Supreme Court

In Superior Court, the plaintiffs, Johnston Equities Associates, LP, and Stay Away From The Cans, LLC, obtained a $1.2 million jury verdict in their favor for a trespass claim against the defendants, the Town of Johnston; Joseph Chiodo, in his capacity as Finance Director of the Town of Johnston; and Robert Parker, in his capacity as the Director of Public Works for the Town of Johnston, for allowing sewage from the town’s sewer pipelines to be discharged into the plaintiffs’ private sewer pipeline.  Following the jury verdict, the trial justice ruled that the $100,000 statutory cap under G.L. 1956 § 9 31 3 was applicable because the plaintiffs’ claim focused on the design of the town sewer system and thus constituted a governmental function.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial justice erred in determining that the town was engaged in a governmental function, rather than a proprietary function.  The plaintiffs submitted that the trial justice erred in (1) applying the statutory cap on liability to the jury’s verdict pursuant to § 9-31-3; (2) determining that the plaintiffs were precluded from collecting prejudgment interest; and (3) sua sponte finding that, even if the plaintiffs were entitled to collect prejudgment interest, the interest should be calculated from the date of the jury’s verdict.

On cross-appeal, the town argued that the trial justice erred in denying its requests for judgment as a matter of law.  The town additionally contended that it was immunized from liability under the public duty doctrine.  Further, the town asserted that the trial justice erred in denying the town’s motion for a new trial, because, the town argued, the jury did not follow instructions in awarding damages; alternatively, the town asserted that its request for a remittitur should have been granted.

The appeals were consolidated by the Supreme Court.  The Court upheld the trial justice’s denial of the town’s motions for judgment as a matter of law.  The Court further held that the trial justice did not err in not applying the public duty doctrine.  The Court, however, held that the trial justice did err in applying the statutory cap on damages and in denying prejudgment interest.  The Supreme Court additionally upheld the trial justice’s denial of the town’s motion for a new trial and/or remittitur.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, West Warwick Housing Authority, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Rhode Island Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, which denied the plaintiff’s motion to vacate an arbitration award, granted the defendant’s motion to confirm the award, and awarded attorneys’ fees to the defendant as the prevailing party.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice committed reversible error in denying its motion to vacate because, the plaintiff contended, the defendant failed to prove at arbitration that an enforceable agreement to arbitrate existed at the time of the termination that gave rise to the grievance at issue in this case.  Conversely, the defendant maintained that, because the trial justice correctly denied the plaintiff’s motion to vacate, this Court should deny the plaintiff’s appeal and remand the matter to the Superior Court for a determination of attorneys’ fees and costs relating to the appeal.

The Supreme Court perceived no error in the trial justice’s decision denying West Warwick Housing Authority’s motion to vacate the arbitration award.  The Court then declined to reach the merits of Rhode Island Council 94’s request to remand for determination of attorneys’ fees and costs.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendants, Philippe L. Houze and Marie Houze, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Charles A. Anton and Tami D. Anton, as Trustees of the Victoria Avenue Realty Trust, that granted the plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief, and denied declaratory and injunctive relief requested in the counterclaim filed by the defendants.  On appeal, the defendants contended that the trial justice erred in (1) deciding that a two-member condominium board consisting of the owners of the condominium’s two units was not inconsistent with the Rhode Island Condominium Act;  (2) holding Mr. Houze in civil contempt; and (3) awarding the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees. 
In their cross-appeal from the same Superior Court judgment, the plaintiffs asserted that the trial justice erred when he determined that the applicable statute of limitations did not bar the defendants’ counterclaims.

The Supreme Court determined that the defendants’ counterclaims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and therefore declined to address the merits of their appeal with respect to the two-member condominium board.  The Court further held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by holding Mr. Houze in contempt or by awarding the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees.  Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction for one count of second-degree murder and one count of first-degree child abuse stemming from the abuse and death of his infant daughter.  The defendant assigned three errors relating to the trial justice’s denial of his motions (1) to suppress a statement alleged to have resulted from an arrest made without probable cause, in violation of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions; (2) to dismiss the indictment as vague, in violation of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions; and (3) for new trial based on the state’s alleged failure to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Supreme Court rejected each assignment of error.
 
Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court judgment of conviction.

The plaintiff, the Town of North Providence, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 13, a police union.  The Superior Court judgment denied the town’s petition to vacate an arbitration award pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 28-9-18 and granted the union’s motion to confirm the award.  The town appealed, alleging that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority.  The Supreme Court held that the arbitrator had so imperfectly executed his authority that he did not provide a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter pursuant to § 28 9 18(a)(2).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the record for further proceedings.

The plaintiff, Betilio Suncar, appealed following the Superior Court’s entry of final judgment in favor of the defendants, Jordan Realty and Smart Homes, LLC. On appeal, Mr. Suncar contended that the hearing justice erred in granting summary judgment because, in his view, his due process rights were violated by Jordan Realty’s failure to include a Language Assistance Notice when it provided notice of a Petition to Foreclose Right of Redemption with respect to a specific parcel of real estate in Central Falls, Rhode Island.

The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of a Language Assistance Notice is not required with service of notice of a Petition to Foreclose Right of Redemption and that Mr. Suncar’s due process rights were not violated. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, the Town of Coventry, appealed from the Superior Court’s November 4, 2019 entry of final judgment in favor of the defendants, Forsons Realty LLC, Ferrara Mechanical Services Inc., and Daniel Ferrara. The Town contended that the trial justice erred: (1) in her conclusions which led her to allow the defendants to conduct heavy-duty vehicle inspections on property which was the site of a pre-existing legal nonconforming use; and (2) in holding that there had not been an impermissible expansion of that legal nonconforming use. The Supreme Court held that heavy-duty vehicle inspections (as limited by the trial justice) were an inherent part of the legal nonconforming use at issue and that, therefore, the trial justice did not err by allowing such inspections to be conducted. In addition, the Court held that the trial justice did not err in ruling that there had been no impermissible expansion of the legal nonconforming use.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiffs, Peter Scotti & Associates, Inc. and Building Bridges Providence, sought review by the Supreme Court of a December 14, 2020 judgment of the Providence County Superior Court denying and dismissing all claims in the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. That judgment followed a decision of the Superior Court that there was no legal basis under G.L. 1956 § 45-24-71 for invalidating the zoning amendment at issue, which would allow the construction of a new high-rise building in downtown Providence. The plaintiffs contended before the Supreme Court that “legislative deference should not apply to a § 45-24-71 challenge” and that the zoning amendment at issue is inconsistent with “Providence Tomorrow: The Comprehensive Plan” (the Comprehensive Plan).

The Supreme Court initially opined that the correct avenue for review in this case would be by petition for a writ of certiorari, but it then decided to treat the appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari and grant the petition. The Court went on to hold that the hearing justice did not err in assigning a rebuttable presumption of validity to the zoning amendment at issue when conducting a review pursuant to § 45-24-71. The Court also held that it was unable to say that the hearing justice committed an error of law or was without the support of legally competent evidence when he concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden to rebut the presumption that the zoning amendment at issue was valid by proving that the amendment was inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendants, the Rhode Island Commerce Corporation, the Rhode Island Airport Corporation, the Rhode Island Airport Police Department, Dennis Greco, and Iftikhar Ahmad, appealed from an order of the Superior Court granting
declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of the plaintiff, Helen Ricci. On appeal, the defendants contended that the hearing justice erred in finding that Ms. Ricci was a “law enforcement officer” as defined by G.L. 1956 § 42-28.6-1(1) of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBOR) and was therefore entitled to the protections afforded by that statute.

The Supreme Court held that Ms. Ricci was a “law enforcement officer” as defined by the LEOBOR statute and thus was entitled to the protections afforded by that statute. In addition, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order
granting injunctive relief to the plaintiff and remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions that it order compliance with the provisions of § 42-28.6-4 and restoration of Ms. Ricci’s salary and benefits to the status quo ante. At the same time, the Supreme Court vacated the mandatory injunction that was previously granted (and subsequently stayed) by the hearing justice.

