The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in refusing to suppress evidence seized from under the defendant’s motel room mattress pursuant to a search that his roommate consented to.  In addition, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense because he correctly assessed that there was no evidence of self-defense in this case.  Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Bridget Selwyn v. Karen Ward et al, No. 02-637 (July 7, 2005)

The plaintiff, who was injured when a minor poured grain alcohol onto an open flame, appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, RC Liquors, Inc., a liquor store, which allegedly sold the grain alcohol to another minor.  The plaintiff argues that the defendant knew or should have known that minors have a tendency to ignite grain alcohol, an extremely flammable substance.  Alternatively, the plaintiff asserts that selling grain alcohol to minors is ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous, warranting application of strict liability.

Terence M. Fracassa v. M. Priscilla Doris et al, No. 03-608 (June 30, 2005)

This is the second appeal to come before the Supreme Court in this matter.  In 2003, the plaintiff appealed from a judgment in the defendants’ favor, denying his claim for specific performance of a purchase and sales agreement.  See Fracassa v. Doris, 814 A.2d 358 (R.I. 2003).  This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for additional findings of fact relative to events occurring after the scheduled closing date.  On remand, the trial justice granted specific performance to the plaintiff.  The defendants appealed this judgment, arguing that the trial justice did not exercise his independent judgment but, instead, read "between the lines" of the Supreme Court’s opinion and interpreted it as a directive to reconsider his decision. 

State v. Mariano Jimenez  No. 2003-640-C.A. ( June 24, 2005)

The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing questioning concerning defendant’s experience and familiarity with the specific gun that he used to kill his victim because defendant opened the door to such questioning when he testified that the killing was directly attributable to the malfunctioning of that gun. The trial justice properly refused to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of diminished-capacity manslaughter because defendant failed to produce sufficient evidence required to warrant such an instruction.

State ex rel. Town of Westerly v. Charles M. Bradley, No. 04-197 (June 21, 2005)

The defendant appeals from a Superior Court judgment of conviction for violating a Westerly town ordinance prohibiting swimming in the Weekapaug Breachway.  The defendant challenges the validity of the ordinance as violating the Rhode Island Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.  The Supreme Court held that:  (1) the ordinance is not void for vagueness, in light of a related town ordinance that further defines the scope of the prohibition and the town’s proffered limiting construction; and (2) the ordinance is a valid exercise of the town’s police power and does not violate the public trust doctrine.  The judgment is affirmed.

John F. McBurney v. Armand A. Teixeira, No. 00-283 (June 15, 2005)

The plaintiff sued the defendant alleging intentional interference with a contractual relationship, and the defendant moved for summary judgment, maintaining that the plaintiff’s suit was barred by the applicable ten-year statute of limitations.  In the alternative, the defendant argued that a settlement agreement and release between the plaintiff and an associate of the defendant, whom the plaintiff had sued earlier, absolved the defendant from any potential liability.  Citing an appeal in a companion case in which the authenticity of the settlement agreement was in issue, the motion justice granted the defendant’s motion on statute of limitations grounds only.  The plaintiff appealed, and the matter was consolidated for argument with McBurney v. Roszkowski, No. 99-496-A. (R.I., filed June 15, 2005).  In light of its holding in that companion case, in which the Court affirmed a Superior Court finding that the settlement was valid, the Court affirmed the motion justice’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the broad and unambiguous language of the settlement agreement evinced a clear intent to release the defendant from liability for the misconduct alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint.  Accordingly, it was not necessary for the Court to consider whether the plaintiff’s suit was barred by the statute of limitations.

John B. Newman et al v. Valleywood Associates, Inc., No. 02-674 (June 15, 2005)

In this case discussing the interplay between the Rhode Island Mechanics’ Lien Law, G.L. 1956 chapter 28 of title 34, and The Arbitration Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 3 of title 10, a Superior Court motion justice determined that the defendant’s motion to arbitrate a contractual dispute would be granted only if the defendant released its mechanic’s lien on the subject real property within two weeks.  This Court read the two statutes in pari materia and held that a party does not waive its right to arbitrate a contractual dispute, as a matter of law, by filing a notice of intention to claim a mechanic’s lien. 

