Supreme Court

Published Opinions 2020 - 2021 Term

  
  
  
Russell Henry v. Media General Operations, Inc., et al., No. 18-169 (July 8, 2021)18-169.pdf18-169
The plaintiff in the instant case, Captain Russell Henry, appealed from the April 11, 2018 entry of final judgment in Providence County Superior Court in favor of the defendants, Media General Operations, Inc., Chris Lanni, James Taricani, Officer Peter Leclerc, Ronald Jacob, and Captain Karen E. Guilbeault.  Final judgment was entered in the case after the defendants’ motions for summary judgment were granted.  On appeal, Captain Henry contended that the trial justice erred in finding a police officer to be a “per se public official * * *.”  He further posited that the trial justice erred in determining that defendants’ broadcast of a purportedly false allegation was not the product of “actual malice” as is constitutionally required if the plaintiff is classified as a public official in the defamation context.  Captain Henry further averred that the “trial justice erred in granting summary judgment on [his] claims of negligent and intentional infliction of distress and violation of R.I. Gen. L. sec. 9-1-28.1 (false light).”

The Supreme Court held that Captain Henry was a public official.  The Court further held that there was insufficient evidence on which a rational jury could conclude that any of the defendants had acted with actual malice.  Finally, it was the Court’s holding that Captain Henry’s other claims failed because a party cannot breathe life into a doomed defamation claim by re-baptizing it as a different cause of action.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.


State v. Tony Gonzalez, No. 19-67 (July 2, 2021)19-67.pdf19-67
The defendant, Tony Gonzalez appealed from a judgment of conviction following a trial by jury for first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit a felony, and two counts of discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence.  On appeal, Mr. Gonzalez contended that the trial justice erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phone, which police seized following his warrantless arrest; (2) denying his motion to discharge the jury pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (3) denying his motions for a mistrial.  Mr. Gonzalez also contended that the state violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

After thoroughly reviewing the record, the Supreme Court first held that the trial justice did not err by declining to suppress evidence obtained from Mr. Gonzalez’s cell-phone records because the state obtained the evidence from a source independent of Mr. Gonzalez’s illegal arrest.  Next, the Court held that the trial justice did not err by failing to grant Mr. Gonzalez’s motion to discharge the jury because Mr. Gonzalez failed to demonstrate (1) that the representation of Hispanic individuals on his jury was not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of Hispanic individuals in the community; and (2) that any under-representation of Hispanic individuals on the jury was due to systematic exclusion of Hispanic individuals in the jury selection process.  Finally, the Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion or was not otherwise clearly wrong in declining to allow Mr. Gonzalez’s motions for a mistrial.  The Court did not address the Brady issue raised by Mr. Gonzalez because it was not preserved during trial and was therefore waived on appeal.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. 
State v. Ralph Reisner, No. 18-27 (June 30, 2021)18-27.pdf18-27
The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction for possession of child pornography. The defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his home and argued that there was no probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant. He also maintained that the trial justice should have granted his motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s reference to excluded evidence during his opening statement.
The Supreme Court determined that the warrant was not supported by probable cause because the twelve-word description of the image referred to mere nudity, no still image or clip of the video was provided, and the warrant failed to link the hash value of the video file to known child pornography. The Court concluded that a judicial officer must have the proper tools to be able to independently assess whether there is probable cause to believe that an image is child pornography.

Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court. Having vacated the judgment of the Superior Court based on the defendant’s first argument, the Supreme Court did not reach the other issue raised by the defendant on appeal
Terrapin Development, LLC v. Irene M. O’Malley Revocable Trust et al., No. 18-346 (June 30, 2021)18-346.pdf18-346
The plaintiff, Terrapin Development, LLC (Terrapin), appealed from a final judgment of the Superior Court denying its claim for specific performance of a purchase and sale agreement (PSA) related to a planned subdivision in Cumberland, Rhode Island.  The trial justice found that Terrapin had not shown that it was able to perform under the PSA.  He further found that the defendants, Irene M. O’Malley Revocable Trust and its trustees (collectively the Trust), had not unjustifiably failed to perform under the PSA.  Thus, the trial justice declined to grant specific performance and granted the Trust’s request to terminate the PSA.
 