The defendants, Westlo Management LLC, Smith/Keen Limited Partners, and Lindsey Hahn, filed a petition for certiorari to challenge an order granting partial summary judgment on counts one, two, three, and seven of the plaintiffs’ third amended complaint against Westlo in favor of the plaintiffs, Curtis W. Andrade and The Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights.  On appeal, the defendants asserted that the existence of genuine issues of material fact precluded partial summary judgment, namely, on the issue of whether an accommodation of a pet policy was reasonable under the Rhode Island Fair Housing Practices Act and the federal Fair Housing Act.  Additionally, the defendants contended that the commission did not have standing to intervene in this matter.

The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice erred in granting the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as to the issue of the liability of Westlo, concluding that, due to the highly fact-specific nature of the assessment of an assistance animal, the issue was not within the purview of summary judgment, and thus genuine issues of material fact existed.  The Supreme Court further held that it could not address the issue of the commission’s intervention because Westlo failed to provide the Court with a proper transcript of the hearing on the commission’s motion to intervene or the subsequent hearings conducted on Westlo’s motion to vacate and motion to reconsider the respective orders granting the commission’s intervention.
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed that portion of the order on review granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to the issue of the liability of Westlo on counts one, two, three, and seven of the plaintiffs’ third-amended complaint.

The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to review an order of the Energy Facility Siting Board concerning the relocation of power lines across the Providence and Seekonk Rivers.  The petitioners, the City of Providence; Friends of India Point Park; Procaccianti Companies, Inc. d/b/a The Hilton Garden Inn; and McMac, Inc. d/b/a The R.I. Seafood Festival, sought review of the Energy Facility Siting Board’s order determining that the so-called “underground alignment” and “bridge alignment north” were not feasible, and approving the “bridge alignment south.”  The respondents, the Energy Facility Siting Board; the City of East Providence; and Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a National Grid, argued that three of the petitioners did not have standing and that the petition for certiorari was not timely.

The Supreme Court held that Friends of India Point Park and McMac, Inc. d/b/a The R.I. Seafood Festival did not have standing but that Procaccianti Companies, Inc. d/b/a The Hilton Garden Inn did have standing.  The Supreme Court additionally held that only the petitioners’ argument as to the sufficiency of the January 17, 2018 order of the Energy Facility Siting Board was timely.  Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the Energy Facility Siting Board failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in its January 17, 2018 order, in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 42 35-12.  The Supreme Court, however, upheld the January 17, 2018 order approving the bridge alignment south, because the parties had agreed on the record that the underground alignment was not feasible, and no party pursued the bridge alignment north.
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the January 17, 2018 order of the Energy Facility Siting Board.

The respondent father, Jason Smith, appealed from a November 20, 2020 Family Court decree terminating his parental rights to his two children, Jae’La G. and Jae’Ona G.  The respondent contended on appeal that the trial justice erred in finding that he was an unfit parent, arguing that he had substantially complied with the service plans developed by the Department of Children, Youth, and Families, and that a finding of unfitness was at odds with the evidence presented.  The respondent further contended that DCYF failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify.  As his final argument, the respondent averred that the trial justice made conclusive merit findings prior to the completion of the trial during a permanency hearing, which were “prejudicial and violated fundamental notions of fairness and due process, both procedural and substantive, under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
  
The Supreme Court held that legally competent evidence supported the trial justice’s findings as to parental unfitness.  The Supreme Court additionally held that the conclusion made by the trial justice on the issue of reasonable efforts to reunify was not clearly erroneous.  Lastly, the Supreme Court determined that there was no error made by the trial justice in conducting the permanency hearing.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Family Court.

In these consolidated appeals, the defendant, Charles Kenner, sought review of two judgments of the Superior Court finding him to be in violation of the terms of his probation.  On appeal, the defendant asserted that the hearing justice erred in finding that he failed to keep the peace and be of good behavior because the testimony the hearing justice relied on was inconsistent and not credible, and because there was not enough evidence to support a finding that the defendant was involved in the drug-deal-turned-robbery incident that precipitated the probation violation hearing. 

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in determining that the defendant violated his probation by failing to keep the peace and be of good behavior. Specifically, the Supreme Court concluded that the hearing justice’s reliance on the testimony presented at the hearing, while noting its inconsistencies, was neither arbitrary nor capricious.  Additionally, the Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant did not keep the peace and maintain good behavior because he was present at the incident and was identified by a witness in a photographic array and in court.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court.  