John F. McBurney v. Joseph J. Roszkowski, No. 99-496 (June 15, 2005)

The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging the latter’s intentional interference with a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and a client.  Shortly after the beginning of trial, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and judgment stipulation.  After reviewing the form of the judgment stipulation, however, the plaintiff sought to correct the record under Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that he had not authorized his attorney to stipulate to a judgment for the defendant.  At that time, the plaintiff also alleged that his signature had been forged onto the settlement and release agreement.  A justice of the Superior Court denied the motion, and the plaintiff appealed.  Before considering the plaintiff’s appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Superior Court for findings of fact regarding the authenticity of the signatures on the settlement agreement and the authority of the plaintiff’s counsel to enter the stipulation in question.  Pursuant to that mandate, a justice of the Superior Court subsequently found that the plaintiff’s counsel had, at a minimum, the implied authority to enter the judgment stipulation at issue, and that the signatures on the settlement agreement were authentic.  The Court affirmed, holding that because the plaintiff’s attorney was authorized to settle the case by the client, she was authorized to take such steps legal, proper, and necessary to carry out the client’s wishes.  In the absence of evidence that the plaintiff specifically had instructed his counsel not to enter into the stipulation at issue, the Court held that the plaintiff’s counsel possessed the authority to resolve the matter.  Turning to the authenticity of the signature on the settlement agreement, the Court discerned no basis to second-guess the lower court’s assessment of the relevant expert testimony presented on remand.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion under Rule 60(b). 

Maria L. DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., et al, No. 04-31 (June 14, 2005)

The plaintiff, Maria L. DeCamp (plaintiff), appealed from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., and the plaintiff’s supervisor, Kenneth Braz (collectively defendants), which dismissed the plaintiff’s suit alleging employment discrimination based upon her sex and her disability.  On the claim of sex discrimination, the Court held that the plaintiff had established both a prima facie case of her gender-based disparate treatment claim and a genuine issue of material fact concerning each element of her gender-based hostile work environment claim.  On the claim of disability discrimination, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the count of disability discrimination, reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the count of sex discrimination, and remanded the case for further proceedings, pertaining to the plaintiff’s gender-based disparate treatment claim and gender-based hostile work environment claim.

Gerald Kaveny et al v. Town of Cumberland Zoning Board of Review, No. 03-318 (June 13, 2005)

Various abutting landowners appealed the decision of the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Cumberland approving developer Highland Hills’s application for a comprehensive permit pursuant to the Rhode Island Low and Moderate Income Housing Act (act), G.L. 1956 chapter 53 title 45, allowing Highland Hills to build 160 units for persons over fifty-five years-old, of which, twenty percent would be reserved for low and moderate income buyers.  This Court vacated the board’s decision because the board failed to make any findings of fact supporting its decision to permit 160 units, as opposed to the originally proposed 343 units.  The Court further concluded that the act was not constitutionally invalid under due process, equal protection, or nondelegation grounds.  The Court declined to consider abutters’ challenge to the State Housing Appeals Board’s implementing regulations because the abutters made no claim that the challenged provision was involved in board’s decision.

Keven A. McKenna P.C. et al v. Frank Williams et al, No. 05-144 (June 6, 2005)

State v. Jeffrey Dustin, No. 04-303 (June 6, 2005)

The defendant, Jeffrey Dustin (defendant), appealed from convictions for possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana handed down after he stipulated to the evidence on record and waived his right to a jury trial.  He claimed the hearing justice erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the search that revealed the narcotics was not incident to a lawful arrest.  As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court held that the issue had not been waived when defendant stipulated to the facts of the case rather than going on with a full adversarial proceeding.  Notwithstanding, his convictions are affirmed because the police officers had the reasonable suspicion necessary to search the defendant and, thus, his constitutional rights were not violated.

Pamela A. Westlake v. Robert L. Westlake, No. 04-43 (June 3, 2005)

In this appeal from a post-final-judgment Family Court placement decision in favor of the plaintiff mother, the defendant father argued that the trial justice erroneously denied his motion to modify placement of the parties’ two minor children.  Soon after the plaintiff mother moved with the children from the area where the family resided before the divorce to a more distant part of Rhode Island, the defendant moved for and was denied physical placement of the minor children.  On appeal, the defendant asserted that the trial justice failed to consider the best interests of the children when making his decision and that instead, the trial justice took into consideration that which was best for the plaintiff mother.   After determining that the trial justice had not abused his discretion, had conducted the appropriate analysis, and had taken into consideration the best interests of the children, the Court denied the defendant’s appeal. 