The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err because, contrary to Terrapin’s contention, he did not overlook evidence that Terrapin was ready, willing, and able to perform under the PSA, nor did he overlook evidence that the Trust was unjustified in its failure to consummate the PSA.  Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
Commerce Park Realty, LLC, et al. v. HR2-A Corp. as General Partner of HR2-A Limited Partnership et al., No. 20-33 (June 30, 2021)20-33.pdf20-33
This case is one of two companion cases issued today.  The first case is set forth in Commerce Park Realty, LLC v. HR2-A Corp., No. 19-468-A., in which certain defendants appealed a Superior Court declaration that a series of loans made by those defendants carrying interest rates ranging from 23 percent to 36 percent per annum were usurious and null and void. This case is a cross-appeal filed by certain plaintiffs seeking review of secondary determinations made by the Superior Court that coincided with the finding that the loans were usurious.
  
On appeal, the plaintiffs assigned four claims of error: (1) the trial justice erred in concluding that they were not entitled to disgorgement payments on certain usurious loans under G.L. 1956 § 6-26-4(c); (2) the trial justice erred in dismissing their claims for punitive damages concerning certain usurious loans; (3) the trial justice erred in allowing defendants to seek and obtain summary judgment on counts that were previously stayed; and (4) the trial justice misapplied the statute of limitations to plaintiffs’ claims for criminal usury under G.L. 1956 § 9-1-2.
 
The Supreme Court held that, under the clear and unambiguous language set forth in § 6-26-4(c), these plaintiffs were not entitled to disgorgement payments because they did not make a payment on the usurious loan.  Next, the Court determined that, because these plaintiffs did not meet the requirements set forth in § 6-26-4(c) to recover disgorgement payments, their claims for punitive damages failed as a matter of law.  The Supreme Court then concluded that, although the trial justice’s ruling on the stayed counts may not have been the best practice, any potential procedural error was harmless in consideration of practicality and judicial economy because a reversal of the trial justice’s decision on those counts would only result in undue delay and expense in litigating legally unsustainable claims.  Lastly, the Supreme Court held that these plaintiffs’ claims under § 9-1-2 were barred by the ten-year statute of limitations.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
Angela Giguere Kumble et al. v. Michael Voccola et al.; Michael Voccola et al. v. Angela Giguere Kumble et al., No. 2019-49-Appeal; No. 2019-47-Appeal. (June 30, 2021)19-49, 47.pdf19-49, 47
These cases arose from a dispute between the beneficiaries and trustees of two testamentary trusts.  In the Superior Court, the trustees sought attorneys’ fees, and interest on those fees, incurred during the administration of the trusts, which the trial justice awarded.  On appeal, the beneficiaries contended that the award of attorneys’ fees and costs was unreasonable, disproportionate, and an abuse of discretion and that the award of interest was contrary to the law and the facts.  The Supreme Court held that the trial justice correctly awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 18 6 1 and had properly weighed the factors for awarding those fees as set forth in Colonial Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Contemporary Construction Co., 464 A.2d 741 (R.I. 1983).  Additionally, the Court held that interest on those attorneys’ fees was a reasonable expense incurred by the trust.  Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
Commerce Park Realty, LLC, et al. v. HR2-A Corp. as General Partner of HR2-A Limited Partnership et al., No. 19-468 (June 30, 2021)19-468.pdf19-468
Certain defendants in this complex and protracted litigation appealed from the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs that primarily determined that a series of loans made by those defendants was usurious and null and void.

On appeal, the defendants alleged that the trial justice erred (1) in finding that certain loans were usurious; (2) in finding that the defendants charged usurious interest rates on those loans prior to their execution; (3) in finding that a release and waiver of usury claims was ineffective; (4) in finding that certain loans were governed by Rhode Island law, notwithstanding choice-of-law provisions dictating that Massachusetts law governed; and (5) by failing to rule that the loans that the trial justice deemed usurious remained due and payable to the defendants because they were originally made prior to the accrual of any usurious interest rates.