In these cases, consolidated by the Supreme Court for opinion, the State of Rhode Island appealed from Superior Court orders and decisions granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss the criminal information against them, which included several counts of accessing a computer for fraudulent purposes, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-52-2, and conspiracy.  The state argued on appeal that the trial justice erred in granting the motions when he conducted an erroneous statutory analysis and overlooked material facts in the criminal information package that established probable cause to believe that the defendants committed these crimes.

The Supreme Court concluded that § 11-52-2 prohibits direct or indirect access to a computer in order to obtain the property of another by means of false or fraudulent pretenses.  The Court reasoned that the gravamen of the statute is the purpose for which the computer is being used: to commit a larcenous act—rather than the unlawful access itself.  The Court further noted that, where false or fraudulent pretenses are employed to access the computer in the first instance, § 11-52-2 does not create a felony; the false or fraudulent pretenses must be intended as the means employed to obtain the property.  Additionally, the Court examined the statutory scheme of chapter 52 of title 11 and determined that the legislative history supported the Court’s statutory interpretation of § 11-52-2.

Ultimately, the Court held that the defendants’ conduct did not fall within the purview of § 11-52-2 because there was no evidence in the criminal information showing probable cause that the defendants made any misrepresentations, fraudulent or otherwise, to the female customers whose electronic devices were accessed.  Similarly, the Court held that, without the § 11-52-2 charges, the conspiracy counts could not survive.  Therefore, the Court determined that the trial justice properly dismissed all counts.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Superior Court.

The respondent mother appealed from a decree of the Family Court, issued on October 26, 2020, terminating her parental rights to her son.  The respondent argued on appeal that the trial justice erred by finding that (1) a chronic “substance abuse problem” rendered her unable to care for Donnell, (2) DCYF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit, and (3) it would be in Donnell’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence and was not otherwise clearly wrong in terminating the respondent’s parental rights.  The Court further held the record supported that termination of respondent’s parental rights would be in Donnell’s best interests.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decree of the Family Court.

The Department of Children, Youth, and Families appealed from two Family Court decrees denying its petition to terminate the parental rights of the respondent parents to their child, Nolan, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(3).  DCYF alleged that the trial justice erred by concluding that DCYF had failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parents with the child, as required by § 15-7-7(a)(3).  The Supreme Court held that the trial justice erred by concluding that DCYF had failed to make reasonable efforts, and further held that DCYF had established by clear and convincing evidence the statutory requirements of § 15 7 7(a)(3).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the decrees of the Family Court and remanded the case for further factfinding on the issue of the child’s best interests.

The plaintiff, eighteen-year-old Flavia Linnea Borgo, suffered a tragic accident in a utility substation which resulted in serious injuries, including the amputation of her left hand.  The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether the owner of the substation, The Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a National Grid, owed a duty of care to Borgo, an admitted adult trespasser at the time of the accident.  The plaintiff asserted that such a duty was owed to her by National Grid either under premises liability or through safety regulations, promulgated by the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, that National Grid was subject to.  The plaintiff also asserted that the hearing justice erred by disregarding an expert affidavit that, according to the plaintiff, provided evidence that National Grid had breached a duty it owed to the plaintiff, whether as a landowner or as an electrical distributor.
 
The Supreme Court held that National Grid did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care under premises liability because she was an undiscovered trespasser and actual discovery, as opposed to constructive discovery, is necessary to create a duty owed from a landowner to a trespasser.  The Supreme Court further held that the safety regulations did not create a duty of care flowing from National Grid to the plaintiff because the regulations were not designed to protect a class of which the plaintiff was a member.  Additionally, the Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not err by not considering the affidavit proffered by the plaintiff, because a duty must be established before evidence of a breach of duty can be considered.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The pro se respondent, Ann Gordon, appealed from a Superior Court decree foreclosing her rights of redemption in property purchased by the petitioner, Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation, through exercise of its right of first refusal.  On appeal, the respondent submitted, inter alia, that there were procedural defects below, that the amount of taxes claimed to be owed were not owed because of various exemptions, that the hearing justice should have recused himself, and that RIHMFC owed a duty to assist her, which she alleges it breached.
  
