July 13, 2023)No. 21-93.pdfNo. 21-93
The defendant, James Robinson, appealed from a March 29, 2021 judgment of conviction and commitment on three counts of first-degree sexual assault entered following a jury trial.  On appeal, the defendant contended that: (1) the trial justice violated his constitutional right to present a defense by excluding certain expert testimony; (2) the trial justice erroneously instructed the jury that there was no need for the complaining witness’s testimony to be corroborated in order to support a guilty verdict even though the complaining witness did not testify explicitly as to penetration; and (3) the trial justice improperly limited the redirect examination of the defendant.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in excluding the proposed expert testimony pursuant to Rule 401 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.  In addition, the Court determined that the trial justice did not err when instructing the jury as to the corroboration issue.  Finally, the Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in limiting the redirect examination of the defendant.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. 
State v. Richard Gamache, No. 20-288 (July 10, 2023)No. 20-288.pdfNo. 20-288
The defendant, Richard Gamache, appealed from a judgment of conviction and commitment on eleven counts of “intentionally and without authorization directly or indirectly” accessing, altering, damaging, or destroying “any computer system, computer network, computer software, computer program or data contained in a computer system,” in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11 52 3 and on two counts of “knowingly giv[ing] to an agent, servant, or employee of the State of Rhode Island, a document * * * which contained a false, erroneous or defective statement in an important particular,” with the intent “to mislead the State of Rhode Island,” in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11 18 1. 

On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground that the uncontroverted relevant evidence revealed that he had the authority to make the deletions in question.  The Supreme Court held that, pursuant to the Court’s raise or waive rule, the defendant’s appellate argument was not properly before the Court.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

State v. James White, No. 21-216 (June 30, 2023)No. 21-216.pdfNo. 21-216
The defendant, James White, appealed from a December 11, 2020 judgment of conviction and commitment on one count of first degree sexual assault entered following a jury trial.  On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice committed prejudicial error by permitting the state to introduce into evidence a nurse’s testimony relative to the alleged sexual assault as related to her by the complaining witness.  The Supreme Court, relying on the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule, held that, with the exception of one discrete portion of the testimony, the trial justice did not commit reversible error in her rulings relative to the nurse’s testimony.  As to the portion of the nurse’s testimony which the trial justice erroneously allowed into evidence, the Court held that said error was harmless.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.  
In re R.M., No. 22-77 (June 30, 2023)No. 22-77.pdfNo. 22-77
The respondent mother, Esmeralda M., appealed from a November 24, 2021 decree of the Family Court terminating her parental rights to her daughter, R.M.  On appeal, the respondent contended that the trial justice erred in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Department of Children, Youth, and Families had made reasonable efforts to achieve Esmeralda’s reunification with R.M.  The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in determining that DCYF made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decree of the Family Court.
Robert Houllahan v. Louis E. Gelineau et al., Peter Cummings v. Louis E. Gelineau et al., Philip Edwardo v.  Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence et al., Nos. 21-32, 21-33, 21-41 (June 30, 2023)Nos. 21-32, 21-33, 21-41.pdfNos. 21-32, 21-33, 21-41
The plaintiffs, Robert Houllahan, Peter Cummings, and Philip Edwardo, appealed from a Superior Court decision in favor of the defendants, Louis E. Gelineau et al., dismissing all claims in these consolidated cases.  On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the trial justice erred in dismissing the complaints as time barred.  The plaintiffs also urged this court to abrogate its prior holding in the leading case of Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873 (R.I. 1996), and its progeny, which serves to bar recovery against those whose conduct, plaintiffs submit, rises to the level of criminality.  The plaintiffs also contended that the trial court erred in overlooking a single claim by plaintiff Edwardo that was based on New York law.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice was correct in finding that § 9 1 51 unambiguously distinguished between perpetrator and non-perpetrator defendants; and that the defendants in the cases at bar were properly classified as non-perpetrators.  The Court also concluded that the defendants could not be found to be aiders and abettors because they did not knowingly, willfully, and intentionally seek, through their conduct, to accomplish the sexual abuse of the plaintiffs by the offending priests.  The Supreme Court further held that even if the defendants had violated Rhode Island’s penal code, their conduct still categorized them as non perpetrators.

The Supreme Court concluded that the legislative history of § 9-1-51 proved fatal to the plaintiffs’ argument that the General Assembly did not intend to retroactively apply the amended statute of limitations as to perpetrator defendants only.  Additionally, the Court declined the plaintiffs’ appeal to abandon its settled precedent and allow claims to go forward in cases in which defendants’ actions rise to the level of criminality, even if they are time-barred.  Finally, the Supreme Court found that the statute of limitations was not tolled under theories of equitable estoppel or fraudulent concealment, and that plaintiff Edwardo’s New York claim was not properly preserved for review.  The Court declined to address defendants’ contention that the revival of these claims against the defendants was prohibited by the Rhode Island Constitution.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court.