After thoroughly reviewing the record, the Supreme Court first held that the trial justice did not err in finding that certain loans were usurious because the lenders did not meet their burden of proving that the borrowers obtained pro forma methods analyses, in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 6-26-2(e), demonstrating that the loans were capable of being repaid.  Next, the Court held that the trial justice did not err in finding that the defendants charged usurious interest rates prior to the execution of those loans.  The Court held that the trial justice did not err in finding that a release and waiver of usury claims was ineffective, because the release and waiver was against public policy.  The Court also held that the trial justice did not err in finding that Rhode Island law governed certain loans that contained choice-of-law provisions in favor of Massachusetts, because Rhode Island had a materially greater interest in the legality of the loans than did Massachusetts and because application of Massachusetts law would be contrary to a fundamental policy of Rhode Island.  Finally, the Court held that the trial justice did not err in finding that the usurious loans did not remain due and payable to the defendants because new agreements were executed in connection with the usurious loans, which had the effect of extinguishing any prior agreements.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
Dr. William Kyros v. Rhode Island Department of Health et al., No. 20-104 (June 30, 2021)20-104.pdf20-104
The defendants, the Rhode Island Department of Health (DOH) and Nicole Alexander-Scott, M.D., in her capacity as Director of the DOH, sought review on certiorari of a Superior Court judgment in favor of the plaintiff, William Kyros, M.D., which reversed a decision and order of the Board of Medical Licensure and Discipline.  The defendants asserted that the trial justice erred: (1) in reversing the Board’s decision because, they contended, competent evidence in the record supported the Board’s decision and the sanction imposed was not arbitrary or capricious; and (2) in declining to remand the case to the Board for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court did not err in reversing the Board’s decision.  The Supreme Court concluded that the charge of unprofessional conduct levied by the Board against Dr. Kyros was not sustained because the Board’s decision overlooked the specified charge.  The Supreme Court concluded that the Board wholly failed to make findings of fact supporting its conclusion that Dr. Kyros needed to attend the Center for Personalized Education for Physicians to assess his clinical competency, and that the record was devoid of any evidence that Dr. Kyros was not clinically competent to practice medicine.  Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court properly recognized the deficiencies in the Board’s decision and reversed the decision.

The Supreme Court also concluded that the trial justice was justified in declining to remand the matter to the Board for further proceedings.  The Supreme Court recognized that parties who are subject to administrative proceedings have the right to an expeditious agency and judicial decision, and that remanding the matter to the Board would not further the interests of justice or produce new information.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
Betty Belmore v. Cheryl Petterutti, No. 19-490 (June 29, 2021)19-490.pdf19-490
This case arose as a result of a slip-and-fall incident that occurred on the property of the defendant, Cheryl Petterutti, which led to the plaintiff, Betty Belmore, suffering multiple injuries that required numerous reparative surgeries. The plaintiff thereafter filed suit in Kent County Superior Court, alleging negligence on the part of the defendant and seeking damages for her injuries. The defendant moved for summary judgment, and judgment entered in the defendant’s favor. The plaintiff then timely appealed to this Court.

The Supreme Court held that, when addressing proximate causation in determining whether or not to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the hearing justice erred by passing upon an issue that is ordinarily inappropriate for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case to that court.
Michael J. Beagan v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training, Board of Review et al., No. 19-11 (June 29, 2021)19-11.pdf19-11
The plaintiff, Michael Beagan, sought review of an order of the District Court that denied his petition for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs related to his unemployment benefits appeal in the District Court.  Initially denied unemployment benefits by the District Court, Mr. Beagan sought review of that decision in the Supreme Court; the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the District Court in Beagan v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training, 162 A.3d 619 (R.I. 2017).  Mr. Beagan then sought attorneys’ fees and costs in the District Court pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 28-44-57(c), arguing that he was entitled to those fees because he was ultimately successful in the Supreme Court.  The District Court denied his request, and Mr. Beagan petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
 
The Supreme Court held that Mr. Beagan was entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs for work performed in the District Court because “appeal” within § 28 44 57(c)(2)(iii) encompassed lower court proceedings on the claimant’s path to receiving benefits.  Thus, the Supreme Court quashed the order of the District Court. 



