In this medical malpractice action, the defendant, Carl Schwartz, M.D. (Dr. Schwartz), appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Paul Oden (Oden).  On appeal, Dr. Schwartz, the echocardiologist at Oden’s heart surgery, argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial.  Specifically, he asserted that the trial justice committed reversible error in (1) refusing to instruct the jury on intervening and superseding cause; (2) admitting certain testimony pertaining to Oden’s cardiac arrest following surgery in August 2004; (3) ignoring relevant and material evidence on the issue of damages; and (4) instructing the jury on insurance.  Additionally, Dr. Schwartz contended that G.L. 1956 § 9-21-10(b) (mandating prejudgment interest at a rate of 12 percent on pecuniary damages in medical malpractice actions) was unconstitutional—an issue of first impression for the Supreme Court.
  
The Supreme Court first held that the trial justice correctly refused to instruct on intervening and superseding cause because Dr. Schwartz was part of a surgical team, and, as such, there was no break in the causal connection between his antecedent negligence and the subsequent negligence committed by the surgeon.  Second, the Court concluded that testimony concerning Oden’s post-operative cardiac arrest was properly before the jury.  Third, the Court agreed with the trial justice that there was sufficient evidence to establish Dr. Schwartz’s negligence and that the jury’s award of damages did not shock the conscience.  Fourth, the Court determined that the trial justice’s instruction directing the jury to ignore any assumptions or implications concerning liability insurance did not contravene Rule 411 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.  Reasoning that the members of the jury are presumed to follow a trial justice’s instructions, and examining the context in which that instruction was delivered, the Court held that the trial justice did not err in so instructing the jury.  Lastly, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of § 9-21-10(b).  Likening the statute to economic legislation, the Court examined the statute under a rational basis standard of review.  Ultimately, the Court held that the statute was constitutional because it was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of promoting settlement as well as compensating an injured plaintiff for the loss of the use of money to which he or she is legally entitled.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in all respects.

The plaintiffs, Cecilia and Manuel Cigarrilha, contended on appeal that the trial justice in the Superior Court erred in declining to declare that their three-family rental property, which is located in an area of the city of Providence that is zoned for no more than two-family dwelling units, was a pre-existing legal nonconforming use.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in declining to declare that the property was a legal nonconforming use.  The Court noted that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the property was used as a three-family dwelling unit prior to the enactment of the city’s zoning ordinance in 1923.  The Supreme Court additionally held that the trial justice did not err in declining to apply the equitable doctrines of estoppel or laches to the case as a basis for allowing the plaintiffs to continue to use the property as a three-family dwelling.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiffs appealed from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, several physicians who treated one of the plaintiffs, Jose Bustamante (Bustamante), and allegedly failed to discover a cancerous tumor in his neck.  The trial justice determined that the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiffs’ medical-malpractice claims and that the action therefore was time-barred, and she granted summary judgment on that ground.  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that their action was not untimely because the statute of limitations began to run, at the earliest, when the cancerous nature of Bustamante’s tumor was discovered on June 10, 2005 and their action was filed within three years of that date.

The Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations began to run on June 2, 2005, the date the plaintiffs were informed that Bustamante had a previously undiagnosed mass in his neck that was described as a cervical tumor by his Miami doctor.  Although the cancerous nature of the tumor was not verified at that point and there were other diagnostic possibilities for the mass, the Court determined that a reasonable person in similar circumstances would have discovered on June 2, 2005 that the wrongful conduct of the defendants—the failure to discover the tumor earlier—was the principal cause of Bustamante’s injuries.  Because the plaintiffs’ complaint was filed more than three years from that date, the Court concluded that the complaint was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial justice’s grant of summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds.

Before this Court is the appeal of Sherwin-Williams Company (Sherwin-Williams) from an order denying its motion for a protective order to prohibit the disclosure of and the use of an internal company document.  Sherwin-Williams argues that the disclosure of that document would offend both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine.  Not surprisingly, the state maintains that the document is not privileged in any way and, therefore, it is not protected from disclosure.  After reviewing the record, the Court held that Sherwin-Williams met its burden of establishing that the internal company document was factual work product, and that the state failed to meet its burden of establishing that the protected document nevertheless was discoverable because of substantial need and a resulting injustice or undue hardship.  The Court also concluded that Sherwin-Williams did not waive the protection afforded by the work-product doctrine.  Because the Court held that the internal document was shielded from discovery based on the work-product doctrine and that this protection was not waived, it did not reach the claim of attorney-client privilege.

Accordingly, the Court vacated the order of the Superior Court denying Sherwin-Williams’ motion for a protective order and remanded the case to the Superior Court.

The applicant, Harold Hazard, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court denying his application for postconviction relief.  Hazard previously was convicted of one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and four counts of second-degree child molestation sexual assault.  Before this Court, Hazard contended that his application for postconviction relief should have been granted based on what he argued was prejudicial error committed by his trial counsel when he provided Hazard’s confidential psychiatric records to the state without his knowledge or consent, failed to limit the state’s use of the psychiatric records or to object to the state’s use of the records, failed to introduce the psychiatric records to buttress Hazard’s defense, and failed to adequately prepare Hazard for cross-examination on the psychiatric records.  Hazard also contends that his trial counsel was deficient because he pursued an argument at trial about racial animosity that Hazard believed should not have been used and because his trial counsel failed to object to what Hazard argued was improper credibility attacks and improper vouching during the prosecutor’s closing argument.
  
After reviewing the record, the Court held that, because there was such strong and overwhelming evidence incriminating Hazard, including Hazard’s own testimony that was replete with inconsistencies, the Court agreed with the trial justice that the unfortunate errors of counsel, which supported a conclusion of ineffectiveness, did not affect the outcome of the trial and, therefore, were not prejudicial.  Further, the Court held that the postconviction-relief justice did not err in finding that the applicant’s trial counsel’s attack on the complaining witness’ credibility was a reasonable tactical decision.  Finally, the Court held that the postconviction-relief justice did not err in finding that the applicant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failure to object to what Hazard argues was improper credibility attacks and improper vouching.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Jose Rivera, appealed from the denial of a motion to reduce his sentence in accordance with Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the sentence of life imprisonment, to be followed by a consecutive sixteen-year incarcerative term, he received upon conviction on multiple counts of first- and second-degree sexual assault and one count of simple assault against three developmentally disabled women was without justification and disproportionate to sentences imposed for similar crimes.

The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice identified several circumstances—including the nature of the multiple offenses, the vulnerability of the multiple developmentally disabled victims, the extensive and continuing impact of the crimes upon the victims, and the defendant’s persistent refusal to accept responsibility or express remorse—to justify the defendant’s sentence.  The Court held that the sentence was neither without justification nor grossly disparate from other sentences generally imposed for similar offenses.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment.

Gary Santos appealed from a judgment of conviction for carrying a firearm in a motor vehicle without a license in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-47-8(a).  Santos’ principal argument on appeal was that the trial justice erred when he denied Santos’ motion to suppress tangible evidence, to wit, a .44-caliber revolver and eleven bullets, which were seized pursuant to what he alleged was an illegal search in violation of article 1, sections 6 and 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Santos also argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, which he alleged was based on insufficient evidence.

After a careful review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the police officer who conducted the search of Santos’ vehicle possessed specific and articulable facts to support a reasonable belief that Santos may have been armed and dangerous and had the present ability to obtain a weapon, thus justifying her decision to search the interior of Santos’ vehicle for weapons.  The Court also concluded that the trial justice did not err when he denied Santos’ motion for a judgment of acquittal, because there was ample evidence to persuade a fact-finder that Santos knowingly possessed the firearm and intentionally exercised control over it.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed judgment of the Superior Court.

The Department of Corrections (the DOC) appealed from a Superior Court decision confirming an arbitration award in favor of the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers (the union).  The parties’ dispute stemmed from the DOC’s proposal to modify the weapons qualification component of the training program for correctional officers.  After the General Assembly amended G.L. 1956 § 11-47-17 so that correctional officers were no longer statutorily required to undergo annual weapons qualification, the DOC intended to conduct live, on-range weapons qualification every two years (instead of annually, per the collective bargaining agreement).  It purchased a computer system for simulated weapons training and proposed to the training committee that this system be used every other year in lieu of live, on-range weapons qualification.  The training committee deadlocked on this issue, and the parties proceeded to arbitration.
      
The Court first held that the arbitrator had correctly concluded that the matter was arbitrable.  Reaching the merits of the dispute, it then held that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement was passably plausible, did not reflect a manifest disregard for the law, and was not irrational.  Accordingly, it affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, James Gaffney, was charged with two counts of felony assault in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-2.  The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction after a jury verdict finding him guilty of the lesser-included offense of simple assault (count 1) and of a “serious bodily injury” felony assault (count 2).  The defendant argued on appeal that the trial justice erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and his motion for a new trial.  The defendant claimed that the state’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction for felony assault (count 2) because the state did not establish either a substantial risk of death or serious permanent disfigurement, as required by § 11-5-2.
  
The Supreme Court determined that the totality of the evidence of the assault—including the multiple blows to the complainant’s head, her lacerated scalp and the resultant profuse bleeding, her bruised “raccoon eyes,” elevated vital signs, and her “critical” condition upon arrival for emergency treatment—was sufficient to serve as a basis for a substantial risk of death finding by the jury.  The Court concluded that the serious physical injury component of the statute satisfactorily was demonstrated and that, accordingly, there was sufficient evidence adduced to convict the defendant of felony assault.
 
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err when she denied the defendant’s motions.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, William Lamont Thomas, sustained injuries when he was shot by the defendant, Omar Proctor, an officer with the Providence Police Department, after fleeing from his attempted arrest.  The plaintiff appealed from a judgment entered after a jury verdict in favor of the defendant in the plaintiff’s civil action seeking damages.  The plaintiff argued that he was unfairly prejudiced when the trial justice allowed the defendant to introduce a redacted police department database report.  The defendant countered that the report was introduced to show the jury information he knew at the time that supported the contention that he believed his life was in jeopardy at the time of the shooting, and that, therefore, his actions in shooting the plaintiff were reasonable.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision below and held that the trial justice’s decision to admit the redacted report was well within his discretionary authority.  The Court reasoned that the report was relevant and that the trial justice properly considered a balancing test before admitting the report into evidence.  The Court also noted that, in doing so, the trial justice addressed the only objection to the report articulated by the plaintiff at that time.

The State of Rhode Island, one of the named defendants, sought review of a Superior Court judgment denying its motion to dismiss the plaintiff Dawn L. Huntley’s employment discrimination claims.  The state argued that the plaintiff’s claims should be barred by the doctrine of res judicata because she had filed a nearly identical suit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, which suit was dismissed.  The plaintiff argued that her federal claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that, therefore, the dismissal was not a final judgment on the merits.

The Supreme Court noted that in her federal court case, the plaintiff failed to object to the defendants’ motion to dismiss (as required by a court rule) and, accordingly, that was the ground for dismissing her complaint. The Court stated that res judicata is intended to bar claims that could have been litigated in an earlier case.  After determining that the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims in the federal court and failed to do so, the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the Superior Court and held that the plaintiff’s claims were barred.

The defendant, Juan G. Catala (Catala or defendant), appealed from a Superior Court money-damage judgment in favor of the plaintiff, David S. Vogel (Vogel or plaintiff).  On appeal, Catala contended that the trial justice erred in finding Vogel to be a credible witness and failing to find that the transaction between Vogel and Catala was void pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 11-19-17 as a loan for betting.
 
The Supreme Court determined that Catala’s failure to order a transcript of the trial below was fatal to his appeal.  Although Vogel had asserted in his pleadings that he lent the money at issue to Catala so that he might win back part of what he had lost, the Supreme Court explained that this judicial admission did not necessarily fall within the embrace of § 11-19-17.  That statute declares void only those transactions where money was “knowingly lent” for the purpose of, among other things, betting.  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, the Supreme Court reasoned, whether Vogel lent this money “knowingly” under § 11-19-17 was a question of fact for the trial justice—a question that the Court could not conclude the trial justice erred in deciding, without reviewing the transcript.  The Court stated that it could not engage in a meaningful review of the trial justice’s factual finding that Vogel did not knowingly lend the money for gambling purposes, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

In 2008, the defendant, Amy Realty, purchased Assessor’s Plat No. 5, lot No. 486 (Lot 486) in the City of Central Falls at a Pawtucket Water Supply Board (PWSB) tax sale auction.  However, unbeknownst to the defendant at that time, no water bill was due and owing on that property, and the PWSB had in fact intended to auction the neighboring property, Assessor’s Plat No. 5, lot No. 456 (Lot 456).  At no point did the plaintiffs, who held validly recorded mortgages on Lot 456, receive statutorily required notice of the tax sale.  When the defendant sought to foreclose on the property over a year later, it discovered the discrepancy with the lot numbers and obtained a corrective deed from the PWSB purporting to convey Lot 456 instead of Lot 486.  After obtaining the corrective deed, the defendant noticed parties with interests in Lot 456 (including the plaintiffs) of its petition to foreclose, but the plaintiffs failed to respond, and a final decree was entered by the Superior Court foreclosing all rights of redemption.
  
The plaintiffs then initiated a separate action under G.L. 1956 § 44-9-24 seeking to vacate the final decree of foreclosure, arguing that their due-process rights were violated when they were not noticed of the initial tax sale and that no taxes were owed on the property that was sold.  The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor, vacating the final foreclosure decree.  The defendant appealed, arguing that, under §§ 44-9-30 and 44-9-31, the plaintiffs were barred from challenging the final decree because they failed to respond to the petition to foreclose.  Additionally, the defendant asserted that § 44-9-24 did not apply because the plaintiffs received notice of the foreclosure petition and the corrective deed rectified the “typo” in the original deed that had resulted in the PWSB conveying the wrong property.