The Supreme Court held that the respondent entered into a valid consent order establishing the amount owed for redemption and setting the terms of redemption, and thus that any procedural defects, all of which were alleged to have occurred prior to entering into the consent order, were irrelevant.  Additionally, the Supreme Court concluded that the respondent’s argument as to recusal was waived and, in any event, meritless, and that RIHMFC did not owe the respondent a statutory duty.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decree of foreclosure entered by the Superior Court. 

The Narragansett Pension Board (the Board) appealed from a September 28, 2020 judgment of the Washington County Superior Court ordering the permanent
reinstatement of plaintiff Matthew Riley’s pension. It contended on appeal that the town’s pension revocation ordinance, Code of Ordinances, Town of Narragansett, Rhode Island, Supp. No. 13, § 58-36 (Sept. 18, 2019), was not unconstitutionally vague; that this matter “should be remanded to the * * * Board for a rehearing with the newly enacted rules and procedures;” and that, if the issue of the award of attorneys’ fees is considered to be ripe for this Court’s consideration, the award of attorneys’ fees should be vacated.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice erred in not conducting an asapplied analysis with respect to the issue of the constitutionality of the pension
revocation ordinance. For that reason and due to the lack of factual findings by the Board, the Court held that the matter should be remanded for a new hearing before the Board. The Court further held that the issues raised by the parties with respect to the award of attorneys’ fees and the availability of pension benefits for an innocent spouse were not ripe for the Court’s review. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated in part the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions that it remand the case to the Board for a new hearing in accordance with the Supreme Court’s opinion.

The plaintiff, EDC Investment, LLC, appealed from a Superior Court order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure brought by the defendant, UTGR, Inc.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts in support of its contractual claims, namely, its claims of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty because the plaintiff had failed to establish that its relationship with defendant was anything more than a typical commercial landlord-tenant relationship.  Similarly, the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract was properly dismissed, and consequently, the hearing justice also did not err is dismissing the plaintiff’s claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court. 

Jean Ho-Rath et al. v. Corning Incorporated et al.; Yendee Ho-Rath et al. v. Rhode Island Hospital et al., Nos. 20-227, 20-228 (May 27, 2022)

In these consolidated appeals, the plaintiffs challenged the hearing justice’s ruling on the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and contended that the hearing justice erred in finding that the defendants owed plaintiffs no duty of care.  The Supreme Court first determined that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not raise a new cause of action that required a different legal analysis and, accordingly, reviewed the case in accordance with the traditional principles of negligence.

The Supreme Court concluded, based on the facts of the case in conjunction with Rhode Island law and the prevailing view of jurisdictions that have considered the same issue, that no duty is owed to a child born with physical defects who alleges that, because of negligence, the child’s parents either (1) decided to conceive the child in ignorance of the risk of impairment, or (2) were deprived of information that would have caused them to terminate the pregnancy.  The Supreme Court held that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that all of the plaintiffs’ claims failed as a matter of law. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court.

The respondent biological father appealed from a Family Court decree terminating his parental rights to his daughter.  He maintained that the decree should be vacated because the trial justice erred in finding that he was unfit to parent his daughter, that the Department of Children, Youth, and Families made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification, and that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate his parental rights.


The Supreme Court determined that the trial justice did not err in finding parental unfitness due to the respondent’s failure to cooperate with case plans developed by DCYF, which included requiring the respondent to maintain a substance-free lifestyle and provide for his daughter’s basic needs, effectively parent her, and maximize her school preparedness.  The Supreme Court determined that DCYF made numerous referrals and set up services to assist the respondent with substance-abuse treatment, parenting, and the child’s cognitive development; but, despite DCYF’s efforts, respondent willfully ignored the Family Court’s order to undergo a substance-abuse evaluation and had little involvement or interest in the services DCYF attempted to put into place to assist with parenting.


Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that there was legally competent evidence to support the trial justice’s finding regarding the reasonableness of DCYF’s reunification efforts, by clear and convincing evidence.  Finally, the Court determined that the decision of the Family Court to terminate the respondent’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child, who had bonded with her foster family.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Family Court.

The State of Rhode Island appealed from a Superior Court order granting a motion to suppress statements made to the police by the defendant.  The state argued that the trial justice erred in finding that the defendant was in custody at the time he made incriminating statements at the scene of an automobile accident and that the rights read to the defendant at the time of his arrest for driving under the influence and at the police station were sufficient to apprise him of his constitutional rights.