Patricia Noonan, individually and in her capacity as Executrix of and on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Estate of William J. Noonan, et al.  v. Sundersansan Sambandam, M.D., No. 22-22 (June 27, 2023)No. 22-22.pdfNo. 22-22
The plaintiffs, Patricia Noonan, individually and in her capacity as Executrix of and on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Estate of William J. Noonan, Linda Byrne, Terri Pare, Karen LeCam, and Steven Noonan, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of an order of the Superior Court granting the motion of the defendant, Sundaresan T. Sambandam, M.D., to compel production of a complete, unredacted copy of a settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and former codefendants who settled the plaintiffs’ claims.  The plaintiffs claimed that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting the motion to compel because the amount paid in accordance with the settlement agreement is not discoverable pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. 

The Supreme Court concluded that the settlement amount would not be admissible evidence at trial pursuant to Rule 408 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence and also that the amount was not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as required by Rule 26(b)(1).  The Court explained that the amount would become relevant only after a verdict was reached in the plaintiffs’ favor in order to determine whether the defendant is entitled to an offset pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, G.L. 1956 § 10-6-7.  Therefore, the Court concluded that the settlement amount was not discoverable and that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting the defendant’s motion to compel.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Superior Court.

State v. Treven Leonard, No. 21-71 (June 26, 2023)21-71.pdf21-71
The defendant, Treven Leonard, appealed from a judgment of conviction and commitment following a jury trial in Kent County Superior Court.  On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial justice’s decisions on two motions that he made during the course of the trial.  First, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to pass the case because the prosecutor’s closing remarks improperly shifted the burden of proof.  Second, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial, on the basis that the trial justice admitted evidence that was both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.

The Supreme Court upheld the trial justice’s rulings on both motions.  The Court concluded that the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments were proper.  The Court also determined that the allegedly objectionable evidence was both relevant and not unduly prejudicial to the defendant.  Therefore, the Court upheld the trial justice’s decision as to both motions.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of conviction entered by the Superior Court.
Newport and New Road, LLC v. Steven D. Hazard, in his capacity as the Tax Assessor, City of East Providence, Rhode Island, No. 21-318 (June 22, 2023)No. 21-318.pdfNo. 21-318
The petitioner, Newport and New Road, LLC, appealed from a Superior Court decision granting summary judgment in favor of the respondent, Steven D. Hazard, in his capacity as the tax assessor for the City of East Providence.  The petitioner argued that the Superior Court justice erred in determining that the three-month statute of limitations contained in G.L. 1956 §§ 44-5-26 and 44-5-27 barred its challenge to the respondent’s assessment of property taxes.

The Supreme Court determined that the three-month statute of limitations contained in § 44-5-26 barred the petitioner’s challenge to the respondent’s property tax assessment and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
Robert M. Estrella, as the Executor of the Estate of Armando Damiani and the Executor of the Estate of Lillian Estrella v. Janney Montgomery Scott LLC et al.,  No. 21-56 (June 22, 2023)No. 21-56.pdfNo. 21-56
Following a civil jury trial, the defendant, Steven Damiani, appealed from a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Robert Estrella, as the Executor of the Estate of Armando Damiani and the Executor of the Estate of Lillian Estrella.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred by permitting a witness to testify despite knowing in advance that she would invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  The defendant argued that the taint from that testimony infected the jury’s verdict as well as the trial justice’s grant of declaratory relief.  The defendant also argued that a party who is found to be a coconspirator in a civil action is an agent of his coconspirator and, thus, a single tortfeasor under G.L. 1956 § 10 6 2.  Because of this, the defendant asserted, a release of his alleged coconspirator also operated to release him. 

The Supreme Court concluded that the probative value of the witness invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege before the jury was outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice to the defendant.  The Supreme Court vacated the jury’s verdict and remanded the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court determined that sufficient facts supported the trial justice’s decision on the plaintiff’s claim for declaratory judgment.  Based on the need to remand the case, the Court did not reach the defendant’s arguments related to the plaintiff’s release of the defendant’s alleged coconspirator.  Accordingly, the Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the Superior Court. 

Donna DiDonato v. Germano DiDonato, No. 21-19 (June 21, 2023)21-19.pdf21-19
The defendant, Germano DiDonato, appealed the decision pending entry of final judgment in this divorce proceeding.  He argued that the trial justice erred in the determination and assignment of marital property and sanctioning him $50,000. Additionally, defendant argued that the trial justice “disfavored” him and erred in crediting $16,000 to plaintiff Donna DiDonato, for funds defendant withdrew from bank accounts while the divorce proceedings were pending. 