The Supreme Court held that the purported corrective deed obtained by the defendant in this case was ineffective to correct the fundamental problem with the tax sale—that the wrong property was mistakenly sold.  The Court therefore concluded that, because no taxes were owed on the lot that was sold at the tax sale, § 44-9-24’s “safety valve” provision applied, and the Superior Court did not err in vacating the foreclosure decree.

The plaintiffs, Joyce and Trudy DiPippo, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendants, Louis and Rebecca Sperling.  The plaintiffs argued that the trial justice erred in holding that Joyce DiPippo’s actions in seeking permission to hang a hammock on a disputed parcel of land were a concession to the defendants’ superior title in that land.  Further, the plaintiffs asserted that the trial justice incorrectly relied on an agreement the parties entered into after the dispute over the land had arisen in finding that Joyce DiPippo acknowledged the defendants’ ownership of the parcel.

The Supreme Court referenced its ruling in Cahill v. Morrow, 11 A.3d 82, 93 (R.I. 2011),  that “objective manifestations that another has superior title, made after the statutory period and not made to settle an ongoing dispute, are poignantly relevant” to the determination of claim of right in an adverse possession case.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, finding that the post-dispute agreement was not entered into to settle an ongoing dispute, as it contained neither a reservation of rights, nor any promise by the plaintiffs to refrain from filing a claim in exchange for permission to use the disputed property.

The defendant appealed from an order of a Superior Court magistrate that denied his motion to vacate what he argued was an illegal sentence that was imposed after he admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his probation.  On appeal, the defendant argued that: (1) the magistrate who revoked five years of his suspended sentence exceeded her authority in doing so; (2) the trial justice who subsequently heard the defendant’s motion to vacate that sentence erred when he declined to address the motion and instead returned it to the original sentencing magistrate to decide; (3) G.L. 1956 § 12-19-18 required that the defendant’s sentence be quashed and his imprisonment terminated; and (4) even if the revocation of five years of the defendant’s suspended sentence was proper, the magistrate erroneously calculated the amount of time that remained suspended after those five years.

The Supreme Court held that, because the defendant had been released from prison, the issues that were raised about his admission and the time that he was required to serve for violation of the terms and conditions of his probation were moot.  Additionally, because the parties agreed that the sentencing magistrate erred when she calculated the length of time that remained on the defendant’s suspended sentence and probation, the Court remanded the matter to the Superior Court for a hearing to recalculate that length of time.

The Supreme Court was called upon for the first time to interpret the Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater Medical Marijuana Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 28.6 of title 21 (Act).  The State of Rhode Island (state) appealed from a pretrial order dismissing a five-count criminal information, filed against the defendants, Dean DeRobbio and Joseph Joubert.  On appeal, the state contended that the hearing justice committed reversible error in determining that insufficient probable cause existed to believe that the defendants had committed various narcotics-related offenses.  The defendants asserted that their possession of marijuana was legal under the Act.
 
As a result of a warranted search of DeRobbio’s home, the defendants were charged by criminal information with (among other things) possessing marijuana with the intent to deliver it, manufacturing marijuana, and conspiracy to violate Rhode Island’s Controlled Substances Act.  The defendants, both medical marijuana cardholders, raised the affirmative defense and dismissal provision set forth under the Act, which would exempt them from prosecution for those offenses. 

The hearing justice dismissed the information, reasoning that the quantity of marijuana found at DeRobbio’s home did not exceed the amount prescribed under the Act.   After carefully reviewing the Act, the Supreme Court determined that the Superior Court had prematurely dismissed the information.  The Act explicitly states that charges brought in a prosecution involving marijuana “shall be dismissed following an evidentiary hearing,” in which the defendant shows that he or she was in possession of an amount of marijuana that conformed to the limits set forth in the Act.  Therefore, because no evidentiary hearing was held, in contravention of the plain terms of the Act, the Supreme Court held that the hearing justice’s dismissal was improper.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court, and instructed the hearing justice to conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the Act.

Moreover, because the parties did not contest the constitutionality of the Act (to wit, whether it was preempted either wholly or partly by federal law), the Supreme Court left for another day the resolution of that looming question.

The Mental Health Advocate—on behalf of Irving Briggs, who is a sentenced inmate at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI)—appeals a decision from the Superior Court granting a request by the Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals for an emergency transfer of Briggs from the Forensic Unit of the Eleanor Slater Hospital, where Briggs was receiving specialized mental-health services as a psychiatric inpatient, to the ACI.  Before this Court, Briggs contends that his emergency transfer to the ACI, in the absence of a full evidentiary hearing, violated his procedural due-process rights.  He further argues that, based on his allegations that the department contrived the emergency precipitating his transfer, the trial justice abused his discretion in denying his motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.

After a careful review of the record, this Court held that the Mental Health Advocate failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because his allegation is moot and that he failed to meet the difficult burden of showing that the circumstances in this case are of extreme public importance capable of repetition yet evading review.  This Court also held that the Mental Health Advocate failed to demonstrate that the trial justice abused his discretion when he denied his motion for Rule 11 sanctions.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

The petitioners, W. Bart and Elizabeth Lloyd, sought review of a judgment of the Superior Court that affirmed the Newport Zoning Board’s decision to grant a special-use permit to Mark and Diana Bardorf, the petitioners’ abutting landowners.
  
The zoning board unanimously approved the Bardorfs’ application for a special-use permit pursuant to §§ 17.72.030(C) and 17.108.020(G) of the Newport Code of Ordinances.  The trial justice found no error on the part of the zoning board in granting a special-use permit; he also found that the board did not err in finding that the Bardorfs were not required to seek a dimensional variance.  In addition, the trial justice rejected the petitioners’ argument that the Bardorfs were not permitted to alter the building because the addition would increase or intensify the existing nonconformity.  Finally, the trial justice concluded that there was sufficient evidence on the record before the board to support its decision.
  
Before the Court, the petitioners argued that (1) the Bardorfs should have been required to obtain a dimensional variance, not a special-use permit; (2) allowing the Bardorfs to utilize lot coverage that was authorized by a previously-obtained dimensional variance was error; (3) the failure to evaluate whether the addition would constitute an intensification of the nonconformity was erroneous; and (4) the evidence did not support the grant of a special-use permit.

After its careful review of the relevant ordinances, the Court held that a special-use permit was the appropriate relief and the board applied the appropriate criteria for the grant of a special-use permit.  Although the Court determined that the trial justice erred when he concluded that the zoning board allowed the expansion “as a matter of right,” it held that the error was inconsequential because the trial justice also carefully examined the sufficiency of the board’s decision in light of the criteria set forth in the ordinance and concluded that the special-use permit properly was granted.  Next, reading G.L. 1956 §§ 45-24-41 and 45-24-42 together, the Court agreed with the trial justice that the General Assembly intended that a use granted by special-use permit may coexist with a dimensional variance only when a municipality’s zoning ordinance so provides.  The Court therefore rejected the petitioners’ argument that any alteration that was the subject of an earlier dimensional variance could occur only if further dimensional relief was granted.  Further, in response to the petitioners’ argument that the zoning board erred when it allowed the addition to a dimensionally nonconforming structure because it would “increase or intensify” the nonconformity, the Court held that the zoning ordinance does not include a calculation of building mass or three-dimensional spaces in the criteria for alterations of dimensionally nonconforming structures.  Finally, the Court held that the trial justice neither misconceived nor overlooked any material evidence and that legally competent evidence existed to support his findings.
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Julie Long, appealed from a judgment of conviction after a jury verdict finding her guilty of manufacturing or cultivating marijuana in violation of G.L. 1956 § 21-28-4.01(a)(1), (4)(i).  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying her Super. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal.  Specifically, the defendant argued that (1) the trial justice erred in denying her motion as to the charge of manufacturing and cultivating marijuana because the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction; (2) the trial justice erred in denying her motion as to aiding or abetting the manufacture and cultivation of marijuana because the evidence did not reflect that the defendant was an aider or abettor; and (3) the trial justice erred in providing the jury with an aiding and abetting instruction.
  
As to the defendant’s first assignment of error, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice appropriately denied the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal because—viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as is required under the standard for a motion for judgment of acquittal—there was sufficient evidence to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Again viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court likewise was satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant’s actions demonstrated a shared unlawful intent to manufacture or cultivate marijuana and, further, that a community of unlawful purpose existed.  Therefore, the trial justice properly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal as to aiding or abetting the manufacture and cultivation of marijuana.  Finally, the Supreme Court found that the trial justice did not err when he instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant of manufacturing or cultivating marijuana as an aider or abettor.  The manner of participation is not an element of the crime, and here, the evidence clearly demonstrated that the defendant was involved in the growing process both before and after the marijuana grow operation commenced.

For these reasons, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Jason Lopes, appealed from a judgment of conviction in Superior Court declaring him to be in violation of his probation and executing six years of his previously imposed sentence.  On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in support of this judgment.

After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner in determining that Lopes violated the terms and conditions of his probation.   The evidence adduced at the hearing was sufficient for the hearing justice to have been reasonably satisfied that Lopes failed to keep the peace or remain on good behavior by possessing a firearm after having been previously convicted of a crime of violence.  The Court emphasized that the sufficiency of the evidence on the new charge was not the focus of its review, nor was it the focus at the hearing below.  Thus, the hearing justice correctly did not consider whether the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Lopes was actually guilty of the crime of possession of a firearm.  The Supreme Court concluded, as did the hearing justice, that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Lopes failed to keep the peace or remain on good behavior.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The applicant, Joseph Hall, appealed from the Superior Court’s denial of his application for postconviction relief.  In his application, Hall claimed that he was denied a fair and impartial trial because the jury was improperly instructed and, further, the trial justice erred when he permitted testimony regarding a witness’s opinion on the truthfulness of a statement that Hall made.  The trial justice found that the application was “devoid of any merit whatsoever” and denied and dismissed it.  On appeal to the Supreme Court, Hall argued that the cautionary instruction did not cure the prejudicial effects of the testimony.

After reviewing the record, the Court held that Hall’s argument that the cautionary instruction was error and that a mistrial was the proper course of action had been waived because it was not raised on direct appeal.  The Court also concluded that the alleged inadequacy of the cautionary instruction was likewise barred and not properly before the Court because Hall failed to raise any objection to it at the time it was given.
 
The Court therefore affirmed the Superior Court judgment.

The defendant, Yoneiry Delarosa, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction. Specifically, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred by admitting into evidence photographs of his tattoos, which also depicted his face “in a ‘scruffy’ and disheveled condition.”  As such, the defendant contended that the photographs should not have been admitted without being redacted because portraying his face in the pictures was not relevant and was unduly prejudicial.  The state countered that the trial justice acted within his discretion in allowing the photographs into evidence. 

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court, holding that the photographs did not implicate the test laid out in State v. Lemon, 456 A.2d 261, 265 (R.I. 1983), because the photographs were not “mugshots” nor did they depict an image in which a viewer would be able to tell that the defendant currently was incarcerated at the time they were taken.  Further, the trial justice found that the defendant looked similar during his court appearance to how he looked in the picture; and, therefore, the Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in allowing the unredacted photographs of the defendant’s tattoos.

The applicant, Joseph Jolly, appealed from a Superior Court judgment dismissing his application for postconviction relief.  On appeal, Jolly argued that, because he was under the influence of prescription medication during his plea hearing, the hearing justice erred in finding that he voluntarily pled nolo contendere to charges of second-degree child molestation.  He also contended that his attorney had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because, according to Jolly, he had (1) coerced him to plead to the charges and (2) advised him to tell the hearing justice that he was not under the influence of any substance when Jolly was asked this question during the plea colloquy.

The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice had not erred in finding that Jolly had voluntarily pled to the charges.  The Court also concluded that Jolly had failed to satisfy his burden of proof with regard to his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Nope’s Island Conservation Association, appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court that recognized a prescriptive easement over its property in Charlestown, Rhode Island.    The trial justice found that the easement ran from a pathway known as the “sand trail,” over the defendant’s land, to a lot owned by the plaintiff, Rhode Island Mobile Sportfishermen, Inc.

The defendant argued (1) that the plaintiff was barred by G.L. 1956 § 34-7-9 from claiming a prescriptive easement over this land because it was held for conservation purposes, (2) that the “relation-back” doctrine founded in Rule 15 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure does not protect the plaintiff from the strictures of this statute, and (3) that even if the plaintiff was not barred from bringing such a claim, it nonetheless failed to prove the elements for a prescriptive easement.  The defendant also requested that the Court adopt a “higher standard” for proving a claim for adverse possession or a prescriptive easement against an owner of conservation or open land.

The Court held that the plaintiff adequately had pleaded its claim for a prescriptive easement in 2000 and that § 34-7-9 applied prospectively.  Therefore, the statute did not bar the plaintiff’s claim.  The Court also rejected the defendant’s request to adopt a higher standard of proof.  Finally, the Court held that there was insufficient evidence in the record to prove that there had been continuous vehicular use for a ten-year period.  The Court then vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the Superior Court for additional findings of fact.

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction after a jury verdict finding him guilty of one count of first-degree child molestation, one count of third-degree sexual assault, and one count of second-degree child molestation arising from a series of assaults upon his stepdaughters.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in failing to grant his motion for a new trial because, according to the defendant, the evidence gives rise to serious doubts about the truth of the allegations and that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived evidence. 

After thoroughly reviewing the record and the trial justice’s articulated reasoning in ruling on the motion, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice independently evaluated the evidence, weighed the credibility of the witnesses, and did not err in his credibility determinations.  The Supreme Court therefore held that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Gerardo E. Martinez, appealed from a conviction of murder in the first degree and the imposition by the trial justice of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  He raised three issues on appeal.  First, he argued that the trial justice committed reversible error in admitting evidence concerning acts of prior misconduct that he allegedly committed against the decedent.  Second, he argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial.  Finally, he argued that the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was unwarranted.