Robert T. Kells v. Town of Lincoln, et al, No. 04-239 (June 3, 2005)

In this case, the defendants, the Town of Lincoln, by and through its finance director, Stephen Woerner, and current town administrator, Sue P. Sheppard, appealed from a Superior Court summary judgment enjoining them from removing the plaintiff, Robert T. Kells, from his position as chief of police.  The defendants also appealed the Superior Court’s granting of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.  The Court affirmed the hearing justice’s determinations, holding that Kells, through both his contract with the town and the provisions of the town charter, was entitled to the protections afforded by the town charter.  The Court ruled that the chief of police, despite his indefinite tenure, could be removed only for cause, and after a specification of charges, notice of a hearing, and an opportunity to be heard before the town council.  The Court further held that because Kells’s contract was both valid and enforceable, the defendants’ failure to adhere to it constituted a breach of contract.  As such, and because there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the defendants, attorney’s fees were warranted. 

  Cheryl Pierce, Individually and Cheryl Pierce, p.p.a. as Parent and Next of Friend of John T. Pierce, a minor v. Rhode Island Hospital, d/b/a Hasbro Children's Hospital et al, No. 04-0374 (June 2, 2005)

Two-and-a-half-year-old John T. Pierce, son of Cheryl Pierce (the plaintiff), was permanently scarred after physicians at Rhode Island Hospital removed a cast from his left leg.  After arbitration and award in plaintiff’s favor, the arbitrator amended the award to reflect the proper statutory interest for medical malpractice.  The plaintiff appealed the Superior Court’s confirmation of the amended award.  This Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator’s initial award was a clear case of "material miscalculation of figures," and, as such, amendment was proper.  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the arbitrator’s denial of her claim for loss of consortium was "manifest disregard of the law" because she failed to submit any supporting evidence.

Thomas Noel O'Sullivan, individually, as exector of the estate of Julia Mary Walsh O;Sullivan, and as natural parent and next friend of Kieran O'Sullivan, Clodagh O'Sullivan and Aoife O'Sullivan, minors, No. 03-70 (May 26, 2005)

The plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against the defendant hospital and certain doctors arising out of the death of the plaintiff’s wife at Rhode Island Hospital, which occurred after she had been treated unsuccessfully at Newport Hospital.  The plaintiff claimed that he did not discover that these defendants were potential tortfeasors until he received his wife’s medical records several months after her death.  The plaintiff appealed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Superior Court ruled that the plaintiff’s wrongful death action against the defendants was time barred pursuant to the three-year statute of limitations period set forth in Rhode Island’s wrongful death statute. 

Arnold Road Realty Associates, LLC, et al v. The Tiogue Fire District, No. 03-615 (May 24, 2005)

The plaintiffs, Arnold Road Realty Associates, LLC (Arnold Road) and A. Cardi Realty Company, Inc. (Cardi Realty), appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, the Tiogue Fire District, on their slander-of-title allegations.  The basis of the alleged slander was both the recording of, and the failure to remove, a tax collector’s deed to property that Arnold Road formerly owned in Coventry, Rhode Island.  The trial justice found that, although someone other than the true owner was given notice of the tax sale and the resulting deed, Arnold Road failed to prove the requisite element of malice necessary to support its slander-of-title claims.  Thereupon, Arnold Road sought to amend its complaint by adding Cardi Realty as a party plaintiff, and by adding counts for declaratory judgment and to quiet title.  The trial justice found that his earlier decision on the slander-of-title claims was dispositive of the additional claims, and granted the plaintiff’s motion to amend and summarily entered judgment for the plaintiffs on the declaratory-judgment and quiet-title counts. 

On appeal, Arnold Road argued that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived the evidence in finding that the Tiogue Fire District did not act with the requisite malice necessary to support the slander-of-title counts.  In its cross-appeal from the judgment in favor of Arnold Road and Cardi Realty on the declaratory-judgment and quiet-title counts, the Tiogue Fire District argued that the addition of the declaratory-judgment and quiet-title counts after the trial concluded, combined with the denial of an opportunity to amend its answer, deprived it of its right to a full and fair hearing on the merits of the additional counts.