The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice correctly determined that the defendant was in custody once the defendant was relocated and the officer, armed with all of the indicia of the defendant’s intoxication, informed the defendant of his belief that the defendant was being untruthful about consuming alcohol—followed by further interrogation to that effect.  Additionally, the Supreme Court concluded that the issue of the sufficiency of the Miranda warnings was not properly before the Court because the trial justice did not address this issue and the state did not assign error to the trial justice’s reason for suppressing the defendant’s post-arrest statements as fruits of the poisonous tree.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.
 

In these consolidated appeals arising from two consolidated Superior Court civil actions, the Town of Johnston appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court granting declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, retired town police officers who filed suit in Superior Court seeking declaratory judgment that they were entitled to distribution of certain contributions they and the town had made to certain accounts. The plaintiffs asserted that the accounts were deferred compensation maintained pursuant to Internal Revenue Code § 457 and that they were entitled to full distribution of the funds as a retirement benefit separate from their pensions.

After the trial justice granted plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment and entered final judgment in their favor, the town appealed. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice’s factual findings overlooked and misconceived material evidence and were clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to provide an adequate factual basis for entitlement to the funds and that the grant of declaratory judgment was an abuse of discretion.

Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court judgment.

The plaintiffs, Kenneth Loffredo and Michelle Loffredo, appealed from the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all eight counts of the plaintiffs’ third amended complaint. On appeal, the Loffredos contended that the hearing justice (1) improperly interpreted and applied G.L. 1956 § 9-1-4 (the Statute of Frauds) in deciding that that statute could properly be invoked as a defense to claims stemming from an alleged oral agreement for the purchase and sale of a particular residential condominium; (2) erroneously granted summary judgment against them with respect to their several claims of tortious conduct; and (3) erroneously ruled that G.L. 1956 § 5-20.5-17(b) does not provide a private right of action to an aggrieved party.

The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice correctly granted summary judgment with respect to all counts except for Count Eight, concerning which fact-finding is necessary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Superior Court as to all counts except for Count Eight.

On review by way of certiorari, the Town of Richmond challenged a judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the plaintiff, Freepoint Solar LLC.  The Superior Court had reversed a decision of the Town of Richmond Zoning Board of Review that denied Freepoint’s application for a special-use permit to construct a solar energy system.
 
The zoning board rejected Freepoint’s application based on Town of Richmond Code of Ordinances § 18.34.030-A (May 15, 2018), a section of the ordinance governing special-use permits for solar energy systems that required that the entire lot on which the solar energy system was to be located be within two miles of a “utility substation.”  Freepoint identified an Amtrak substation that was within two miles of the site.  The zoning board questioned whether Amtrak was a “utility” within the meaning of § 18.34.030 A, or whether “utility substation” should be limited to the relevant electrical utility, National Grid.
 
Freepoint appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the zoning board’s decision, reasoning that the phrase “utility substation” was unambiguous and that the zoning board erred by looking beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of § 18.34.030-A.  The town sought review in the Supreme Court, maintaining that the phrase “utility substation” was ambiguous.  The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that the component words had plain and ordinary meanings, and that the phrase was not susceptible of more than one meaning.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the Superior Court did not err by finding that the zoning board decision was affected by error of law.

Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court judgment.

The plaintiffs, V. George Mitola and Carol A. Mitola, appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court awarding them $492,000 plus interest in the amount of $6,309.20 for the development rights to their property, which rights were acquired by the defendant, Providence Public Buildings Authority.  On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted that the trial justice erred in denying both their petition to compel purchase in fee and their motion to reconsider the court’s decision and order denying their petition to compel purchase in fee.  In appealing the trial justice’s denial of the petition to compel purchase in fee and the motion to reconsider, the plaintiffs argued that the trial justice did not strictly construe G.L. 1956 § 45 50 13(a)(5) and therefore erroneously enforced a time limitation on the filing of the petition to compel purchase in fee.  The plaintiffs also contended that the trial justice erred in finding that the doctrine of laches applied.  Additionally, the plaintiffs ascribed reversible error to the trial justice’s acceptance of the valuation of the property offered by the defendant’s appraiser and thereby her rejection of the comparable sales method of valuation as calculated by the plaintiffs’ appraiser.