The Supreme Court first considered the defendant’s contention that the admission of testimony relating to his alleged prior misconduct was propensity evidence in violation of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.  The Court agreed with the trial justice’s conclusion that the prior misconduct testimony was admissible so that the jury could consider the defendant’s intent at the time of the murder.  Next, the Court examined whether the trial justice erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  The defendant averred that the evidence adduced at trial established that he had committed second-degree murder, rather than first-degree murder.  The Court concluded that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence when, after conducting his own independent review of the record, he agreed with the jury’s verdict in finding the defendant guilty of first-degree murder.

Finally, the Court conducted a de novo review of the trial justice’s sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  After independently determining that the murder was committed with both aggravated battery and torture, the Court next considered whether the defendant’s character and propensities warranted the imposition of that sentence.  Although the Court acknowledged certain mitigating factors, on the whole, they did not outweigh the aggravating factors.  Accordingly, the Court held that the sentence was justified and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in all respects.

The plaintiff, Nellie S. Francis, appealed from the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Dr. James A. Gallo and West Bay Psychiatry Associations, Ltd.  Doctor Gallo, a licensed psychiatrist, had treated Ms. Francis at West Bay.  Thereafter, Ms. Francis brought a civil action against Dr. Gallo and West Bay; her complaint included claims for slander based on remarks that Dr. Gallo made in two separate proceedings.  The first alleged slander occurred when Dr. Gallo provided deposition testimony in connection with Ms. Francis’s case before the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC).  The second alleged slander occurred when Dr. Gallo testified before the Rhode Island Department of Education (RIDE), having been called as a witness by Ms. Francis at a hearing concerning her alleged wrongful termination from her teaching position.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment.  Ms. Francis’s claims based on the WCC testimony were time-barred by the statute of limitations for slander, which provides that claims must be filed within one year after the words at issue have been spoken.  Further, Dr. Gallo’s statements made at the WCC deposition were non-actionable because, under Rhode Island law, statements made in judicial proceedings are privileged and thus cannot form the basis for a slander claim.  Likewise, Dr. Gallo’s statements as a witness at the RIDE hearing were also privileged because they were made in the course of a judicial proceeding.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the defendants’ favor.

The defendant, Thomas G. Lamoureux, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction declaring him to be in violation of his probation and executing seven years of his previously imposed suspended sentence.  On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in support of this judgment.  After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court held that the hearing justice had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that Lamoureux had violated his probation.  The evidence adduced at the hearing established that Lamoureux had violated his probation by engaging in acts of violence on two consecutive days.  The hearing justice correctly observed that the main issue was not whether the evidence established that Lamoureux had committed new crimes, but whether the evidence established that he had failed to keep the peace and remain on good behavior.  The Supreme Court concluded, as did the hearing justice, that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Lamoureux had violated his probation.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

In 2006, the plaintiff’s decedent died while in the care of a now-defunct nursing home as a result of an accidental morphine overdose.  The plaintiff filed a wrongful-death action against a variety of defendants and obtained a default judgment against the nursing home.  Both the nursing home and the employee directly responsible for the overdose filed for bankruptcy protection: the nursing home’s Chapter 11 case has been dismissed, and the employee received a Chapter 7 discharge.  Columbia Casualty Company (Columbia), the defendant in the instant appeal, had issued a professional liability insurance policy covering the nursing home and its employees during the relevant time period.  The policy limited coverage to $1 million per claim, but it also contained a Self-Insured Retention (SIR) Endorsement, under which the nursing home would be responsible for the first $2 million of any damages and expenses associated with a claim, and Columbia would be obligated to pay only those amounts in excess of the SIR.  The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Columbia (and denied the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment), concluding that Rhode Island law permits healthcare providers to self-insure and does not require minimum insurance coverage levels for healthcare providers.

On appeal, the plaintiff urged the Supreme Court to reverse the Superior Court and enter summary judgment in her favor, arguing (1) that G.L. 1956 § 42-14.1-2(a) does not permit SIRs in healthcare professional liability insurance policies; (2) that Rhode Island law requires healthcare providers to be minimally insured for $100,000 per claim; (3) that the purported minimum coverage requirements applied separately to both the nursing home and its employee; and (4) that the insurance contract required Columbia to pay prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the full amount of the judgment, rather than on only that portion of the judgment that fell within the purported minimum-coverage requirement.

The Supreme Court held that the SIR Endorsement was invalid under Rhode Island law because, although § 42-14.1-2(a) authorizes the DBR to permit SIRs, that agency has not yet taken that affirmative step of promulgating the requisite rules and regulations.  Additionally, because the plaintiff at all times prior to this appeal had requested relief only in the amount of the purported statutory minimum coverage requirement, the Supreme Court concluded that it was unnecessary to pass on whether Rhode Island law actually requires such minimum coverage levels.  The Supreme Court also held that plaintiff had waived her argument that the nursing home and its employee should be treated as separate insureds by failing to raise that issue below.  Finally, the Court concluded that the insurance policy’s language required Columbia to pay prejudgment and postjudgment interest on only a portion of the judgment.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded for entry of judgment in the plaintiff’s favor for $100,000, plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest calculated on the basis of that amount.

The defendant, Eileen Morrice, appeals from the denial of her motion to seal records pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 12-19-19(c) and G.L. 1956 § 12-1-12.  The defendant has completed a deferred sentence, but is ineligible to have her records expunged under G.L. 1956 §§ 12-1.3-2 and 12-1.3-3. The defendant argued that § 12-19-19, as amended in 2010, would allow the sealing of her criminal records, a remedy not previously available to her.  The defendant asserted that the trial judge erred in refusing to apply § 12-19-19(c) retroactively, by finding that the provision violated the separation of powers doctrine, and by declining to sever the “shall be exonerated” portion of the statute from the “shall be sealed” provision.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, holding that the amended statute may not be applied retroactively, either by its plain language or necessary implication.  Further, the Court held that the amended statute created new substantive rights and thus could not be applied retroactively.  Because the amended statute may not be applied retroactively, and because no defendant who entered a deferred sentence agreement subsequent to the 2010 amendments to § 12-19-19 will yet have completed his or her five-year deferment, the Court concluded that the issues relating to the separation-of-powers doctrine were not yet ripe for review.

The applicant, Floyd Edmond Webb, III, petitioned the Court for a hearing on the recommendation of the Supreme Court’s Committee on Character and Fitness that he be denied admission to the Rhode Island bar.  The applicant argued that the committee abused its discretion by neither admitting him to the bar outright, nor recommending conditional admission.
 
The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the committee, finding that, despite several hearings and multiple opportunities to amend his application, the applicant failed to fully disclose information requested in the application.  Notably, the applicant failed to amend his application to disclose a recent arrest.  The Court found no evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the committee, and it held that the applicant had failed to meet his burden of proving his character and fitness to practice law as a member of the Rhode Island bar.

The applicant appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court denying and dismissing his application for postconviction relief.  On appeal, the applicant argued that the hearing justice erred in granting his attorney’s motion to withdraw as counsel by not adhering to the procedural requirements set forth in Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000).  He also claimed that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before his application was denied.
 
The Supreme Court ruled that all the requirements of Shatney were complied with and that the applicant was given ample opportunity to be heard on his postconviction-relief application.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff corporation appealed from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  The plaintiff corporation contended that it was not required to maintain a certificate of authority because it was no longer transacting business within Rhode Island as required by G.L. 1956 § 7-1.2-1418.

After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court held that, although a certificate of authority would be required before the plaintiff corporation could proceed to final judgment, such a certificate was not required during the pendency of the instant litigation because the plaintiff corporation had the appropriate certificate at the time that it filed suit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment.

The defendant, International Fidelity Insurance Company (IFIC), appeals from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Drago Custom Interiors, LLC (Drago).  Drago filed a complaint in the Superior Court against IFIC and Carlisle Building Systems, Inc. (Carlisle), the general contractor for the construction project on which Drago had performed carpentry work, alleging that Drago had performed work for which it had not been paid.  In its answer to Drago’s complaint, IFIC admitted that it was the surety on a labor and material payment bond that had been issued for the project.  The proceedings then were stayed, and the parties submitted their dispute to arbitration in accordance with the Public Works Arbitration Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 16 of title 37.  The arbitrator first found that no evidence had been presented that a bond existed for the project, and he accordingly found IFIC not liable to Drago.  Because Drago was unaware that IFIC was contesting the existence of the bond, it sought to reopen the proceedings so that the bond could be introduced.
   
The arbitrator issued two amended awards; in each, the arbitrator still found IFIC not liable to Drago, but he added that the award was “without prejudice to any rights of Drago as asserted in any pending litigation involving Drago and IFIC.”  Additionally, the arbitrator found in the first amended award that IFIC’s liability was neither asserted nor denied at the arbitration proceedings, but he deleted this finding in the second amended award.  Drago then filed a motion to confirm the second amended award with respect to Carlisle and to modify it with respect to IFIC so that, if Carlisle could not satisfy the award, IFIC would be liable.  The Superior Court trial justice determined that the arbitrator’s findings with respect to whether the existence of the bond was at issue during the arbitration proceedings were unclear, especially when IFIC had conceded in its answer that it was the surety on the bond.  The trial justice exercised what she believed to be her inherent authority to remand the case to the arbitrator for clarification of that issue.  Upon remand, the arbitrator issued an award that found IFIC and Carlisle liable to Drago.  When the trial justice confirmed the award after remand, IFIC appealed, contending that the Superior Court was without authority to remand the case back to the arbitrator for clarification.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not possess the inherent authority to remand the case back to the arbitrator for clarification.  However, the Court determined that, because the phrase “without prejudice to any rights of Drago as asserted in any pending litigation involving Drago and IFIC” deprived the second amended award of the requisite finality and definiteness, the trial justice could have vacated the second amended award and remanded the case to the arbitrator for a rehearing under §§ 37-16-18 and 37-16-19.  Because the trial justice’s actions accomplished the same result that would have been accomplished under §§ 37-16-18 and 37-16-19, the Court affirmed the judgment on other grounds.
 

The defendant, James LaPierre, appealed from a judgment of conviction for three counts of first-degree child molestation and for three counts of second-degree child molestation.  On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice’s denial of his motion for a new trial clearly was erroneous because the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence and failed to do substantial justice.   Specifically, he argued that the testimony of the complaining witness was “so characterized by vagueness, illogic, inconsistency, and lack of recall that she was simply incredible.”  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding that the trial justice’s findings and conclusions about credibility determinations were well within his discretion, and therefore, did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial. 

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction declaring him to have been in violation of his probation and executing thirty months of his previously imposed suspended sentence.  The defendant contended that the hearing justice erred in excluding from evidence a letter written and sent to him by the state’s complaining witness, testimony about past arguments between him and the complaining witness, and testimony about whether the complaining witness had brought him drugs while he was in a drug-treatment program.  Additionally, the defendant argued that the hearing justice’s credibility determinations were unsupported by the record and amounted to arbitrary and capricious fact-finding.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court.  Concerning the letter, the Court concluded that the defendant waived any argument about its substantive admissibility by not clearly asserting it below and held that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in excluding the letter for impeachment purposes.  The Court also held that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in excluding testimony regarding past events that were not directly relevant to whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation on the evening in question.  Finally, the Court deferred to the hearing justice’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility and concluded that the record sufficiently supported the hearing justice’s finding that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation by failing to keep the peace and be of good behavior.

The applicant, Kyle Campbell (the applicant), appeals from the Superior Court’s denial of his application for postconviction relief, arguing, inter alia, that the trial justice erred in failing to appoint counsel before he dismissed the applicant’s allegations.  The trial justice summarily dismissed five of the applicant’s allegations before an attorney had been appointed, despite the applicant’s request for counsel.  After the summary dismissal, the trial justice appointed an independent attorney, who did not represent the applicant, to conduct an investigation into the merits of the remaining allegation.  The appointed counsel concluded that the remaining allegation had no merit and, accordingly, was permitted to withdraw from the case.  At a subsequent hearing, the trial justice dismissed the applicant’s remaining allegation.

The Supreme Court held that in order to have a meaningful opportunity to reply before summary dismissal under G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-6(b), an indigent, first-time applicant for postconviction relief must be afforded counsel upon request.  Because the applicant, who was indigent and had filed only one application for postconviction relief, had not been afforded counsel before the summary dismissal of five of his allegations despite his request for a lawyer, the Court determined that he was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to reply before summary dismissal.

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction of one count of first degree child molestation and two counts of second degree child molestation. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial because, in the defendant’s estimation, she misconceived evidence and erred in her evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses.

After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not misconceive evidence nor err in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Maria Carbone (the plaintiff), brought suit against the defendants, John Ward, the finance director for the Town of Lincoln, and the Town of Lincoln (collectively, the defendants) for injuries she sustained in a fall on a public street on March 31, 2008.  The plaintiff’s first notice alleged that the place of injury was a “[s]idewalk and street outside of the Coventry Credit Union at the corner of Railroad Street and Summer Street.”  The plaintiff then sent a second notice, which indicated that she was injured when she fell into a hole “on Winter Street parallel to Railroad Street in the Town of Lincoln/Manville, RI.”  The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because the notice of the place of injury was insufficient as a matter of law pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 45-15-9 and 45-15-10.  The trial justice granted summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff’s notice of claim “excluded the actual area where the accident occurred” and “did not fix the location in a [reasonably] sufficient manner” and, therefore, the notice failed to comply with the requirements of § 45-15-9.
  