State v. Carlos Rivera, No. 19-196 (June 29, 2021)19-196.pdf19-196
A jury in Providence County Superior Court found Carlos Rivera guilty of one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and two counts of second-degree child molestation sexual assault. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in excluding on evidentiary grounds the testimony of a particular witness concerning certain statements allegedly made by defendant’s daughter regarding the results of and a certain person’s feelings about a federal immigration proceeding in Boston.

After carefully reviewing the transcript of what took place in the Superior Court in light of the pertinent provisions of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court ruled that the decision of the trial justice to exclude evidence was not an abuse of discretion. The Court therefore affirmed the defendant’s conviction.
Angela Dextraze et al. v. Timothy Bernard et al., No. 20-48 (June 28, 2021)2020-48.pdf2020-48
This suit arose out of an assault by one student on another at the Ponaganset High School.  The injured student and his parents filed suit against the Foster-Glocester Regional School District alleging that the defendant failed to provide the injured student with a safe environment and failed to supervise the aggressor student.  Following a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the Superior Court denied the school district’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, and the school district appealed.  Before the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs offered no evidence (expert or otherwise) to establish the standard of care or proximate causation.  The Supreme Court held that expert testimony was not needed where there was evidence that the school district exercised no degree of care in the face of a known, foreseeable danger.  The Court further held that the record demonstrated that the plaintiffs presented sufficient facts upon which a jury could find that the school district’s failure to act was a substantial cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries.  Thus, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
Jane Doe v. Brown University et al., No. 19-167 (June 28, 2021)19-167.pdf19-167
The plaintiff, Jane Doe, appealed from a Superior Court judgment dismissing her complaint against the defendants, Brown University and two of its employees. In Superior Court, the plaintiff asserted claims under both the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA) and article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred in determining that her claims under RICRA were precluded by the prior dismissal of the plaintiff’s federal Title IX claim.  The plaintiff also argued that the hearing justice erred in holding that section 2 of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution does not grant the plaintiff a private right of action.
  
The Supreme Court first held that the plaintiff’s claims under RICRA were predicated upon the defendants’ alleged violations of Title IX, which had already been litigated in federal court.  Further, the Supreme Court stated that the resolution of that issue in federal court was essential to the judgment on the merits and, therefore, issue preclusion barred the plaintiff’s claim in Superior Court.  The Supreme Court also held that the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants interfered with her contract with an educational institution was not actionable.

Next, the Supreme Court examined the antidiscrimination clause contained in section 2 of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution and held that it was not self executing.  Further, the Supreme Court held that principles of judicial restraint prevented the Court from creating a private right of action under these circumstances.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
State v. Gregory Hampton-Boyd, No. 19-100 (June 28, 2021)19-100.pdf19-100
The defendant, Gregory Hampton-Boyd, appealed from a judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court following a jury verdict of guilty on one count of first-degree robbery, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-39-1(a); one count of discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-47-3.2(b); one count of possession of a firearm without a license, in violation of § 11-47-8(a); one count of possession of a firearm after being convicted of a crime of violence, in violation of § 11-47-5; and one count of assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-2. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in refusing to instruct the jury on cross-racial identification and that the trial justice’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the state’s habitual offender notice violated his right to due process.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice properly relied on Rhode Island law when he decided not to use the defendant’s requested cross-racial identification instruction. However, while the Court discerned no reversible error in this case, the Court also held that simply stating that the jury may consider differences in race and ethnicity without further context for that instruction is not an appropriate charge. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the trial justice’s refusal to employ the defendant’s requested instruction.