The Supreme Court held that the record supported the Superior Court justice’s decision that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant acted with malice in either recording or failing to remove the tax collector’s deed.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the issue of the validity of the tax collector’s deed was tried with the implied consent of the parties and affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the declaratory-judgment and quiet-title counts.   The Court did not examine the issue of the propriety of adding Cardi Realty as a party plaintiff for the declaratory-judgment and quiet-title counts, because Arnold Road had standing to bring the quiet-title action and the addition of Cardi Realty did not change the essential result, which was to void the tax deed and to quiet title to the property.

State v. Israel Rivera, No. 04-164 (May 20, 2005)

On an appeal from a Superior Court judgment that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation, the Court determined whether the trial justice could properly consider testimony regarding a witness’s financial relationship to the defendant when assessing credibility.  Israel Rivera was presented as a violator of his probation pursuant to Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  His girlfriend testified on his behalf, and the trial justice posed questions from the bench about her financial reliance on defendant.  The defendant argued that the trial justice improperly considered such information when assessing the witness’s credibility.  Applying the rule that determinations of witness credibility at probation-revocation hearings are made at the discretion of the trial justice, and that such determinations will be overturned only if they are found to be arbitrary or capricious, the Court found that the consideration of the testimony was proper.  The Court reasoned that such testimony was relevant when considering the possible bias of the witness, and, therefore, the judgment was affirmed.

Anthony J. Dellagrotta et al v. Cynthia A. Dellagrotta, No. 02-46 (May 19, 2005)

Both parties appealed from a decision of the Superior Court in a nonjury case, in which the court found that the plaintiffs were the rightful owners of certain property, but the defendant was entitled to compensation for the cost of improvements she made to the property and the house’s appreciation in value attributable to those improvements.  In addition, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in granting the plaintiffs an award of rent and attorney’s fees on their trespass and ejectment claim.  The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court that the defendant failed to prove the elements of promissory estoppel or that a constructive trust should be imposed upon the property for her benefit.  The Court vacated the plaintiffs’ award of attorney’s fees, holding that the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 18 of title 34, did not apply because there was no rental agreement between the parties.  An award of rent was appropriate, the Court determined, to compensate the plaintiffs for the defendant’s possession of the house after receipt of notice that she no longer was privileged to remain there.  Finally, the Court directed entry of a new judgment on the defendant’s unjust enrichment award because the benefit conferred upon the plaintiffs was the increased value of the house only.

Azarig Kooloian v. Suburban Land Co. et al v. Azarig Kooloian, Jr., alias, No. 03-4 (May 18, 2005)

This appeal arises from a buyer’s claim of damages from the defendants for breach of contract and fraud in the context of a purchase and sales agreement for real estate.  The defendants—the property’s seller, the seller’s controlling shareholder, and a related corporation—appeal from a money judgment.  The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence supported the trial justice’s finding that the defendants breached the contract and committed fraud.  The buyer acquired the property at a foreclosure sale at a higher price than the purchase price agreed to in the purchase and sales agreement.  The trial justice found that because defendants acted in bad faith and committed fraud, the buyer was entitled to damages compensating him for his loss of the bargain negotiated in the purchase and sales agreement.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. 

Mary Seide v. State of Rhode Island et al, No. 03-521 (May 16, 2005)

The plaintiff sued the defendants, several police officers and their governmental employers, to recover for injuries suffered in an accident with the driver of a stolen vehicle who was being pursued by the defendant police officers.  The plaintiff appealed from the Superior Court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law, and on appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment. 

Specifically, the Court held that the Public Duty Doctrine did not grant the defendants immunity because G.L. 1956 § 31‑12‑9 expressly waives an officer’s immunity from suit by providing that, when a police officer pursues a person suspected of violating the law, the officer is not protected "from the consequences of [his or her] reckless disregard of the safety of others."  Additionally, the Court concluded that judgment as a matter of law was improperly granted on the issue of proximate cause because the plaintiff produced evidence that reasonably could lead a jury to conclude that the officers’ decision to continue the pursuit and their failure to terminate the chase earlier was in reckless disregard for the safety of others.  Also, the plaintiff did not need to present expert testimony that the defendants breached a duty of care owed to plaintiff because the jury was capable of understanding the facts and drawing correct conclusions without the assistance of an expert.  Finally, a police department’s pursuit policy, adopted as official policy governing high-speed police pursuits, may serve as a standard that the jury could compare with the defendants’ conduct in deciding whether the defendants breached the standard of care owed to the plaintiff. 