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s decision.  The Court concluded that the General Assembly has made it clear that there must be specificity in the notice of claim, and thus the plaintiff’s notice was insufficient.  The Court noted that, although the statute does not require “complete accuracy,” the notice in this case failed to specify on which of the four corners of the cross-section of streets the injury occurred and omitted any description of how close to the corner, or how far from Winter Street, the incident occurred.  Because the description provided in the notice did not specify the actual area where the injury occurred, the Court affirmed the trial justice’s decision that the plaintiff’s notice did not fix the location in a reasonably sufficient manner.

The plaintiff appeals from a decision of the Superior Court that granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and argues that the trial justice erred when he denied her motion to amend the complaint.  The plaintiff was employed as a bus driver by Durham School Services, a private bus company that provides transportation for the Town of Johnston School Department.  Displeased with the plaintiff’s handling of an incident in which she reported that her bus had been shot at, the town sent a letter to Durham asking that she no longer be assigned to transport Johnston school children.  She later ceased working for the bus company and filed suit against the defendants for wrongful termination.
  
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the town cannot be held liable for wrongful termination because it was not the plaintiff’s employer.  At the hearing on the motion, the plaintiff’s counsel made a motion for leave to amend the complaint to include a claim for tortious interference with a contractual relationship.  The trial justice denied the motion to amend and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

The Supreme Court held that, under Rule 15(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend pleadings should be freely granted absent extreme prejudice or some other compelling reason.  The Court held that the trial justice did not give sufficient reasoning for denying the motion and did not make any findings regarding what prejudice to the defendants would result if leave was granted.  Accordingly, the Court vacated the grant of summary judgment and remanded the matter for a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion to amend.

The defendant, Bradley E. Bellem, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction declaring him to be in violation of his probation and executing four years of his previously imposed suspended sentence.  The defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to support the hearing justice’s conclusion that he had violated the terms of his probation, and, therefore, that the hearing justice’s violation finding was arbitrary and capricious.  The Supreme Court affirmed the decision below, noting that the hearing justice’s findings were supported by the uncontroverted testimony of two witnesses that the defendant violated at least one no-contact order.

The applicant, Hector Jaiman, appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court denying his application for postconviction relief.  On appeal, the applicant contended that the hearing justice erred when he (1) dismissed his argument that his right to due process was violated by improper argument by the prosecutor, (2) denied his argument that he was subjected to an illegal sentence, (3) denied his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel occasioned by his trial counsel’s failure to object to what the applicant maintains was improper witness vouching, and (4) dismissed his assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object to a first-degree murder instruction, which was a more serious offense than that faced by the principal offender, who was convicted of second-degree murder.

After reviewing the record, the Court held that the applicant waived his claims of due-process violation and ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to the first-degree murder instruction.  This Court also held that the applicant’s conviction of a more serious offense than the principal was proper based on the plain and ordinary meaning under G.L. 1956 § 11-1-3.  Finally, the Court held that the applicant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failure to object to what he argues was improper vouching because he failed to satisfy the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

Local 1080, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO (the union) sought review of a Superior Court judgment in favor of the City of Newport (city).  The dispute between the parties stemmed from the city’s decision to modify the health insurance benefits it provided to retired firefighters.  In response to that decision, the union filed grievances and requested arbitration.  Thereafter, the city sought declaratory and injunctive relief in Superior Court.  The hearing justice granted judgment in the city’s favor, having determined that (1) the retired firefighters who would be affected by the city’s decision were not necessary and indispensible parties to the complaint; and (2) the dispute was not arbitrable under the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement (CBA).  The union disagreed and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.

The Supreme Court held that, because only the union itself could submit a dispute to arbitration, the hearing justice did not err in concluding that joinder of individual retired firefighters was unnecessary.  The Court next reviewed de novo the hearing justice’s finding that the dispute was inarbitrable.  After reviewing the CBA in light of the Fire Fighters Arbitration Act (FFAA), G.L. 1956 chapter 9.1 of title 28, the Court held that the hearing justice did not err in concluding that the parties did not intend to arbitrate disputes regarding retiree healthcare.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in all respects and quashed the writ of certiorari previously issued.

The defendant, Gerrit Musterd, appealed from a judgment of conviction for first-degree murder and three related crimes.  Musterd raised three issues on appeal.  First, he argued that, because the police lacked sufficient probable cause to arrest him without a warrant, the trial justice should have granted his motion to suppress his confession and any evidence seized as the fruits of illegal arrest.  Second, he argued that, because the Pawtucket police failed to properly present him in court, and because they engaged in “trickery and lying” during his interrogation, the trial justice should have granted his motion to suppress his confession.  Finally, he argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. 
  
The Supreme Court first conducted a de novo review of the trial justice’s determination of whether probable cause existed to support Musterd’s arrest.  After reviewing the record and taking into account all the circumstances surrounding Musterd’s arrest, the Court held that the trial justice did not err in concluding that the police had probable cause to arrest Musterd.  The Court next considered Musterd’s additional arguments supporting his contention that, even if probable cause existed to support his arrest, the trial justice should have granted his motion to suppress evidence.  The Court agreed with the trial justice’s conclusion that any delay in presentment did not affect the voluntariness of Musterd’s statement to police.  Furthermore, it held that the trial justice properly concluded that Musterd had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.  The Court declined to hold that Musterd’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights was later vitiated when the police recorded a portion of his statement without his knowledge.  The Court therefore affirmed the trial justice’s denial of Musterd’s motion to suppress evidence.

Finally, the Court reviewed the evidence adduced at trial and held that the trial justice neither committed clear error nor overlooked or misconceived material or relevant evidence when he denied Musterd’s motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in all respects.

The respondents, Harry Harris (Harris) and Caitlin Patenaude (Patenaude) (collectively, the respondents) appealed from a Family Court decree terminating their parental rights to their daughter, Amiah P.  The Family Court justice granted the petition to terminate the respondents’ parental rights on the grounds of unfitness by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the child.  The trial justice found that Amiah had been in the custody of the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families for the statutory twelve-month term.  As to Patenaude, the trial justice declared her unfit to parent the child based on chronic substance abuse, such that the child would not be able to return to her custody within a reasonable period, considering the child’s age and the need for a permanent home.  As to Harris, the trial justice based his finding of unfitness on Harris’s incarceration, which was of a duration that made it improbable for him to care for the child for an extended period of time.  After finding the respondents to be unfit, the trial justice concluded that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate the respondents’ parental rights.

On appeal, the respondents argued that the record before the Family Court justice did not support the justice’s finding of unfitness by clear and convincing evidence or his finding of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the child.  Additionally, both of the respondents contended that the trial justice erred when he precluded Patenaude from testifying that her assault complaint against Harris—the offense that led to his incarceration—was false.  The respondents argued that this testimony was relevant and admissible as to Harris’s parental fitness as well as to the determination of Amiah’s best interests.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s decree terminating the respondents’ parental rights with respect to their daughter.  The Court, noting that Patenaude did not contest the trial justice’s finding that she was unfit, concluded that the remainder of her contentions were without merit.

Next, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s termination of Harris’s parental rights.  The Court concluded that the trial justice properly considered Harris’s participation in programs at the ACI.  The Court also held that the trial justice’s finding that Harris was unfit because of his incarceration was correct because the trial justice also considered other factors, such as the duration of his incarceration and the child’s age, development, and the uncertain home environment the child would face upon the father’s release.

The Supreme Court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the trial justice’s conclusion that the respondents were unfit by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the child and affirmed the judgment.

The defendant appealed from judgments of conviction based on a Superior Court jury’s finding of guilt on thirty counts of obtaining money by false pretenses.  On appeal, the defendant contended (1) that the then presiding justice of the Superior Court exceeded his authority in granting the prosecutor’s request to change venue; (2) that the charges filed against him were improperly joined as a matter of law, in view of the provisions of Rule 8(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (3) that, even if the charges had been properly joined, the trial justice’s failure to sever the cases infringed upon his right to a fair trial.

The Supreme Court held that, in light of the considerations of judicial economy and the significant resources demanded by the defendant’s trial, the then presiding justice’s ruling with respect to the motion to transfer constituted a sustainable exercise of his discretion. 

With respect to the defendant’s contention as to joinder, the Court stated that the offenses charged were of the same or similar character.  The Court therefore held that joinder was proper as a matter of law.  The Supreme Court further held that, due to the fact that the evidence of the other alleged crimes might well be admitted at separate trials and the fact that the allegations were nearly identical, the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in joining the criminal informations for trial. 

The Supreme Court held that the defendant had waived his contentions with respect to the issue of severance.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court.

On November 14, 2008, a jury convicted the defendant, James S. Richardson, of one count of murder and one count of burglary.  The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  The defendant appealed his conviction and asserted that the trial justice erred by: (1) allowing one of the state’s expert witnesses to bolster the credibility of another expert witness; (2) denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in all respects.

The Court rejected the defendant’s assertion that the second expert witness’ testimony constituted impermissible bolstering.  The Court held that the substance of the second expert witness’ testimony was an opinion that was based on the objective scientific observations, facts, and figures contained in the first expert’s reports.  The second expert’s reliance on the objective measurements contained in the worksheets and reports distinguished his testimony from the kind of “subjective analysis” that the Court previously had held constituted bolstering. 

With respect to the denial of the motion for a new trial, the Court held that the trial justice performed an exhaustive review of the evidence presented at trial, and he conducted a thorough and proper analysis with respect to the defendant’s motion for a new trial in this matter.  Despite the defendant’s contention that the trial justice should not have found the state’s primary witnesses to be credible, the Court noted that it was clear that the trial justice considered the testimony of both witnesses and came to a different conclusion.  Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial justice’s ruling denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  Because the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment with respect to the motion for a new trial, the Court did not reach a review of the motion for judgment of acquittal.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction on one count of second-degree murder and one count of using a firearm while committing a crime of violence.  On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred in failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal on the second-degree murder charge; the basis for that contention was the defendant’s subordinate assertion that the state failed to provide legally sufficient evidence for a jury to find that he acted with malice in connection with the death of the victim.  The defendant additionally contended on appeal that the trial justice erred in omitting the phrase “criminal negligence” from his instruction to the jury concerning involuntary manslaughter and instead used “confusing language,” which made it difficult for the jury to distinguish the crime of involuntary manslaughter from the crime of murder in the second degree.

After thoroughly reviewing the record and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence produced at trial to support a verdict of second-degree murder.  The Court therefore held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the second-degree murder charge. 

Next, the Court reviewed the defendant’s contention that the trial justice erred in failing to include the term “criminal negligence” in the instruction concerning involuntary manslaughter.  The Court noted that the instructions that were given, when viewed as a whole, could have misled a jury composed of ordinary intelligent lay people to the prejudice of the defendant.  Therefore, the Court held that, in view of the facts of this case, the trial justice was required to instruct the jury as to the concept of criminal negligence.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Sofya M. Zharkova, appealed from a judgment of the Family Court dismissing her complaint for divorce from the defendant, Paul D. Gaudreau.  In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that a common-law marriage had existed between the defendant and her.  At trial, after hearing testimony from the parties and from several other witnesses and after considering the exhibits in the record, the trial justice found that the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of a common-law marriage by clear and convincing evidence; accordingly, he dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint.

On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial justice’s decision failed to do “substantial justice” between the parties and that the trial justice overlooked and/or misconceived relevant and material evidence or was otherwise “clearly wrong.”
 
The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not clearly err in finding that there was no clear and convincing evidence of the intent of the parties to enter into a husband-wife relationship.  The Court further stated that, after considering all of the evidence as well as the trial justice’s credibility determinations, the trial justice did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a general reputation in the community that the plaintiff and the defendant were husband and wife.  As a result, the Court held that the trial justice did not misconceive or overlook relevant evidence, nor was he clearly wrong when he found that the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of a common-law marriage between herself and the defendant.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Family Court.

After a jury returned verdicts of guilty on twenty-two counts ranging from first-degree sexual assault to identity fraud, the defendant, James Cook, appealed.  The defendant contended (1) that the trial justice erred by denying his motions to pass the case after a witness testified that the defendant had been on probation, and (2) that the trial justice committed reversible error when he admitted instances of the defendant’s prior sexual misconduct into evidence because the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence and also because under Rule 404(b) it was not reasonably necessary for the state to prove its case.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by declining to pass the case after testimony was given that the defendant had been on probation.  After considering all the circumstances surrounding the errant statement, including the trial justice’s cautionary instructions to the jury as well as his individual voir dire of each juror regarding the offending testimony, the Court concluded that the statement was not sufficiently prejudicial to prevent the jury from calmly and dispassionately weighing the evidence. 

The Supreme Court also held that the trial justice did not commit reversible error by admitting evidence of prior sexual misconduct committed by the defendant.  The Court first determined that the defendant’s right to appeal based on Rule 403 grounds had been waived because the defendant never sufficiently articulated to the trial justice any objection based on that rule.  However, in assuming that the objection was not waived, the Supreme Court held that, in comparison with the other, probably more inflammatory, evidence presented against the defendant at trial, the evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual misconduct, while prejudicial, was not unfairly prejudicial.  Finally, the Court held that the prior sexual-misconduct evidence was reasonably necessary under Rule 404(b) for the state to rebut the defense of consent, argued by the defendant at trial.
  
For these reasons, the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions.

The plaintiff, Laurel Y. Hazard (the plaintiff), appeals from the grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, East Hills, Inc. (the defendant), declaring that the plaintiff was barred by the doctrine of laches from prosecuting a claim of ownership of an undeveloped eight-acre tract of land in South Kingstown, Rhode Island, and declaring that the defendant had established ownership of the lot by adverse possession and in accordance with the Rhode Island Marketable Record Title Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 13.1 of title 34.   On appeal, the plaintiff, who was pro se, asserted that the claim should not be barred by the doctrine of laches, that the defendant failed to satisfy the requisite elements of adverse possession of the subject property, and that a 1909 boundary agreement entered into by the defendant’s predecessor in interest was defective and was improperly relied upon by the special master as a title transaction for purposes of establishing marketable record title.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court based on the equitable doctrine of laches.