The Court also declined to overrule its prior interpretation of the Rhode Island habitual offender statute, G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21, as set forth in State v. Peterson, 722 A.2d 259 (R.I. 1998). The Supreme Court determined that notice received on the date of the pretrial conference complied with the holding in Peterson and advised the defendant of the consequences of a conviction, which is all that due process requires. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
State v. Xavier Vidot, Nos. 20-84, 20-18 (June 28, 2021)20-84, 20-18.pdf20-84, 20-18
The defendant, Xavier Vidot, was convicted by a jury of one count of second degree murder and one count of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, thereby causing death.  He was sentenced to twenty-four years’ imprisonment for the second degree-murder conviction and a consecutive life sentence for the discharge-of-a-firearm conviction.  On review, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred by (1) failing to declare a mistrial and (2) denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

First, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in failing to grant a mistrial, as the defendant argued, because the grounds for a mistrial that the defendant raised on review were never articulated before the trial justice; and, thus, the defendant’s appellate arguments on this issue were deemed waived.  Next, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice had articulated adequate grounds for denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial and did not overlook or misconceive material evidence.  Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice had properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Epic Enterprises LLC et al. v. 10 Brown & Howard Wharf Condominium Association et al., No. 20-194 (June 25, 2021)20-194.pdf20-194
The respondent, Bard Group, LLC, appealed from an order of the Superior Court granting the request of the petitioners, Epic Enterprises LLC, Kurt Rauschenbach, Kristin Rauschenbach, and Donna Morvillo, to appoint a temporary receiver. On appeal, the respondent renewed its argument that the petitioners lacked standing to file a motion to appoint a temporary receiver for the respondent and that the hearing justice therefore erred in appointing one.

The Supreme Court concluded that the petitioners were neither creditors nor shareholders of Bard Group, LLC, and therefore lacked standing to seek the appointment of a receiver, either under statutory law or as a matter of equity. Accordingly, the Court vacated the order of the Superior Court and held that the receivership should be brought to an immediate close.
State v. Kunwar Chadha, No. 19-438 (June 25, 2021)19-438.pdf19-438
The defendant, Kunwar Chadha, appealed from a June 20, 2019 judgment of conviction and commitment entered against him in Providence County Superior Court on two counts of second-degree child molestation sexual assault. The defendant argued on appeal that the trial justice erred both by denying his motion for a new trial and by “restricting [his] right of confrontation and sufficient cross-examination.” The Supreme Court reviewed the trial court record and held: (1) that the trial justice was within her discretion in excluding certain lines of questioning on cross-examination; and (2) that the trial justice adequately conducted the required analysis in ruling on the motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
State v. Matthew Sheridan, No. 18-234 (June 24, 2021)18-234.pdf18-234
The defendant, Matthew Sheridan, appealed following the entry of a November 21, 2017 judgment of conviction and commitment reflecting the fact that a jury found him guilty of one count of first-degree sexual assault.  On appeal, he contended that the trial justice abused his discretion: (1) “when he overruled [Mr.] Sheridan’s objection to Dr. [Amy] Goldberg’s testimony * * * [because] [t]he state’s disclosure was too late and was wholly insufficient, [Mr.] Sheridan was prejudiced, and the trial justice’s remedy did not ameliorate the prejudice;” (2) “when he admitted Dr. Goldberg’s testimony because it invaded the province of the jury;” and (3) “when he permitted the prosecution to refer to the complainant as ‘the victim,’ which prejudiced the jury prior to trial[.]”

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in fashioning a remedy for the late disclosure of Dr. Goldberg’s testimony.  The Court further held that her testimony did not invade the province of the jury.  Finally, the Court held that Mr. Sheridan’s contention with respect to the prosecutor referring to the complaining witness as the “victim” was waived.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
In re J.T., No. 20-253 (June 24, 2021)20-253.pdf20-253
The respondent appealed from a District Court order committing him to a residential living facility for adults with developmental disabilities.  On appeal he asserted that (1) he was entitled to a de novo hearing on appeal in the Superior Court, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 40.1-22-10(f), and (2) the District Court judge erred in considering evidence of his juvenile adjudications, as well as uncharged conduct and his community notification requirement, in determining whether he was developmentally disabled and whether his discharge created a likelihood of serious harm to himself or others.