State of RI v. Horton, No. 2002-401 (May 5, 2005)

The defendant appealed his 2001 conviction of first-degree child molestation sexual assault for which he was sentenced to twenty years, eight to serve, with the balance suspended with probation.  On appeal, the defendant advanced three points of error as reasons for reversing his conviction.  The defendant argued that the trial justice committed reversible error when she overruled the defense’s objections to certain comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument, that the trial justice erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the trial justice’s weighing of certain testimony, and that the trial justice erroneously admitted into evidence pictures that had not been provided to the defendant during discovery.   The Court held that two comments the prosecution made and that the defendant objected to failed to rise beyond the level of harmless error, and as such, did not warrant reversal.  The Court also held that the trial justice followed the appropriate procedure and, considering both the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, rightly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  Finally, the Court did not agree that there was reversible error in the prosecution’s discovery violation because the defendant had the opportunity to view the videotape.  For these reasons, the Court denied the defendant’s appeal and upheld his conviction.

State of RI v. Sylvia,  No. 2004-152 (May 5, 2005)

The defendant, Terrence Sylvia, appealed from a Superior Court judgment revoking four previously suspended sentences and sentencing him to serve eight years at the Adult Correctional Institutions for violating the terms of his probation.  The defendant argued on appeal that, notwithstanding the reduced burden of proof required at a violation hearing, the evidence adduced against him nevertheless was insufficient to show that he violated the terms of his probation.  Thus, he asserted, the hearing justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously.  The defendant also argued that the hearing justice improperly relied upon the defendant’s previous contacts with the criminal justice system to buttress the state’s proof.           

The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found the defendant’s contentions to be without merit.  The Supreme Court was satisfied that the hearing justice properly weighed and considered the evidence presented and found that the testimony of the complaining witness identifying the defendant as his assailant was credible.  Moreover, the record disclosed that the hearing justice considered the defendant’s criminal history only with respect to the issues of bail and sentencing, after he had revoked the suspended sentences.  The Supreme Court held that the trial justice acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously in considering the evidence and in determining that, despite apparent inconsistencies, there existed reasonably satisfactory evidence to support a finding that the defendant had violated the conditions of his probation.

Euphemia Barr Gardner et al v. Wayne R. Baird, No. 04-237 (May 4, 2005)

In this appeal arising from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant-property owner, the Supreme Court held that the motion justice erred by finding that the plaintiffs could not prove that they had an ownership interest in the defendant’s property.  The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a claim for a prescriptive easement and demonstrated that factual questions existed that may prove they are entitled to a judgment in their favor.  In addition, the Court held that the plaintiffs who failed to pay the appellate filing fee were properly before the Court on appeal.

I. Shane Olshansky et al v. Rehrig International et al, No. 04-184 (May 3, 2005)

The plaintiffs, I. Shane and Myra Olshansky (plaintiffs), appealed from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Rehrig International (defendant), on the plaintiffs’ claims of strict liability, negligence, breach of implied warranty, and loss of consortium.  The motion justice determined that the plaintiffs were unable to prove their case based on the evidence on the record, particularly since they did not plan to retain an expert to explain what defect caused the basket of a shopping cart to disengage from the wheels, thus causing Mr. Olshansky’s alleged injuries.  This Court affirmed, holding that nothing on the record established that this defendant was in any way negligent, that it breached an implied warranty, or that a defect existed in the product that caused Mr. Olshansky’s injuries.  The plaintiffs provided no information to survive summary judgment.

The Elena Carcieri Trust-1988 et al v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Rhode Island, No. 04-176 (May 3, 2005)

The defendant-lessee appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the plaintiff-lessor in this commercial landlord-tenant case.  The defendant argues that it timely exercised its option to extend the lease in accordance with its provisions, which required that notice of the defendant’s election to extend the term of the lease be given "not later than three (3) months prior to expiration of the original term." 

Loretta M. Scarborough v. Thomas E. Wright, No. 03-510 (May 2, 2005)

Summary judgment in favor of defendant on statute of limitations grounds is affirmed based upon plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.  In this case, the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment was not valid because it was not notarized, i.e. it was not taken before a person having authority to administer such oath or affirmation.