The Court initially concluded that the trial justice did not err in confirming the report of the special master because the special master conducted his charge thoroughly and produced an eloquent and detailed report; thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s confirmation of the special master’s report.  The Supreme Court then held that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the equitable doctrine of laches because she had waited well over 100 years to bring her suit.  Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff failed to provide a fair explanation for such a protracted delay and the delay significantly prejudiced the defendant because, over the 100-year span of time, evidence was lost, witnesses died, and title to the parcels changed hands many times.  Based on the Court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by laches, it declined to reach the issues of adverse possession or the applicability of the Marketable Record Title Act.

The defendant, Kenneth Viveiros (the defendant or Viveiros), came before the Supreme Court on appeal from a conviction on four counts of simple assault against three inmates at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), occurring while the defendant was employed as a lieutenant at the ACI.  On appeal, the defendant asserted that the trial justice erred by: (1) denying the defendant’s motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendant, Captain Gualtar Botas (Botas); (2) granting the state’s motion in limine, precluding the testimony of inmate Sebastian Atryzek; (3) giving improper jury instructions; and (4) denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the insufficiency of the evidence.  The Supreme Court affirmed Superior Court’s judgment of conviction in all respects.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to sever because the trial justice carefully assessed the potential for prejudice in joining the defendant’s case with the other defendants, severed out the party and claims he believed would create prejudice, and, for purposes of judicial economy, kept together the cases and claims that could be tried without prejudicing the defendant. 

With respect to the defendant’s second contention, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err by granting the state’s motion in limine to preclude a defense witness from testifying.  The Court found that the proposed testimony constituted collateral extrinsic evidence intended to contradict that of another witness and was therefore inadmissible under Rule 608(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.
 
The Supreme Court also held that the defendant could not raise an objection to the jury instructions on appeal because the defendant failed to make the objection at the time of trial.  Based on the Court’s “raise-or-waive” rule, the defendant’s argument that the jury instructions were improper was waived.  The Court noted that although the defendant was precluded from arguing improper instructions because he had failed to raise the matter below, the Court was satisfied that the instructions were in fact proper and adequately covered the law.

Finally, the Supreme Court declined to disturb the trial justice’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial because there was no evidence that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived any material evidence or that he was clearly wrong.  The trial justice engaged in a comprehensive and proper analysis of the evidence presented; he reviewed the testimony from both sides and independently assessed the credibility of the witnesses.  The Court held that the trial justice properly denied the motion for a new trial after concluding that the case was one where reasonable minds could differ.

Before the Court was the appeal of the pro se defendant, Mary Y. Seguin (Seguin), challenging a Superior Court justice’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Jessup & Conroy, P.C. (the law firm), on Seguin’s counterclaim in this collection action.  A motion justice of the Superior Court determined that Seguin had not submitted any competent evidence to show a disputed issue of material fact and that she had therefore failed to sustain her burden in opposing the motion.  On appeal, Seguin maintained that genuine issues of material fact existed as to each of her fifteen counts of her counterclaim against the law firm, which included claims of deceptive trade practices, RICO violations, negligence, and fraud, among others.  Seguin also contended that she did not receive a fair hearing on her opposition in the lower court.

After a de novo review of the motion justice’s grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court held that, despite the voluminous materials presented by Seguin in connection with her opposition, she had failed to submit any competent evidence from which the Court could discern a genuine issue of material fact.  The Court also concluded that Seguin received a full and fair hearing on her opposition.  Based on Seguin’s failure to sustain her burden as a nonmoving party opposing a motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

Several days of intense rainfall in October 2005 overloaded the sewer system servicing the plaintiffs’ Cranston home, causing water and sewage to back up and enter the plaintiffs’ basement through a toilet, resulting in extensive damage to their home and personal property.

The plaintiffs filed suit against the city and the companies responsible for operating and maintaining the sewage disposal system (the operating companies), alleging negligence.  The plaintiffs also sued their homeowner’s insurance carrier (insurance carrier) for denying their claim of coverage under their homeowner’s insurance policy.  After summary judgments were granted in favor of the operating companies and the insurance carrier in the Superior Court for Providence County, the plaintiffs appealed.  The Supreme Court consolidated these separate appeals on April 10, 2012. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs alleged that the judgments in favor of the various defendants were improper because of the existence of several genuine issues of material fact.  Concerning the appeal involving the operating companies, the Supreme Court held that, because the plaintiffs failed to file a notice of appeal within twenty days from the date that final judgment was entered pursuant to Article I, Rule 4 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, their appeal was untimely and not properly before the Court. 

Regarding the plaintiffs’ appeal from the judgment in favor of the insurance carrier, after first determining that the homeowner’s insurance policy was clear and unambiguous, the Supreme Court held that the policy excluded coverage for water damage caused from water or sewage that backed up from sewers.  The plaintiffs also argued in their appeal that a remaining issue of material fact existed about whether the property damage to their home was the result of an act of God or human negligence.  However, the Supreme Court held that this argument was waived because it was never raised in the prior proceedings. 
  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, the Rhode Island Tax Administrator, filed this collection action against the defendants, William J. and Marielle Reilly, in pursuit of more than $1 million in assessed, but unpaid, personal income taxes from the late 1990s.  In their answer to the plaintiff’s complaint, the defendants denied that they owed any personal income taxes for the assessed years.  Eventually, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by a justice of the Superior Court.  The defendants timely appealed, arguing that the motion justice erred because (1) the defendants were nonresidents that were not subject to Rhode Island income tax; (2) the period of limitation for filing a tax-collection-action had expired; and (3) the equitable doctrine of laches should bar the tax administrator’s suit under these circumstances.
  
The Supreme Court held that the motion justice did not err when he granted summary judgment to the plaintiff.  The Court held that the defendants were not entitled to judicial review of the tax administrator’s assessment of taxes for the contested tax years because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.  Taxpayers that wish to contest a tax assessment must follow the statutory scheme; they cannot simply wait to be sued by the tax administrator in a collection action and object for the first time in their answer to the complaint.  The Court also held that the defendants had waived any argument with respect to the statute of limitations or laches.
  
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.  

This case came before the Supreme Court on appeal by the defendant, Raymond McWilliams, from a judgment of conviction for first-degree robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwelling.  On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred by: (1) providing a supplemental jury instruction that contradicted Rhode Island law; (2) refusing to recuse from presiding as the trial justice because of comments he had made during a joint probation-violation hearing and bail hearing; (3) admitting into evidence the defendant’s prior conviction for second-degree murder; (4) denying his motion for acquittal; and (5) denying his motion for a new trial.
 
The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in his supplemental instruction to the jury because it adequately covered Rhode Island law and it was clearly consistent with the law of other common-law jurisdictions that had explicitly interpreted the felonious intent to steal.  Because the defendant’s appeal based on a motion for a new trial and a motion for a judgment of acquittal necessarily turned on whether the Court held that there was error in the supplemental jury instruction, the Court did not address those contentions after concluding that the trial justice did not err.

The Court also rejected the defendant’s contention that comments made by the trial justice at the joint probation-violation and bail hearing warranted his recusal from presiding at the trial.  First, the Court explained that the justice made the challenged comments at the close of all the evidence after he fairly conducted a joint probation-violation and bail hearing.  Second, the Court noted that the defendant failed to bring to the Court’s attention even one incident that occurred during trial that demonstrated any prejudice the trial justice harbored toward him.
 
Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he allowed one of the defendant’s numerous convictions into evidence for the purpose of impeaching the defendant should he testify at trial.  The Court concluded that a review of the cautionary instructions provided by the trial justice demonstrated that he adequately delineated the limited purpose for which the evidence was admitted; and, therefore, the Court held that he did not abuse his discretion.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The Cumberland Teachers Association (union), appealed to the Supreme Court from the entry of judgment confirming an arbitrator’s award in favor of the Cumberland School Committee (school committee).  Before the Court, the union argued that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded a contract provision when he found that there was no written agreement about how the new salary schedule would be implemented for the 2007-2008 year.  The school committee responded by relying on this Court’s exceptionally limited standard of review with respect to arbitration awards.  The school committee also contended that there was no support for the union’s position that there was a mutually “agreed-upon” transition plan. 
 
The Court reviewed the arbitrator’s analysis of the proposals of the parties as they struggled to articulate how the salary steps should be condensed from twelve steps to ten steps.  The Court noted that the arbitrator painstakingly analyzed the various proposals of the parties as they struggled to articulate how to structure their agreement that twelve incremental salary steps could be condensed to ten in an efficient manner.  In the end, the arbitrator concluded that the school committee’s position best expressed the intent of the contracting parties and was more in keeping with their mutual understanding about the overall costs of the CBA.

Therefore, based on the exceptionally deferential standard of review, the Court held that the arbitrator’s award “drew its essence” from the contract and was based on a “passably plausible” interpretation of the contract. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendants, Ralph and Lucia Rafaelian, appeal from a Superior Court ruling granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Charles, Marguerite, and Randolph Takian.  The dispute centers on the plaintiffs’ management of property that the parties purchased together in South Kingstown, Rhode Island, and a business—Lumar Realty Corporation—formed to manage that property.  Succinctly stated, over time the relationship between the parties had become acrimonious, and the defendants sold their interest in the property to the plaintiff Randolph Takian.  Contemporaneous with the sale, all the parties executed a release absolving the plaintiffs from “any and all claims arising out of the ownership of the property and operation of the business.” After the sale, the defendants persisted in their investigation of the plaintiffs’ management of the property and believed they uncovered facts suggesting to them that the plaintiffs committed misdeeds far more serious that mere mismanagement.

In a preemptive strike, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory relief seeking a judgment that the release barred any further claims by the defendants. The defendants counterclaimed, both on behalf of themselves and on behalf of the corporation, alleging a torrent of claims including embezzlement, misrepresentation, misappropriation, and loss of corporate opportunity.  A justice of the Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs after he found that the release was both valid and effective against both the defendants and the corporation.

On appeal, the defendants argue that the motion justice erred when he granted summary judgment on their direct claims because he made impermissible findings of fact with respect to issues that genuinely were disputed by the parties, such as the defendants’ knowledge about the scope of the plaintiffs’ misconduct, the defendants’ knowledge that the property’s tenants were willing to negotiate a sale of the property, and that the defendants were “sophisticated” businesspeople.  With respect to their derivative claims, the defendants argue that the motion justice erred because Lumar was not referred to in the release agreement, and that the reinstatement of Lumar’s revoked certificate of incorporation had the effect of giving the corporation standing to sue for wrongs committed during the period of revocation.
 
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Superior Court.  The Court affirmed the motion justice’s ruling that granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the defendants’ derivative counterclaims because it was undisputed that the defendants were not shareholders of Lumar at the time of the alleged wrongdoing; therefore, they had no standing to complain according to the contemporaneous shareholder rule. In addition, the Court affirmed the motion justice’s ruling that dismissed the defendants’ counterclaims for negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, loss of business opportunity, and breach of the duty of good faith, and fraudulent inducement to sell an interest in real estate against Randolph Takian. However, with respect to the defendants’ personal counterclaims against Charles and Marguerite Takian, the Court held that there were genuinely disputed issues of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court remanded the plaintiffs’ counterclaims for abuse of process, violation of the Rhode Island RICO Act, and conspiracy to violate the RICO act to the Superior Court. 

Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Superior Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The plaintiffs, Philip and Eileen Pelletier (the Pelletiers), appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court entered in favor of their neighbor, Aphrodite Laureanno (Laureanno), dismissing the Pelletiers’ complaint for injunctive relief and monetary damages.  The Pelletiers believed that a written and recorded agreement, entered into by the Pelletiers and Laureanno’s predecessor-in-interest, created a permanent easement for parking on a small portion of Laureanno’s adjacent property. After a trial on the merits, the trial justice concluded that the written agreement at issue did not grant an easement to the Pelletiers, but instead served merely as a revocable license. 

On appeal, the Pelletiers maintained that the trial justice erred in his determination that the written agreement at issue was clearly and unambiguously personal in nature, and did not create a permanent easement.  The Pelletiers also argued that the trial justice erred by considering the absence of “words of inheritance” within the agreement as a dispositive factor in his analysis.  Additionally, the Pelletiers challenged the trial justice’s credibility determinations concerning the testimony of Eileen Pelletier, the only signatory to the driveway agreement to testify at trial.

Upon a de novo review of the instrument at issue, the Supreme Court held that the document was clear and unambiguous, and did not convey an easement, as purported by the Pelletiers.  Rather, the Court concluded that the agreement was personal and permissive in nature, thus constituting a license.  The Court also determined that the trial justice did not consider the document’s lack of binding language in a dispositive fashion, but instead viewed that deficiency as one of several factors in his analysis.  Lastly, the Court held that, even if the agreement was ambiguous, the trial justice’s rejection of Eileen Pelletier’s testimony on credibility grounds was not error.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiffs, Butterfly Realty and Dairyland, Inc., appealed from a judgment entered against them on their claims for a prescriptive easement on the property of the defendant, James Romanella & Sons, Inc.  According to the plaintiffs, the alleged prescriptive easement was necessary to allow for large commercial vehicles to gain access to a loading dock located in the rear of the plaintiffs’ commercial building.  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial justice erred in finding that the hostility required for a prescriptive easement was not shown.  The plaintiffs further contended that the trial justice misconstrued evidence in finding that the prescriptive use of the disputed area was not continuous.
 