The Court ruled that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion distributing marital property and sanctioning defendant.  Moreover, the Court concluded that defendant did not properly present an issue for appellate review with respect to his other arguments.  Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court.

Anne Capaldi v. Steven Capaldi, No. 21-328 (June 21, 2023)No. 21-328.pdfNo. 21-328
The defendant, Steven Capaldi, appealed the Family Court’s decision to reopen this case and award a portion of his pension to the plaintiff, Anne Capaldi.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s request for one-half of the marital portion of the defendant’s pensions, filed more than two decades after the Family Court finalized their divorce, was untimely pursuant to the statute of limitations in G.L. 1956 § 9-1-17 and barred by the doctrine of laches.  The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff’s latent discovery of the defendant’s pension did not toll the statute of limitations. 

The Supreme Court vacated the orders of the Family Court.

State v. Tony Reverdes, No. 21-218 (June 20, 2023)No. 21-218.pdfNo. 21-218
The defendant, Tony Reverdes, appealed from a judgment of conviction of five counts of first-degree robbery and three counts of conspiracy to commit robbery.  On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial justice erred by (1) failing to exclude certain statements the defendant made regarding firearms during a post-arrest police interview and (2) denying his motion for a new trial. 

The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in failing to exclude the defendant’s statements made regarding firearms during his post-arrest police interview.  Specifically, the Court concluded that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting the defendant’s statements pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.  The Court also determined that the trial justice had not violated Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence when he decided not to preclude the admission of the defendant’s statements.  Lastly, the Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial because the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

State v. Louis Sinapi, Nos. 19-388, 19-415 (June 20, 2023)Nos. 19-388, 19-415.pdfNos. 19-388, 19-415
The defendant, Louis Sinapi, appealed from a judgment of conviction following a jury trial for larceny of an automobile and from a judgment adjudicating him a probation violator.  On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial justice erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence collected as a result of a warrantless search of his real-time cell-site location information (CSLI); (2) denying his motion to suppress David DiSano’s identifications of him pursuant to Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; (3) denying his motion to exclude Jill Cataldi’s testimony regarding the consistent refusal of the decedent to loan his car to others, pursuant to Rule 406 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; and (4) determining that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation.

The Supreme Court concluded that the acquisition of the defendant’s CSLI constituted a search under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under article 1, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution, for which a warrant was generally required.  The Court, however, concluded that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement was met under the facts of the case.  The Court also determined that the trial justice properly admitted DiSano’s identifications of the defendant under Rule 403 and Cataldi’s testimony under Rule 406.  Lastly, the Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in declaring him a violator of his probation.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court.
Brian Dockray v. Roger Williams Medical Center, No. 22-235 (June 15, 2023)No. 22-235.pdfNo. 22-235
The plaintiff, Brian Dockray, appealed from the Providence County Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Roger Williams Medical Center.  The plaintiff contended that the motion justice erred in holding that he could not prove his claims, which sounded in medical malpractice and negligent credentialing, without expert testimony.  The Supreme Court held that the motion justice did not err in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff could not establish his claims without expert testimony because the alleged negligence would not be obvious to a layman.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, not in its individual capacity but solely as Certificate Trustee of BOSCO CREDIT II TRUST Series 2010-1 v. David Cavalloro et al., No. 22-166 (June 13, 2023)No. 22-166.pdfNo. 22-166
The defendants, David and Nicole Cavalloro, appealed from a Superior Court final judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB.  The complaint sought to recover principal, interest, late fees, attorneys’ fees, and costs under the terms of a promissory note.  On appeal, the defendants contended that the hearing justice erred by granting the motion for summary judgment because the issue as to the adequacy of the notice given to the defendants constituted a genuine issue of material fact that should have precluded the hearing justice from granting summary judgment.

The Supreme Court concluded that the hearing justice erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because, read in its entirety, the promissory note set forth the procedures pursuant to which notice should be provided and the plaintiff failed to abide by those procedural requirements.  Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment appealed from and remanded the case to Superior Court for further proceedings.



State v. John Davis, No. 21-337 (June 13, 2023)No. 21-337.pdfNo. 21-337
The defendant, John Davis, appealed from a Superior Court order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the habitual offender statute requires that some portion of a habitual offender sentence be parolable; and that, therefore, the ten-year nonparolable habitual offender sentence he received was illegal.  

The Supreme Court held that the plain and unambiguous language of the habitual offender statute does not preclude the sentencing justice from ordering the entire sentence to be served, provided that the habitual sentence does not exceed twenty-five years.  Consequently, the Court affirmed the order denying the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Ronald J. Resmini v. Verizon New England Inc., No. 22-32 (June 13, 2023)No. 22-32.pdfNo. 22-32
The plaintiff, Ronald J. Resmini, appealed from the Superior Court’s grant of the motion to dismiss of the defendant, Verizon New England Inc.  The plaintiff had filed a complaint that alleged fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract on the grounds that he had allegedly been charged for a burglar alarm service that had become inoperable.