The Supreme Court concluded that § 40.1-22-10(f) was ambiguous, as it did not provide a timeframe in which to appeal nor did it clarify whether the Superior Court or the Supreme Court was the correct forum for the appeal.  The Court determined that the language of § 40.1-22-10(f) indicated that the Supreme Court was the proper forum to hear the District Court appeal.  The Court also concluded that respondent’s appeal, filed eleven days following entry of the final order in the District Court, was filed within a reasonable time.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that the respondent’s second argument regarding the admission of evidence was waived.  Accordingly, the order of the District Court was affirmed.  
State v. Joseph Segrain, No. 18-144 (June 24, 2021)18-144.pdf18-144
The defendant, Joseph Segrain, appealed from a March 29, 2018 judgment of conviction and commitment entered in the Providence County Superior Court, which reflected the fact that he was found guilty on five counts related to conduct stemming from a drive-by shooting. On appeal, the defendant contended that: (1) the trial justice erred by granting a particular mistrial, thereby allegedly violating his constitutional rights against double jeopardy; (2) his motion to suppress an eyewitness identification was erroneously denied; (3) the trial justice erred by denying his motion to recuse; (4) the trial justice erred by denying his right to represent himself at trial and at the sentencing hearing; and (5) the trial justice erred by allowing certain videos and testimony to be admitted into evidence.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice committed no reversible error as to issues two, three, and four; and the Court further held that the defendant had failed to properly preserve issues one and five for appellate review. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
Timothy Koback v. Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, No. 19-423 (June 24, 2021)19-423.pdf19-423
The respondent, Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, sought review of a decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court, awarding counsel fees and costs to the petitioner. The respondent claimed that the Workers’ Compensation Court lacked specific statutory authority to award counsel fees in accidental disability retirement cases and that, if there were statutory authority to award fees, the petitioner did not submit an affidavit from a disinterested attorney to support the fee determination.
  
The Supreme Court determined that there was nothing in the language contained in G.L. 1956 § 45-21.2-9 or in reference to G.L. 1956 § 28-35-20 that conferred to the Workers’ Compensation Court statutory authority to award attorneys’ fees in accidental disability retirement appeals.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court. 

Vikash Patel et al. v. Rasikbhai Patel et al, No. 19-144 (June 22, 2021)19-144.pdf19-144
The defendants appealed from a judgment entered in the Superior Court after a jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, and from an order of the Superior Court denying their motion for a new trial. On appeal, the defendants contended that the trial justice erred in permitting consideration of prior oral agreements under the parol evidence rule, impermissibly allowed for enforcement of an illegal scheme, abused his discretion by admitting a recording they alleged was illegally made to impeach a witness’s testimony, and erred in denying their motion for a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendants’ motion for a new trial because the trial justice performed a comprehensive review of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses before providing his grounds for denial. Additionally, the Court determined that the defendants failed to preserve their first two arguments, regarding parol evidence and illegality, which in any event lacked merit. The Supreme Court also upheld the trial justice’s determination that an audio recording was admissible for impeachment and its late provision by the plaintiffs did not constitute a discovery violation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment and order of the Superior Court.
In re Manuel P., In re Angel P., In re Isaiah M., In re Victoria M., Nos. 19-452, 453, 454, 455 (June 17, 2021)19-452, 453, 454, 455.pdf19-452, 453, 454, 455
The respondent mother appealed from a decree terminating her parental rights to four of her children. On appeal, the respondent argued that the trial justice violated her right to procedural due process by proceeding with trial in her absence, following another court’s determination that she was incompetent to stand trial in a criminal matter. The respondent also contended that DCYF failed to establish that it made reasonable efforts to strengthen the parental bond and offer services aimed at reunification, as the department is required to do under G.L. 1956 §§ 15-7-7(a)(3) and 15-7-7(b)(1).