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.  The Court held that the trial justice misapplied the law as to whether the plaintiffs’ use of the disputed land was sufficiently hostile.  The Court held that, to show sufficient hostility for a prescriptive easement, a claimant must, by clear and convincing evidence, demonstrate evidence of objective trespassory acts that are adverse to the rights of the true owner.  The Court also directed the trial court to further examine the issue of whether the use was continuous and whether the plaintiffs’ tenants’ use may be considered for the purpose of establishing a prescriptive easement. 
   
Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The defendant, Jeffrey Alston, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction for conspiracy to break and enter, breaking and entering of a dwelling, and assault with a dangerous weapon.  He also appealed from the denial of his motions for a new trial. The defendant first contended that his right to confrontation under the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions was violated by the evidentiary rulings of the trial justice.  Specifically, he asserted that the trial justice erroneously allowed statements made by his coconspirator into evidence as either admissions or adoptive admissions.  The defendant also argued that his right to cross-examine one of the state’s witnesses was unduly restricted and that the trial justice erred in refusing to pass the case.
 
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in all respects.  With respect to the defendant’s right-to-confrontation argument, the Court held that the statements at issue were not testimonial and that their admission, therefore, did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation.  The Court then acknowledged the defendant’s alternative argument that the statements at issue were inadmissible hearsay, but concluded that the trial justice did not err in admitting the statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.  Next, the Court held that the defendant’s cross-examination of a state’s witness was not unduly restricted when the trial justice sustained an objection to one of the defendant’s questions because the defendant did not proffer an argument that a response to his question would have led to relevant evidence.  Finally, the Court held that the defendant failed to show that the remark underlying the defendant’s motion to pass the case was so inflammatory and prejudicial that the jury would not be able to decide the case adequately, based solely on the evidence before them. 

The defendant, Michael Gondusky, filed a civil suit in the Superior Court against End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc. (End Zone), alleging that he had suffered serious injuries caused by the actions of two of End Zone’s employees when they refused to allow him to enter End Zone.  End Zone’s insurance provider, Great American E&S Insurance Company (Great American), filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that it was under no duty to defend or obligation to indemnify its insured, End Zone, in the underlying matter.  This appeal stemmed from the granting of Great American’s motion for summary judgment and a decree that Great American owed no duty to defend or obligation to indemnify End Zone or Mr. Gondusky in the underlying matter.  On appeal, Mr. Gondusky alleged that Great American committed an unfair claims practice by failing to satisfy its duty to inform him of its denial of coverage within a reasonable period of time under G.L. 1956 § 27-9.1-4.  Additionally, he contended that the assault and/or battery exclusion within the insurance policy was illusory, arguing it would preclude coverage for any contact resulting in an injury to a patron by an End Zone employee, whether the injury was intended or not and that, as such, the policy was unenforceable.
 
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding first that Rhode Island’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, upon which Mr. Gondusky relied, did not provide him with a private cause of action nor did it provide him with the relief he sought.  Further, the Court held that the assault and/or battery exclusion was not illusory.

The defendant, Katherine Bunnell, was convicted of second-degree murder and of conspiracy to commit murder after the death of her three-year-old nephew.  She appealed from her conviction and from a Superior Court order denying her motion for a new trial.  Specifically, the defendant asserted that the trial justice erred in two ways: First, by excluding from evidence certain excerpts from an interview that her boyfriend gave at the Woonsocket Police Department the day before her nephew died, and second, by ignoring “numerous inconsistencies” in the testimony of one of the state’s witnesses in denying her motion for a new trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.  First, the Court held that a “statement,” under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, pertains to the individual declarations provided within a longer narrative, rather than the entire narrative itself.  As such, the Court was satisfied that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in excluding the six excerpts that the defendant contested.  Second, the Court held that the trial justice had performed the correct analysis in deciding the defendant’s motion for a new trial and that, in so doing, he did not overlook or misconceive material evidence.  Further, the Court was satisfied that the trial justice adequately articulated his reasons for denying the motion, sufficiently summarized the evidence presented at trial, and made appropriate determinations on the witnesses’ credibility to support the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

In this appeal, the Supreme Court was called upon to confirm the extent of uninsured motorist coverage provided under an automobile insurance policy issued to a husband and wife, both of whom suffered injuries at the hands of an uninsured motorist while riding on a motorcycle owned by the husband but not expressly identified in the policy at issue.  The insurer, New London County Mutual Insurance Company (NLC), filed an action for declaratory relief in the Superior Court, seeking clarification as to the rights and obligations of the parties pursuant to the policy it had issued to the defendants.  Arguing that an “owned but not insured” exclusion set forth in the policy unambiguously excluded the defendants’ claim for uninsured motorist benefits, NLC filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the Superior Court.  The defendants, Karolyn Fontaine, individually, and Karolyn Fontaine on behalf of the estate of her husband, Leo Fontaine, who died as a result of his injuries, appealed the grant of summary judgment and contended that the pertinent policy provision was ambiguous and should have been construed in favor of coverage. 

After reviewing the contested policy language in accordance with the rules of contract construction, the Supreme Court held that the “owned but not insured” exclusion was clear and unambiguous, and consequently extracted defendants’ claims from coverage.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Beth A. DePrete, appealed from an order of the Family Court reflecting the court’s denial of her motion seeking leave of court to relocate the parties’ two minor children from Rhode Island to Texas and seeking modification of the final judgment of divorce to reflect same.  On appeal, the plaintiff contended (1) that the justice of the Family Court who passed upon her motion abused his discretion, overlooked or misconceived the evidence, and was clearly wrong in finding that it was not in the best interests of the children to allow them to relocate to Texas; and (2) that, in determining whether relocation served the best interests of the children, the Family Court justice failed to properly apply the criteria set forth in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dupré v. Dupré, 857 A.2d 242 (R.I. 2004).
 
After thoroughly reviewing the testimony and the hearing justice’s review and application of the Dupré factors, the Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in denying the plaintiff’s motion to relocate with the minor children, nor were his factual findings clearly wrong.

Next, the Court addressed the plaintiff’s contention that, according to the ALI Principles cited in Dupré, the relocation analysis should focus on the primary custodial family.  In addressing that contention, the Court ruled that the plaintiff failed to recognize that, in Dupré, the Court did not adopt the ALI Principles in toto; rather, the opinion noted that the Court in Dupré had merely reviewed that well-respected legal organization’s contribution to the ongoing discourse on the issue of relocation and ultimately drew upon concepts contained in several approaches to relocation in order to fashion its list of factors.  In fine, the Court perceived no abuse of discretion or clear error on the hearing justice’s part.  Hence, the Court declined to disturb the hearing justice’s ruling that relocation of the minor children to Texas would not be in their best interests.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Family Court.

The plaintiff, Daniela Turacova, M.D. (the plaintiff or Turacova), appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant and counterclaimant, Patricia DeThomas, administratrix of the estate of Ronald DeThomas (the defendant or the estate), in the amount of $658,573.28, including prejudgment interest.  On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial justice erred in disregarding the parties’ agreement that payment for DeThomas’s interest in Taunton Avenue Medical Associates, LLC was due within thirty days from the date of the trial court’s determination of the purchase price.   The plaintiff also argued that the trial justice erred in entering judgment and awarding prejudgment interest to the defendant when there was no money judgment and no breach of contract action before the court.  Lastly, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in determining that the operating agreement executed by the parties contemplated that interest would run at the statutory rate beyond the three-month buyout period set forth in the agreement.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the defendant. 

The Supreme Court held that the settlement agreement did not supersede language in the operating agreement ¬concerning the time for payment for the property.  The Court declared that the settlement agreement explicitly provided for a request that the trial justice consider the effect of the plaintiff’s delay in complying with the three-month buyout provision in the operating agreement and, therefore, the trial justice did not exceed his authority by conforming to the parties’ request.

The Supreme Court also held that the trial justice’s imposition of prejudgment interest was appropriate because there were breach of contract claims before the trial justice and the plaintiff was found to have breached the terms of the operating agreement.  The Court found no error in the trial justice’s conclusion that the plaintiff breached the contract by failing to perform according to the terms of the operating agreement.  Additionally, the Court determined that the trial justice did not err in concluding that the parties intended for the imposition of interest to occur after the three-month buyout period.

The plaintiff appealed from a Superior Court grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  On appeal, the plaintiff contended that G.L. 1956 §§ 28-5-17(d) and 28-5-24.1(d) of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) rendered the release document which the plaintiff executed as part of his severance package void as it applied to his pending FEPA claims.  Specifically, the plaintiff contended that because a waiver of all attorneys’ fees was compelled as a condition of the release, the just-referenced sections of the General Laws “de facto require” that the plaintiff’s attorney have actual knowledge of any proposed agreement.

The issues before the Supreme Court involved statutory interpretation.  Upon reviewing the language of § 28-5-17(d), the Court held that the statute was plain and unambiguous; the Court noted that its language requiring an attestation stating that a waiver of attorneys’ fees was not compelled as a condition of a settlement was required when a consent order or conciliation agreement was entered by the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (Commission).  The Court held that the release signed by the plaintiff was in no sense a consent order or conciliation agreement entered by the Commission; and, therefore, it held that § 28-5-17(d) did not apply to the facts of the instant case.

The defendant, Milton D. Pelosi, appealed from two orders of the Family Court.  The first order denied his motion to vacate the entry of the interlocutory judgment and the final judgment of divorce.  The second order granted the motion to dismiss his appeal, which motion was brought by the plaintiff, Kathleen Pelosi.  On appeal, the defendant contended that he was never provided notice of (1) the entry of the final judgment of divorce or (2) the hearing pursuant to which the amended final judgment was entered.  As a result, the defendant requested that the Supreme Court vacate both of those judgments and also that the Court vacate the order which dismissed his appeal.

The Supreme Court stated that the defendant did not do enough to satisfy his burden of responsibility with respect to the timely transmission of the record and transcripts.  The Court noted that the defendant failed to transmit the transcripts during the fifteenth month period between the filing of his notice of appeal and the hearing on plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, and it further noted that the defendant had not articulated a sufficient reason for that failure.  For that reason, the Court held that the Family Court justice did not abuse his discretion in granting the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss in light of the fact that the defendant had failed to perfect his appeal.  The Court further held that it did not need to reach the defendant’s argument with respect to his appeal from the denial of his motion to vacate.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Family Court.

The plaintiffs, Warwick Sewer Authority and the City of Warwick (city), brought a complaint for a declaratory judgment concerning the city’s ownership of real property, and a hearing justice granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on that complaint.  The defendant appealed, contending that when he dedicated the property at issue to the city in 1979, he did so subject to it being used exclusively as open space.  He argued that he maintained a reversionary interest in the property, and that, therefore, genuine issues of material fact should have precluded the hearing justice from granting summary judgment.  The defendant further asserted that the Superior Court lacked the requisite jurisdiction to grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs because no actual justiciable controversy existed in this case.

The Supreme Court first held that this case was justiciable because the plaintiffs had standing to bring their declaratory judgment action and, in so doing, they had presented sufficient facts giving rise to some conceivable legal hypothesis that would entitle them to some relief against the defendant.  On the merits, the Court stated that the plat map that the defendant had filed with the city upon his dedication sufficiently and unambiguously evidenced his intent to make an unconditional dedication of the subject property, without any limitations or restrictions.  The Court noted that acceptance by the public—the second element required to effectuate a dedication—was met when the city accepted the defendant’s dedication by noting it on a plat card that was signed by the chair of the planning board and recorded by a deputy city clerk.  The Supreme Court further reasoned that because the plat map and the plat card—the only two documents evidencing the defendant’s dedication—were unambiguous on their face, parol evidence was not admissible to vary the terms of those documents.  Ultimately, the Court held that no genuine issue of material fact existed and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
 

The plaintiff, Sean LaFreniere (the plaintiff or LaFreniere) and the defendant, Michael P. Dutton (the defendant or Dutton), were traveling in Ohio in a vehicle owned and operated by the defendant, when Dutton rear-ended another vehicle on the highway.  The plaintiff sustained injuries from the collision, filed a complaint against the defendant alleging that his negligence caused the collision, and later received workers’ compensation benefits from the defendant’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier.  Dutton filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that LaFreniere was precluded from pursuing a negligence claim because he already had collected workers’ compensation benefits and, therefore, could not recover a second time in tort because of the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, G.L. 1956
§ 28-29-20.  The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff was precluded from collecting in tort, based on the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant because he and the defendant were traveling for “personal reasons” and because Dutton did not meet the requirements set forth in § 28-29-20, as he was not an employer, director, officer, agent, or employee of M.P. Dutton Landscaping, thereby precluding him from the protections of the exclusivity provision. 

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial justice.  The Court held that Dutton was the plaintiff’s employer in accordance with the definition of employer set forth in § 28-29-2(5), allowing the defendant to seek protection under the exclusivity provision.  The Supreme Court concluded that because the plaintiff already had received workers’ compensation benefits from the defendant’s insurance carrier, the plaintiff was precluded from pursuing a negligence claim against Dutton based on § 28-29-20 of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Dennis Gallagher was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma.  A trial judge of the Workers’ Compensation Court entered decrees holding Mr. Gallagher’s most recent employer, USGEN New England, Inc. (USGEN), liable to pay benefits to Mr. Gallagher and to his wife, Maureen Gallagher, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 28-34-8.  The Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court (Appellate Division) vacated those decrees and entered final decrees assessing liability against National Grid USA/Narragansett Electric (National Grid), where Mr. Gallagher had worked prior to working at USGEN.  Mrs. Gallagher and National Grid each petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review the Appellate Division’s final decrees.  The Supreme Court issued both writs and consolidated the cases.