State v. David L. Crow, No. 02-407 (April 29, 2005)

In this appeal by a defendant found guilty of solicitation to commit murder and to commit arson, there was sufficient evidence of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence, was not clearly wrong, and articulated a sufficient rationale for denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  The defendant’s failure to have properly objected to the jury instructions on criminal solicitation constituted a waiver of that issue on appeal.

Brian Martin v. Matthew J. Marciano et al, No. 03-561 (April 27, 2005)

The plaintiff, Brian Martin (plaintiff), was attacked while attending a high school graduation party that the defendant-parent, Lee Martin (defendant), hosted at her home in honor of her daughter, Jen Martin (Jen).  The evidence showed that the defendant may have provided alcohol to the plaintiff and other underage guests at the party.  The plaintiff brought suit against:  the defendant; party guest Matthew J. Marciano; and the uninvited attacker, Chijoke Okere (Okere).  A Superior Court motion justice granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty to protect him from Okere’s attack.  The plaintiff appealed and the Supreme Court reversed.  As an adult provider of alcohol to the underage plaintiff, the defendant was duty bound to exercise reasonable care to protect him from criminal attack.  Whether Okere’s actions constitute a supervening act breaking the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries is an unresolved question of fact for the jury to consider. 

Dawn Tedesco et al v. Richard F. Connors, in his capacity as Finance Director and Purchasing Agent of the Town of Johnston et al, No. 03-469 (April 27, 2005)

The plaintiff, Dawn Tedesco, brought suit against the defendant, Rhode Island Department of Transportation (DOT), for injuries suffered in a bicycle accident after her tire slipped into a parallel-bar sewer grate on Atwood Avenue.  At the close of the plaintiff’s case, the defendant moved for a judgment as a matter of law on two grounds:  (1) that the public duty doctrine barred plaintiff’s case and the egregious conduct exception did not apply; and, in the alternative, (2) that G.L. 1956 § 24-5-1(b), in allocating a duty to the local municipalities to make roadways safe for bicycles, thereby relieved the state of that same duty.  The trial justice granted the town’s motion on the issue of the public duty doctrine and, thus, never reached the statutory argument.

 The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the trial justice and held that determination of the egregious conduct exception is a mixed question of law and fact and, therefore, that a trial justice must allow a jury to find the predicate or duty-triggering facts, provided any exist, in making such a determination.  Furthermore, § 24-5-1(b) was of no help to the defendant because of the DOT’s own policy of replacing parallel-bar sewer grates on Rhode Island roadways. 

Russell DePetrillo et al v. Norman Lepore a/k/a Lepore Farm, No. 04-122 (April 27, 2005)

The plaintiffs, Russell and Donna DePetrillo (plaintiffs), asked this Court to declare a real estate purchase and sale agreement specific enough for specific performance.  The trial justice denied specific performance, finding that the contract could not be specifically performed because it was not sufficiently clear, definite, certain, and complete as to its essential terms.  The plaintiffs appealed.  Because there was significant doubt as to precisely what parcel would constitute the seller’s reserved lot, this Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in finding that the contract could not be specifically performed.

Angelina M. Wellborn v. Spurwink/Rhode Island et al, No. 04-183 (April 25, 2005)

In this sex discrimination case, the defendant, Spurwink/Rhode Island, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the plaintiff, former employee Angelina M. Wellborn, arguing that the trial justice should have granted its Super.R.Civ.P. 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternate, its Super.R.Civ.P. 59 motion for a new trial.  Although Wellborn alleged sex discrimination by Spurwink and two of her supervisors, the trial court granted Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of law relating to both supervisors, but denied the motion relating to the defendant.  The jury returned a verdict in Wellborn’s favor, finding that she had been the victim of adverse employment action by Spurwink as a result of her pregnancy, and the trial justice denied the defendant’s subsequent Rule 59 motion for a new trial.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice should have granted either its Rule 50 motion or its Rule 59 motion, claiming that there was no evidence to show that Wellborn was the victim of any adverse employment practice or discriminatory animus, or that Wellborn had been constructively discharged from her job.  The Court denied the defendant’s appeal, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to determine whether the plaintiff had met her burden of proving that Spurwink’s proffered justifications were pretexts for discrimination.   