The Supreme Court determined that the respondent’s due process rights were not violated, because the Family Court trial justice ensured that respondent was represented by counsel and a guardian ad litem at all times. Additionally, the Supreme Court held that there was legally competent evidence to support the trial justice’s findings regarding the reasonableness of DCYF’s efforts, by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, the Court determined that the decision of the Family Court was in the best interests of the children, who had found stability with their respective foster families. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decree of the Family Court.
Richard Machado et al. v. Narragansett Bay Insurance Company, No. 19-374 (June 17, 2021)19-374.pdf19-374
The home of the plaintiffs, Richard Machado and Susan Machado, was insured by the defendant, Narragansett Bay Insurance Company (NBIC).  In March of 2015, the Machados notified NBIC of water damage to their home, and they promptly submitted a claim to NBIC with respect to the damage.  Shortly thereafter, they received from NBIC a check for $14,549.78 as compensation for the damage.  The instant case arises out of a dispute as to whether the Machados, pursuant to their homeowners insurance policy with NBIC, were entitled to receive a subsequent appraisal of the damage to their property as well as additional compensation for said damage.  The overriding legal issue was whether or not the Machados requested such an appraisal in a reasonably timely manner.

The Supreme Court held that, because no genuine issues of material fact existed, the case was properly decided pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

Sergio A. DeCurtis v. Visconti, Boren & Campbell Ltd. et al., No. 19-245 (June 16, 2021)19-245.pdf19-245
The plaintiff, Sergio DeCurtis, appealed from a partial judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the defendants, Visconti, Boren & Campbell Ltd. and Richard Boren (collectively defendants), in this action alleging that the defendants committed legal malpractice in the drafting of DeCurtis’s antenuptial agreement and in rendering advice related to that agreement and a postnuptial agreement.  Before the Superior Court, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  DeCurtis contended, in part, that Attorney Boren was not exonerated from his alleged malpractice due to a change in the law and that the antenuptial agreement did not contain language to protect DeCurtis’s earnings.  The defendants countered that Attorney Boren was entitled to judgmental immunity for his choice of language in the agreement and that a “pure construction” of the antenuptial agreement at issue in this case would have protected the plaintiff’s assets.
  
The trial justice granted partial summary judgment to defendants after finding that Attorney Boren did not have a duty to include any additional language in the agreements and denied all other aspects of the parties’ motions.  Thereafter, the parties filed renewed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial justice again granted partial summary judgment to defendants because he determined that Attorney Boren was entitled to judgmental immunity.
  
On appeal, DeCurtis argued that the trial justice erred in deciding that Attorney Boren did not have a duty to include additional language in the antenuptial agreement and by finding that Attorney Boren was entitled to the protection of judgmental immunity.  The Supreme Court held that the trial justice erred by analyzing the duty owed to DeCurtis when the question presented was one of contract interpretation.  The Court also held that judgmental immunity has never been recognized in Rhode Island and that, nevertheless, the Court would not address that issue in this case.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.
Michelle Andrade v. Christano Andrade, No. 19-467 (June 16, 2021)19-467.pdf19-467
The plaintiff, Michelle Andrade, appealed from two Family Court orders—the first denying her motion to relocate with the parties’ minor child, and the second granting the motion of the defendant, Christano Andrade, to modify child support.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in denying her motion to relocate by “overlooking and/or misconceiving evidence.”  The plaintiff also argued that the trial justice erred in failing to consider the relevant factors under G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.2(a) and by failing to make the findings required by §§ 15-5-16.2(a), 15 5 16.2(c)(2), 15-5-16.2.4, and 15-5-16.7.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the plaintiff’s motion to relocate with the parties’ minor child.  The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice properly considered and weighed the relevant factors in denying the plaintiff’s motion to relocate.  The Supreme Court also held that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in denying the plaintiff’s motion to relocate.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order denying the motion to relocate.