The Supreme Court held that the motion to dismiss should have been treated as a motion for summary judgment.  The Court further held that the motion for summary judgment should have been denied due to the presence of disputed issues of material fact.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.


Erin Beaudry, in her capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Armand Beaudry v. Randy Rossi, in his capacity as Finance Director/Treasurer for the Town of Smithfield, No. 21-279 (June 9, 2023)No. 21-279.pdfNo. 21-279
The plaintiff, Erin Beaudry, in her capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Armand Beaudry, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Randy Rossi, in his capacity as Finance Director/Treasurer for the Town of Smithfield.  Specifically, the Superior Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s amended complaint without prejudice, in order to give the plaintiff an opportunity to exhaust the available administrative remedy relative to her claim.

The matter initially arose from a dispute over the plaintiff’s disability pension benefits from the town.  The central issue on appeal was whether an amendment to the town’s pension plan had been properly enacted by the town council.

On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the validity of the amendment as a matter of law.  After reviewing the language of the town charter and the relevant caselaw, the Court held that the amendment was not properly enacted by the town council.  As a result, the Court concluded that no administrative remedy existed at the time of the plaintiff’s claim and that, therefore, she had proceeded properly in the Superior Court.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.


Karen A. Oliveira v. Ashley L. Levesque, No. 22-45 (June 9, 2023)22-45.pdf22-45
The defendant, Ashley L. Levesque, appealed pro se from a Superior Court entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Karen A. Oliveira.  According to the defendant, she did not object to the plaintiff’s motion or appear at the Superior Court hearing on the motion because she was under the impression that she and the plaintiff had settled. 

The Supreme Court held that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. 
Gary V. Jenkins v. City of East Providence et al., No. 22-130 (June 6, 2023)No. 22-130.pdfNo. 22-130
The plaintiff, Gary V. Jenkins, appealed from the denial of his petition for writ of mandamus and dismissal of his complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.  On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the trial justice erred in concluding that res judicata barred his claims and that he had failed to establish the required elements that would entitle him to a writ of mandamus.

The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to provide any meaningful discussion of the issues on appeal, as required by Article I, Rule 12A of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure.  The Supreme Court also concluded that the plaintiff’s arguments were not raised in the trial court and were therefore waived.  The Court noted, however, that even if the plaintiff’s claims were properly before it, it was undisputed that the claims were barred by res judicata.
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.
In re R.M., No. 21-336 (June 2, 2023)No. 21-336.pdfNo. 21-336
The respondent appealed from a Family Court decree, issued on November 24, 2021, terminating his parental rights to his biological child.  The respondent maintained that the decree should be vacated because the trial justice erred in finding that he was unfit to parent, that the Department of Children, Youth, and Families made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification, and that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate his parental rights. 

The Supreme Court determined that competent evidence supported the trial justice’s findings.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Family Court.

Joan Vecchio v. Women & Infants Hospital, No. 21-278 (May 30, 2023)No. 21-278.pdfNo. 21-278
On review by way of certiorari, the petitioner, Joan Vecchio, challenged a Superior Court order granting the respondent’s, Women & Infants Hospital, motion for a protective order limiting the deposition testimony of Vecchio’s expert witness, David Brewster, M.D., to causation opinions and prohibiting Vecchio from further supplementing Dr. Brewster’s disclosure to include other opinions.  Before this Court, Vecchio contended that the Superior Court order should be overturned, arguing that: (1) the supplemental disclosure of Dr. Brewster was the product of trial preparation and in compliance with the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) the supplemental disclosure was not made on the eve of trial, and, thus, W&I Hospital had sufficient opportunity to reschedule Dr. Brewster’s deposition; and (3) prohibiting Vecchio from supplementing her expert disclosures would be drastic and inequitable, and will hinder her right to a fair trial.

The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting W&I Hospital’s motion and prohibiting Vecchio from supplementing Dr. Brewster’s testimony to include opinions on the postoperative standard of care, reasoning that the record made clear that Vecchio had made every attempt to comply with the Superior Court’s scheduling orders regarding discovery and expert disclosures.  Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that counsel for Vecchio notified opposing counsel promptly after learning from Dr. Brewster that he intended to opine on the postoperative standard of care.  Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that this was clearly not a case in which Vecchio grossly or repeatedly deviated from the Superior Court’s scheduling orders or Rules of Civil Procedure, and that W&I Hospital would not be prejudiced in any way by Vecchio supplementing Dr. Brewster’s disclosure.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the order of the Superior Court.
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