Credit Union Central Falls v. Lawrence S. Groff, No. 04-196 (April 22, 2005)

Doris P. Riendeau (Riendeau) appealed the denial of a motion to intervene in a Superior Court civil action brought by Credit Union Central Falls (CUCF or plaintiff) against attorney Lawrence P. Groff (Groff or defendant).  The Court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding that Riendeau was entitled to intervention of right because she claimed a particularized interest in the specific funds attached in the underlying action, and, but for intervention, that civil action might, as a practical matter, have impaired or impeded her ability to protect her interest.  Riendeau’s interest was not adequately represented by Chief Disciplinary Counsel because she endeavored to go beyond merely identifying her interest, and affirmatively sought to establish her superior right to the attached funds in Groff’s client account.  The Superior Court’s supplemental order did not moot the appeal because, although it did provide for notice and an opportunity for a hearing, the supplemental order was not sufficiently specific in describing what would take place at the hearing and, in any case, any such hearing could prove meaningless without the opportunity for discovery before it was held.

State v. Neil Stierhoff, No. 04-117 (April 19, 2005)

The defendant was convicted of misdemeanor stalking in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-59-2 following a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court.  On appeal, the defendant alleged that the trial justice committed several errors of law.  The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s appeal, holding: (1) the defendant waived his argument that the state had failed to introduce competent medical evidence to prove that the complainant sustained substantial emotional distress by failing to raise the issue before the trial justice; (2) there was no indication that the trial justice misconceived the evidence or was otherwise wrong in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss where the evidence established that the defendant was well aware that his advances toward the complainant were unwanted and unwelcome; and (3) the defendant waived his argument that the state’s failure to disclose the content of the testimony of a witness violated Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to adequately object to the testimony on such grounds before the trial justice.  The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that § 11-59-2, as applied to him, was unconstitutionally vague, reasoning that the evidence presented by the state unmistakably established that the defendant knew that the complainant was bothered by his advances. 

State v. Jacques Gautier, No. 04-165 (April 12, 2005)

The defendant, while on probation for a previous conviction, was arrested in 1998 for the murder of Jeffrey Indellicati.  The state presented the defendant as a violator, but a justice of the Superior Court determined that the state had failed to present sufficient evidence that the defendant had killed the victim.  The state petitioned for certiorari, and the Supreme Court quashed the judgment.  State v. Gautier, 774 A.2d 882 (R.I. 2001) (Gautier I).  On remand, the hearing justice deemed the defendant a violator, and the state thereafter formally charged the defendant for the 1998 murder.  The defendant argued that the findings of fact made by the hearing justice during his original probation-revocation hearing precluded the state from prosecuting him for the murder, and moved to dismiss the indictment.  A Superior Court justice denied the defendant’s motion, and he sought review before the Supreme Court.  In denying the defendant’s appeal, the Court revisited its holding in State v. Chase, 588 A.2d 120 (R.I. 1991) and overruled it, holding, pursuant to its decisions in State v. Godette, 751 A.2d 742 (R.I. 2000) and State v. Znosko, 755 A.2d 832 (R.I. 2000), that even if the hearing justice had made additional findings on remand, those findings would in no way preclude the state from prosecuting the defendant for the misconduct underlying the alleged probation-violation.  Accordingly, Chase, insofar as it is inconsistent with the Court’s decision, is expressly overruled. 

Pleasant Mangement, LLC v. Maria Carrasco et al, No. 03-470 (April 12, 2005)

The defendants, Maria Carrasco (Carrasco) and her husband Jose Ortega (collectively defendants), appealed from the denial of their motion to vacate a default decree that foreclosed their right to redeem ownership of a tenement house currently owned by the plaintiff, Pleasant Management, LLC (plaintiff).  In light of the violation of Article V, Rule 4.2 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct committed by the plaintiff’s counsel, the Supreme Court held that the motion justice committed in error of law in failing to consider whether that violation constituted excusable neglect under G.L. 1956 § 9-21-2.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated that decision and remanded the case for such a determination.   

State v. Michael B. Champion, No. 04-151 (April 11, 2005)

After a jury convicted the defendant, Michael B. Champion (defendant), on one count of simple assault against his former girlfriend, the defendant sought a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.  Inexplicably, the motion for new trial, which counsel alleges he filed fifteen days after the jury rendered its verdict, was never received by the trial justice, the Superior Court clerk’s office, or the prosecutor.  Once defense counsel was notified that no one had received the motion, he filed a new motion along with an affidavit stating that he had filed the original motion as required by Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.