In support of its petition for certiorari, National Grid argued that the Appellate Division erred in overturning the trial judge’s findings of fact because the trial judge did not overlook or misconceive the evidence and was not clearly wrong.  Mrs. Gallagher similarly argued, asserting additionally that the trial judge’s findings were supported by Mr. Gallagher’s undisputed testimony that there was asbestos in the workplace at USGEN.  She further asserted that the Appellate Division misinterpreted the law by requiring Mr. Gallagher to be exposed to asbestos at USGEN as a condition precedent to his success against USGEN.

The Supreme Court affirmed the final decrees of the Appellate Division.  In so doing, the Court noted that because the Appellate Division found clear error on the part of the trial judge, it was free to conduct a de novo review of the evidence.  The Court did not find error with the Appellate Division’s findings that Mr. Gallagher’s testimony with respect to USGEN was mere speculation and not probative on the issue of whether his conditions while working for USGEN were of the same type or nature in which he first contracted the disease.  Therefore, the Court held that the Appellate Division did not err in vacating the trial judge’s decrees and in entering final decrees assessing liability against National Grid instead.

The applicant, Emmanuel Barbosa, appealed from a Superior Court judgment denying his application for postconviction relief.  The applicant argued “that the hearing justice misconceived or overlooked evidence in determining that there was not a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of his trial would have been different.”  Specifically, the applicant contended that if his trial counsel had presented testimony at trial of Sheila Calderon, a witness who testified in a deposition that she did not see the applicant with a gun on the night in question, the jury would have found reasonable doubt.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding that the applicant’s ineffective assistance claim was groundless in that he failed to set forth any evidence suggesting that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies. 

The plaintiff, Robert Watson, together with nine Republican colleagues from the Rhode Island House of Representatives, filed a complaint for declaratory relief in which they sought a ruling that the process the General Assembly used to allocate $2.3 million in state funds for legislative grants to local and private organizations in the FY2008 budget act violated articles 5, 6, and 9 of the Rhode Island Constitution. The plaintiffs brought this action in their private capacities as Rhode Island taxpayers, and not in their capacities as elected officials.  In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  A justice of the Superior Court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claim because Rhode Island does not recognize so-called “taxpayer standing,” and the plaintiffs were unable to articulate a particularized injury that was distinct from any injury that may have been suffered by the public in general.  The motion justice also concluded that even if the plaintiffs had standing to maintain their action, the requested relief was a nonjusticiable political question.  Only the plaintiff Robert Watson appealed from that judgment to the Supreme Court. 

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that his injury-in-fact as a taxpayer is sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement or, in the alternative, urged the Court to join a number of other states that recognize so-called “taxpayer standing.” The plaintiff also argued that the Court should invoke the “substantial public interest” exception, and overlook standing in this matter.  The defendants maintained their argument that the plaintiff lacked proper standing, and argued that the Court should neither adopt the doctrine of taxpayer standing nor overlook that requirement based on the facts of this case. 

The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff failed to show any concrete, particularized harm under its traditional standing analysis.  On the contrary, the Court held that his alleged injury was indistinguishable from that of any other member of the public, and therefore insufficient to maintain this action.  The Court declined to adopt the doctrine of taxpayer standing because of Rhode Island’s long-standing jurisprudence that requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a distinct, palpable injury and the factual distinctions between this case and the cases of other jurisdictions that have adopted such a rule.   Furthermore, the Court  declined to exercise its discretion by invoking the “substantial public interest” exception in order to overlook the standing requirement.  The Court concluded that it would be imprudent to overlook the standing requirement when faced with questions of constitutional import that bear on the authority and duties of a coordinate branch of government, particularly where the plaintiff waited so long to bring this action and has apparently failed to join all necessary parties.    

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Shurron Washington, sought review of a Superior Court judgment that declared him to be in violation of the terms of his probation.  That judgment revoked the suspension of a ten-year sentence that had previously been meted out pursuant to the defendant’s conviction of assault with intent to commit certain specified felonies. 

On appeal, the defendant contended that the hearing justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding a violation of the terms and conditions of his probation.  The defendant focused his appeal upon the contention that the record in the case raised too many questions as to the reliability of the identification of him as the perpetrator of the alleged attack on a female visitor to the CCRI campus in Lincoln.

The Supreme Court ultimately held that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in assessing the credibility of the various witnesses or in adjudicating the defendant to be a probation violator.  The Court stated that, after carefully reviewing the entire record, it was evident that the hearing justice had more than plausible reasons for accepting the complaining witness’s testimony and identification of the defendant and for rejecting the version of events testified to by the defendant and by various members of his family. 

The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice’s detailed findings as to the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing were more than sufficient to serve as predicates for his conclusion that the defendant had not kept the peace and had not been of good behavior.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

This case came before the Supreme Court on appeal by the defendant, Esteban Carpio (the defendant or Carpio), from a judgment of conviction for the first-degree murder of a police officer; discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence; and felony assault with a dangerous weapon.  The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, with a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment for committing a crime of violence with a firearm resulting in death, and another consecutive twenty-year term for felony assault.  On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant contended that, based on his mental incapacity, he could not be found guilty of the crimes set for in the indictment, and that the trial justice improperly instructed the jury on the question of criminal responsibility.  The defendant also argued that the sentence of life imprisonment without parole was error.  The Supreme Court denied and dismissed this appeal and affirmed the judgment in all respects.

On the defendant’s assertion that the Supreme Court should review the alleged insufficiency of the evidence concerning the question of criminal responsibility, the Court refused to conduct such a review because the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal by declining to file a motion for a new trial.  The Supreme Court also declined to accept the defendant’s argument that the insufficiency of the evidence should be reviewed under the plain error rule because Rhode Island does not recognize the plain error rule.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in his instructions to the jury because the instructions adequately covered the law, and clearly articulated the factors that the jury was to consider in deliberation in order to determine whether the defendant possessed the mental capacity to be held liable for his actions.

Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment without parole.  After careful review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the sentence of life imprisonment without parole was appropriate because the crime and the offense fit squarely within the narrow category of offenses for which such a sentence is reserved.  The murder of a twenty-seven-year law enforcement veteran, committed with the officer’s own firearm, did not warrant a reduction in sentence.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and ratified the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Before the Court was the plaintiff’s appeal of a Superior Court decision granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant.  The plaintiff’s appeal in this matter presented the Court with an issue of first impression—does the driver of a motor vehicle, who is an adult but underage drinker, have a duty to protect third parties from the tortious conduct of the intoxicated individual he has agreed to transport, who is likewise an adult but underage drinker, by preventing that individual from operating a motor vehicle?  On appeal, the plaintiff presented what she perceived to be four distinct theories of liability:  (1) liability resulting from a cognizable duty ascertained from a consideration of the factors set forth in Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987); (2) liability pursuant to a “special relationship” between the defendant and his intoxicated passenger as set forth in the Restatement (Second) Torts § 315 (1965) and Rhode Island case law; (3) consequent liability based on the defendant’s purported assumption of a duty to prevent his passenger from later driving under the influence; and (4) liability stemming from the defendant’s alleged “substantial assistance” of his intoxicated passenger’s subsequent operation of a motor vehicle.  In countering, the defendant argued that the duty alleged by the plaintiff—one that places an affirmative obligation on an adult individual to prevent a third party from operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol—is not a duty that supports a cognizable claim under existing authority.  The defendant emphasized the evident public policy concerns, urging the Supreme Court to refrain from essentially creating a new cause of action. 

After performing the requisite case-specific analysis to ascertain whether a duty existed under the facts of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the duty alleged by the plaintiff could not be supported by any of her proposed theories.  The Court also highlighted the numerous public policy considerations associated with imposing what could be viewed as a “designated-driver” duty, and it held that these concerns, in conjunction with the difficulties in defining such a burdensome duty, made the issue more appropriate for legislative review and public debate.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Citizens Insurance Company of America/Hanover Insurance (Citizens), appealed from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Companies (Empire).  Citizens argued that the hearing justice erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Empire for the complete reimbursement of attorneys’ fees expended by Empire in defending against a civil suit resulting from an accident caused by a driver insured by Citizens.  Citizens contended that, because its and Empire’s insurance policies contained conflicting “other insurance” provisions, Empire was entitled only to a pro-rata apportionment of defense costs.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.  As an initial matter, the Court determined that it would not literally apply the “other insurance” provision language of Citizens’ policy to the additional insured lessor, BMW Financial, because doing so would render Citizens’ coverage of BMW Financial illusory.  The Court then determined that the ordinary reader and purchaser of such policy would have interpreted it as providing BMW Financial with primary coverage under the circumstances of this case.  Accordingly, the Court held that Citizens, as the primary insurer, had the primary duty to defend BMW Financial.  As a result, the Court concluded that there was no conflict between Citizens’ and Empire’s policies and, that therefore, there was no need for a pro-rata apportionment of defense costs.

The defendant, Gary Gromkiewicz (the defendant), appealed from a Superior Court judgment declaring him in violation of his probation, stemming from his alleged participation in an armed robbery.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence presented at his violation hearing was insufficient to meet the reasonable satisfaction standard and that the trial justice erred by finding that the defendant had violated his probation by failing to keep the peace and remain on good behavior.

The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation.  The Court further concluded that the trial justice acted within her discretion when assessing the credibility of the testifying witnesses.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.   

The defendant, Brian D. Krivitsky, appealed pro se from two Family Court orders authorizing a commissioner to sell the defendant’s real property to satisfy the child-support arrearage he owes to the plaintiff, Jo-An Krivitsky.  The defendant asserted three main issues on appeal: (1) the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the appealed orders; (2) it was error for the Family Court to order the sale of his home; and (3) various judicial improprieties occurred in the Family Court throughout the course of the litigation.

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Family Court and remanded the case to the Family Court for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion.  First, the Court determined that the Family Court had the authority to enter the appealed orders because at the time such orders were entered, the papers of the case had been remanded to the Family Court.  Second, the Court ruled that it was well within the Family Court’s authority to order the sale of the defendant’s property to satisfy his outstanding child-support obligation.  Lastly, the Court held that the defendant’s allegations of judicial bias were not properly preserved and, in any event, were without merit.

The defendant, Central Falls Detention Facility Corporation (Detention Facility or the facility), appealed from a Superior Court order granting the plaintiff’s, AVCORR Management, LLC’s (AVCORR), petition to appoint a binding arbitrator to settle the parties’ dispute over several types of fees that AVCORR alleged it was owed by the facility.  On appeal, Detention Facility argued that only the “Annual Fixed Fee” and AVCORR’s business expenses were subject to binding arbitration pursuant to the parties’ agreement.  The facility further alleges that the “Annual Man Day Fee” was not subject to arbitration pursuant to the “limiting language” of the agreement’s arbitration clause.

After reviewing the agreement at issue, the Supreme Court concluded that the parties intended to arbitrate only those disputes dealing with the “invoice,” which was payable on a monthly basis.  The Court stated that the term “invoice” was defined by the parties as consisting of the monthly portion of the Annual Fixed Fee and the business expenses, but not the Annual Man Day Fee.  According to the Court, the Annual Man Day Fee, described in a different section of the agreement, was to be paid separately from the monthly invoice—specifically, “within [t]hirty (30) [d]ays of the end of each Annual Period during which the fee was earned.”  Based on all of this, the Court held that Detention Facility and AVCORR agreed to submit to arbitration only those disputes dealing with the Annual Fixed Fee and the business expenses, and not those disputes dealing with the Annual Man Day Fee.  Consequently, it vacated and reversed the order of the Superior Court to the extent that the order granted AVCORR’s petition to appoint a binding arbitrator to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding the Annual Man Day Fee.

The plaintiffs, Shannon Reagan, William A. Reagan, Terrance Moy, and Margaret Moy, appealed from a judgment in favor of the defendants, the City of Newport and its representatives, on the plaintiffs’ action to clear title to a portion of the Washington Street Extension located in the City of Newport.  The plaintiffs argued that the trial justice erred in holding that statutory abandonment is the exclusive means by which a municipality may abandon a public highway.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and held that the exclusive method by which a municipality may abandon a public highway is through strict compliance with the requirements of G.L. 1956 chapter 6 of title 24, the Abandonment Statute.

The applicant, Wesley R. Spratt (Spratt), appealed pro se from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his application for postconviction relief.  On appeal, Spratt contended that the hearing justice (1) wrongfully dismissed his claim that a courthouse identification of Spratt by a witness was improperly orchestrated by the state; (2) improperly denied his claim that an in-court witness identification of Spratt was unreliable and violated his due-process rights; (3) erroneously denied his claim that the police purposely withheld profile photographs in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure; (4) incorrectly rejected his claim of unlawful sentencing; and (5) wrongly dismissed his assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Additionally, Spratt argued that the evidence presented at trial by the state was insufficient to convict him. 

After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that, because there was no evidence that the state orchestrated the chance encounter between Spratt and a witness, the hearing justice did not err in rejecting Spratt’s claim.  In regard to Spratt’s allegation that an in-court witness identification violated his due-process rights, the Court concluded that the identification was reliable and not tainted by any state coercion.  Concerning Spratt’s allegation that the state improperly withheld photographs, the Court determined the contention to be without merit.  The Supreme Court likewise found that the hearing justice did not err in dismissing Spratt’s allegations of unlawful sentencing, ineffective assistance of counsel, or insufficiency of evidence.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court

When the plaintiffs’ efforts to act as general contractors on a new home foundered because of faulty work performed by a framing subcontractor, they made a claim on the homeowner’s insurance policy issued to them by the defendant, Peerless Insurance Company.  The plaintiffs believed that the repairs were covered under what was titled the “Special Ultra Plus” endorsement, which they had purchased in addition to the policy’s base coverage. The defendant denied the claim, citing two exclusions in the policy.  Consequently, the plaintiffs filed a declaratory-judgment action against the carrier in the Providence County Superior Court.  A hearing justice determined that the terms of the policy were ambiguous, and according to this state’s settled law, entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 

On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in her determination that the insurance contract was ambiguous.  It argued that the Ultra Plus endorsement for ordinance or law compliance only applied to “covered losses,” and that the plaintiff’s loss was excluded from covered losses under a “faulty-workmanship” exclusion and an “ordinance or law” exclusion.  Peerless contended that the terms of these exclusions, when read along with the Special Ultra Plus coverage summary, were clear and unambiguous.