The Supreme Court further held that the trial justice erred by failing to consider the circumstances, or any change thereof, concerning the minor child’s needs or the defendant’s ability to pay child support, as was necessary when considering a motion to modify child support.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the order granting the defendant’s motion to modify child support.
Middle Creek Farm, LLC, et al. v. Portsmouth Water & Fire District et al., No. 19-95 (June 16, 2021)19-95.pdf19-95

The defendant appealed from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in a case concerning the obligation of the defendant to provide water to certain lots of real property on the Portsmouth-Middletown line.  The defendant claimed that the hearing justice erred when he granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and decided that three lots within a subdivision were part of the water district’s coverage area under its charter.  In addition, the defendant argued that the hearing justice erred in not finding that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and failed to join all other property owners on the Portsmouth-Middletown line as indispensable parties.

The Supreme Court determined that the language of the charter, when read as a whole, created a link between taxation and services.  Thus, it held that the defendant was required to provide water to the three lots at issue, because they were part of the water district’s coverage area and the owners of the lots paid taxes to the district.  Additionally, the Supreme Court held that there was no error in failing to join additional property owners, as their interest in the outcome was purely speculative.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
State v. Miguel Avila, No. 19-440 (June 16, 2021)19-440.pdf19-440
The defendant, Miguel Avila, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of first-degree murder.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial because, he contended, the evidence supported a verdict of voluntary manslaughter, the trial justice failed to consider whether the state disproved voluntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial justice erred by finding that the evidence supported a finding of premeditation.

The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice performed the required analysis and provided an adequate rationale for denying the defendant’s new-trial motion and was not obligated to perform an analysis of the lesser-included offenses, including voluntary manslaughter.  The Supreme Court also concluded that the record established sufficient evidence to support a conviction for first-degree murder.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
Read’s Landscape Construction, Inc. v. The Town of West Warwick et al., Nos. 19-313, 323, 442 (June 10, 2021)19-313, 323, 442.pdf19-313, 323, 442
The defendant, 4N Properties, LLC, appealed from a partial Superior Court judgment and order granting injunctive relief in favor of the plaintiff, Read’s Landscape Construction, Inc.  The plaintiff prevailed on its claim that the warranty deed that conveyed property to the plaintiff established a right of way in and to a forty-foot right of way, known as Nunes Lane, in favor of the plaintiff.  The plaintiff also prevailed on its claim for injunctive relief, and the defendant was enjoined from interfering with the plaintiff’s use of Nunes Lane.  On appeal, the defendant asserted that the trial justice erred (1) in granting summary judgment due to the existence of a number of disputed material facts and (2) in granting a permanent mandatory injunction due to RLC’s failure to establish irreparable harm and great urgency.
  
The Supreme Court concluded that—based on the clear and unambiguous language in the warranty deed—the plaintiff acquired an easement appurtenant over Nunes Lane.  The Supreme Court also concluded that the Superior Court properly granted a mandatory permanent injunction ordering the defendant to cease blocking the plaintiff’s access to its property from Nunes Lane and to remove all impediments that blocked the plaintiff’s access.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and the order of the Superior Court. 
State v. Lisa Ricker, No. 18-293 (June 10, 2021)18-293.pdf18-293
The defendant, Lisa Ricker, appealed from a judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court following a jury verdict of guilty on one count of driving under the influence, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in limiting cross-examination of a witness and abused its discretion in denying her motion for a new trial. The defendant also raised two purported errors of law related to a jury instruction and the jury verdict form.

The Supreme Court determined that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by limiting the defendant’s inquiry on cross-examination, due to its potential to confuse the jury, and that her defense was not prejudiced by the limitation. Additionally, the Court discerned no error in the trial justice’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial, because the evidence regarding the margin of error for breathalyzer results did not preclude a finding of guilt by the jury, where the defendant’s results fell within that margin. Finally, the Supreme Court held that the defendant’s other arguments were waived. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
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