The Supreme Court concluded that, because the statute did not expressly impose a time limit for a property owner’s request for the authority to purchase property in fee simple, the issue turned on whether the plaintiffs filed their petition in a reasonably timely manner.  The Supreme Court determined that a lapse of less than four years was not an unreasonable amount of time, and that the plaintiffs’ petition was therefore timely filed.  Moreover, the Supreme Court determined that, because there was no negligence on the part of the plaintiffs that led to a delay, and because the delay did not cause any significant prejudice to the defendant, the doctrine of laches did not apply.  Lastly, based on its holding, the Supreme Court concluded that it did not need to address the plaintiffs’ arguments that the trial justice erred in both denying the plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider and accepting the defendant’s appraiser’s hybrid approach of valuation.
  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court with directions for the entry of an order compelling the taking in fee and for the valuation of a fee-simple interest in the property.  

The petitioner, Doris Phillips, sought review on certiorari of a decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court vacating a prior decree of a judge of the Workers’ Compensation Court and denying and dismissing her petition for surviving-spouse compensation benefits and funeral expenses.  The petitioner challenged the Appellate Division’s finding that the going-and-coming rule precluded her recovery of benefits for the fatal injuries sustained by her husband, Joseph Phillips, while he was employed by the respondent, Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Rhode Island, LLC.
 
The Supreme Court held that an existing exception to the going-and-coming rule, the Branco exception, should be expanded to include factual situations in which the risk of injury is created by the location of the parking facility, irrespective of whether the parking facility was owned or maintained by the employer, so long as the employer furnished it for employee parking.  The Supreme Court concluded that petitioner had sufficiently established that the employer had furnished the parking lot for employee parking, and had also established the other elements of the Branco exception test, and therefore that recovery was not barred by the going-and-coming rule. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the decree of the Appellate Division and remanded to the Appellate Division for it to reinstate the trial judge’s decision. 

In these consolidated cross-appeals, the parties challenged the trial justice’s rulings on the city’s motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.  On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial justice erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the city because, he maintained, the trial justice erred in determining that the egregious conduct exception to the public duty doctrine did not apply because she usurped the jury’s fact-finding function.

The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the city because she made factual determinations at the Rule 50 stage to determine the applicability of the egregious conduct exception to the public-duty doctrine.  The Supreme Court concluded that the record created an evidentiary basis that could allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the city created circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent person into a position of extreme peril, that the city had actual or constructive notice of that specific peril, and that the city failed to remedy that peril after a reasonable amount of time.
  
The Supreme Court further held that the city’s failure to move for a new trial in the Superior Court was fatal to its position on appeal because the city, as the party that pled the public duty doctrine as a defense to the plaintiff’s claim, bore the burden of proving that defense.  By failing to move for a new trial the city deprived the trial justice of the opportunity to correct the error of law that occurred in this case.
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and directed the court to reinstate the jury verdict. 

In these consolidated cases, the State of Rhode Island appealed from a Superior Court order granting the defendants’ motion to suppress all wire, electronic, and oral communications obtained through the use of wiretaps and any subsequently obtained evidence.  The state argued on appeal that the trial justice erred in finding that an associate justice of the Superior Court had no authority to issue the wiretap orders and that, even if the associate justice was without statutory authority, the trial justice erred in concluding that suppression of the evidence derived from those orders was warranted.

The Supreme Court concluded that G.L. 1956 § 8-3-4 was inapplicable to cases involving the interception of wire, electronic, and oral communications, which are strictly governed by the wiretap act, chapter 5.1 of title 12 of the general laws, setting forth who has the authority to receive wiretap applications and issue these orders.  Therefore, the Supreme Court determined that, in accordance with the wiretap act, only the presiding justice, or the senior associate justice of the Superior Court when the presiding justice deems it necessary to disqualify himself or herself from entering the wiretap orders, may receive applications or issue wiretap orders.  The Supreme Court concluded that the wiretap orders violated the wiretap act, resulting in the unlawful interception of communications; that suppression of the evidence was the appropriate remedy; and that the good-faith exception did not apply.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court granting the motion to suppress.