The Supreme Court held that the terms of the Ultra Plus endorsement’s coverage summary, when read in concert with the terms of the policy, created an ambiguity in the terms of the insurance contract.  The coverage summary simply stated that “Ordinance or Law Compliance (required after a loss)” was “Included.”  Furthermore, the Court held that even if an ordinary reader and purchaser could be expected to weave their way through the dense policy provisions to reach either of these exclusions, he or she could reasonably conclude that the repairs nonetheless were covered by the Special Ultra Plus endorsement.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. 

The plaintiff corporations, Cheaters, Inc. (Cheaters) and Cheaters Holding Corp. (the Holding Corp.), appealed from the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, United National Insurance Co.  On appeal, the plaintiff corporations contended the following: (1) that the hearing justice erred in holding that the “On-Premises Endorsement” in the insurance policy at issue applied to the “indemnification contract between Cheaters and the Holding Corp.;” (2) that the hearing justice erred because her application of the On-Premises Endorsement renders the Additional Insured Endorsement an illusory contract; (3) that limiting liquor liability coverage to “on-premises losses only” violates public policy; and (4) that the policy’s liquor liability exclusion does not preclude insurance coverage with respect to Cheaters’ possible liability arising pursuant to “contracts of indemnification.”

After carefully considering the United National policy issued to Cheaters, the Supreme Court determined that the On-Premises Endorsement was unambiguous and applied to the insured contract.  Accordingly, it found that the hearing justice did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant based on the On-Premises Endorsement.  The Court additionally stated that there was no merit to the plaintiff corporations’ arguments that the On-Premises Endorsement rendered illusory the Additional Insured Endorsement and that limiting liquor liability coverage to “on-premises losses only” was against public policy.

The Supreme Court further determined that, due to the fact that the Court had already ruled that coverage was barred by the On-Premises Endorsement, it need not reach any further contentions concerning the liquor liability exclusion. 

For the reasons set forth in its opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, United National Insurance Co.

The plaintiff appeals from a Superior Court judgment in its favor for $1,600, plus interest, in an action for breach of a residential lease agreement.  The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant breached his lease agreement by painting over expensive, historical wallpaper inside the plaintiff’s nineteenth century Benefit Street property and by failing to pay the last month’s rent.  The plaintiff’s complaint sought $1,600 in unpaid rent, $25,000 for repairs to the property, punitive damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees.   After a bench trial in the Providence County Superior Court, the trial justice found that the defendant breached the lease by painting portions of the premises, but she also ruled that the plaintiff had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it had incurred damages that exceeded the amount of unpaid rent. 

On appeal, the plaintiff alleged three errors:  (1) that the trial justice improperly forced a co-counsel and cotrustee for the trust, to withdraw from representation prior to testifying as a witness; (2) that the trial justice erred in her determination of damages; and (3) that the trial justice should have awarded attorneys’ fees in accordance with the lease agreement.   

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Superior Court.  The Court held that the trial justice erred when she determined damages because she appeared to have applied the “diminution of value” standard rather than the “cost of repair” standard, and that the “cost of repair” standard was supported by ample testimonial evidence.  The Court also held the lease was clear and unambiguous and that the defendant agreed to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees if legal action was required to obtain compensation for any damage to the property.  The trial justice’s award of $1,600 in unpaid rent, however, was affirmed.

Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the Superior Court for a hearing on the issues of damages and attorneys’ fees. 

On December 6, 2011, the defendant, City of Cranston (the defendant or the city), came before the Supreme Court on appeal from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the plaintiff, James Casale (the plaintiff), in an action for declaratory judgment.  The defendant argued that the trial justice erred by misinterpreting G.L. 1956 § 45-19-1.1, and finding that the city was not entitled to reimbursement from the proceeds of the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist benefits. 

The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff.  The Supreme Court held that the defendant is not entitled to reimbursement from the injured-on-duty plaintiff’s uninsured motorist insurance proceeds when the plaintiff did not recover from the liable tortfeasor.  The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in finding that the defendant is not entitled to reimbursement for the injured-on-duty payments paid to the plaintiff.

The defendant, Yoneiry Delarosa (Delarosa), appealed from a Providence County Superior Court judgment adjudicating him a violator of probation.  Delarosa argued on appeal that the hearing justice erred (1) by crediting the testimony of Christina Bartley (Bartley) after she was offered a favorable plea disposition by the state to testify against him; (2) in overruling defense counsel’s objection to certain testimony by Bartley about which he had not been apprised prior to the hearing; and (3) by failing to allow defense counsel or Delarosa the opportunity to address the court prior to sentencing.

After careful review, the Court concluded that reasonably satisfactory evidence existed to support the hearing justice’s finding that Delarosa violated the terms and conditions of his probation.  The Court noted that the hearing justice acknowledged the state’s plea offer to Bartley and that she found Bartley to be credible despite the offer.  Thus, the Court refrained from “second-guessing” the hearing justice’s supportable credibility assessments.  The Court also held that the hearing justice did not err in allowing Bartley’s challenged testimony because no discovery violation by the state occurred, as contended by Delarosa. Lastly, the Court declined to extend the right of allocution to all probation violation cases.

Therefore, the Court held that the hearing justice acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously when she adjudicated Delarosa a probation violator based on the record before her.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

On April 6, 2010, a jury convicted Christopher Smith (Smith or the defendant) of three counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and two counts of second-degree child molestation sexual assault for a series of incidents involving a thirteen-year-old girl.  The defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of fifty years, with twenty-five years to serve and twenty-five years suspended, with probation, on the three counts of first-degree child molestation, and thirty years, with twenty-five years to serve and five years suspended, with probation, for the two counts of second-degree child molestation.  The defendant appealed his conviction and asserted that the trial justice erred by: (1) denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, which was based on his argument that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and (2) permitting the state, over the defendant’s objection, to cross-examine Smith about weapons training he received while in the military. 

The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.  The Court held that the trial justice performed an exhaustive review of the evidence presented at trial, and that he was well within his discretion in determining that the complainant was believable and that the defendant was not a credible witness.  The Court also held that the trial justice properly exercised his discretion under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence in allowing the state to pose a single question to Smith regarding weapons training he received while in the National Guard.  The Court determined that the state’s question was relevant to rebut defense counsel’s assertion that the victim inexplicably had delayed reporting the molestation.  The question tended to show the reasonableness of the victim’s fear of Smith, who had threatened to kill her, and the question posed no significant risk of inflaming the passions of the jury.

This case came before the Supreme Court on November 30, 2011, on appeal by the defendant, Isabel Taveras (defendant or Taveras), from a judgment of conviction after a bench trial for one count of possession of an enumerated quantity of cocaine, for which she received a ten-year suspended sentence, with probation.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of her motion to suppress.  The defendant alleges that the arresting police officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they detained her unlawfully at a traffic stop and conducted a pat-down search without a reasonable articulable suspicion that she might be armed and dangerous.  The defendant also alleges that the motion to suppress should have been granted because the officers exceeded the scope of a permissible pat-down search by directing her to unzip and open her jacket. 

The Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because, based on the totality of the circumstances, the police officers possessed sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the vehicle and to undertake a limited pat-down search of the defendant.  The Court also concluded that the officer did not exceed the permissible scope of a Terry-style pat-down search when he asked the defendant to open her jacket because, based on the circumstances, he had reasonable suspicion that the defendant might be armed.  The officers gave credible testimony that when the cruiser approached the vehicle, they saw the defendant reach down to the floor and stuff something into the left side of her jacket.  The Court concluded that asking the defendant to open her coat was a minimally intrusive method to determine whether she was concealing a weapon or other dangerous instrumentality while maintaining officer safety.  According, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court for Washington County finding that the defendant and its assigns were the record title holders of a parcel of real estate located in the Town of North Kingstown.  On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that his due-process rights were violated because he was not notified nor afforded a chance to respond before losing title to the property as a result of a tax sale and subsequent foreclosure of his redemption rights by virtue of a Superior Court decree.  The plaintiff also argued that Rule 5(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure entitled him to receive notice of additional Superior Court proceedings involving the property.    
  
The Supreme Court held that because the plaintiff defaulted at an earlier proceeding to foreclose his right of redemption (after a tax sale of the property), the final decree entered against him at the foreclosure hearing was absolute.  The Court ruled that this decree forever barred him from asserting any subsequent claim to the property—including his claim set forth in the instant action.  The Court further held that a prior Superior Court judgment appearing to “re-vest” the property back to the plaintiff was made in error and therefore was void.  Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff’s due-process rights were not violated because he had properly received notice of both the impending tax sale of the property and the subsequent petition to foreclose his right of redemption.   

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

After being convicted of two counts of first-degree robbery, the defendant, Allen Wray, appealed.  He argued on appeal that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the eyewitness identifications that led to his conviction were unreliable and not substantial enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the robberies in question.  The defendant additionally contended that the trial justice committed reversible error by allowing a trial witness to vouch for, and bolster the credibility of, the two eyewitnesses.

With respect to the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial, the Supreme Court noted that the defendant’s assertion that the eyewitness identifications were unreliable went to the witnesses’ credibility—an issue for the jury.

The Court ultimately held that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive any material evidence and did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  The Court also held that no impermissible bolstering occurred because the witness in question—a police officer—rather than giving his opinion on the ability of another witness to describe the defendant accurately, was asked to compare independently the physical description of the defendant given in police-radio dispatches with the actual appearance of the defendant.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in all respects.

The defendant, Kimberly St. Michel, appealed from a Superior Court judgment of conviction for embezzlement of funds in excess of $100.  On appeal, the defendant advanced two arguments:  First, she contended that the trial justice erred when he prevented defense counsel from eliciting the defendant’s own out-of-court statement that “she didn’t do any of this” through the testimony of her employer, the complaining witness.  She argued that the statement was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to impeach her employer’s prior testimony that she “had no explanation” for the missing money or the suspicious paperwork.  Second, she asserted that the trial justice erred when he denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial because he overlooked or misconceived material evidence and because the jury’s verdict failed to do substantial justice.

The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he truncated defense counsel’s cross-examination of the defendant’s employer because the defendant’s out-of-court claim of innocence did not explain, contradict, or discredit the witness’s prior testimony; therefore it was not proper impeachment material.  Furthermore, because the defendant elected to exercise her Fifth Amendment right not to testify, the Court held that the trial justice correctly ruled that the statement was inadmissible hearsay according to State v. Harnois, 638 A.2d 532 (R.I. 1994).     

With respect to the motion for a new trial, the Court held that the trial justice committed neither clear error nor overlooked or misconceived evidence in making his ruling.  The trial justice carefully adhered to the appropriate standard; he made a detailed review of the testimony of the three witnesses, the documentary evidence, and the arguments of the parties, passed favorably on the credibility of each witness, and concluded that he agreed with the jury’s verdict.  Therefore, there was no error.

Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. 

The plaintiff, Yi Gu (the plaintiff or Yi Gu), appealed the trial justice’s denial of her motion for a new trial after a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA) and Edmund E. Hathaway (Hathaway) (collectively, the defendants), finding that they were not negligent.  The plaintiff, who was struck by a RIPTA bus while crossing the street at the intersection of Waterman Street and North Main Street in Providence, averred that the trial justice erred by failing to grant her motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence, and based on errors that she alleges occurred during a jury view of the scene of the collision that gave rise to the underlying complaint. 

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for a new trial.  The Court concluded that, when ruling upon the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, the trial justice erroneously considered a jury view and demonstration as evidence, despite the well-settled Rhode Island rule that a jury view does not constitute evidence.  The Court additionally held that the proper prophylaxes meant to safeguard the integrity of the view were absent in this case.

The circumstances of this case constitute but one chapter in what appears to have been an ongoing feud between the defendant and the complaining witnesses.  The increasing enmity between the parties erupted during a late-night brawl in July 2008.  As a result, the state charged the defendant with three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and one count of simple assault.  After a jury trial in the Kent County Superior Court, he was acquitted of the three felony counts, but convicted of simple assault.  The trial justice sentenced the defendant to one year at the Adult Correctional Institutions, with ninety-days to serve and nine months suspended with probation. 

On appeal, the defendant advances two arguments.  First, he contends that the trial justice erred when he denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of simple assault because the state failed to introduce evidence of malice or wantonness.  Second, the defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the trial justice’s evidentiary rulings deprived him of his constitutional right to present a full and fair defense.  He contends that the trial justice erred by improperly limiting his attempts to delve into the relationship between the parties and by ruling that his out-of-court statement to a police officer about being the victim of hate crime in 1998 was inadmissible hearsay.

The Supreme Court held that, considering, as it must, all the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with malice when he struck one of the complaining witnesses in the shoulder during the fight in an attempt to reach the door of his vehicle. Therefore, the trial justice did not err when he denied the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.  Additionally, the Court held that there was no abuse of discretion when the trial justice curtailed the defendant’s cross-examination of a complaining witness about an encounter earlier in the day, or when he prohibited a police officer from testifying to the defendant’s out-of-court statement about why he may have held a particular state of mind at the time of the alleged offenses.  Furthermore, the Court held that the defendant received precisely what he asked for with respect to a jury instruction regarding the existence of mutual preliminary injunctions between the defendant and the complaining witnesses and an in camera review of documents from the Department of Elderly Affairs.  Therefore, the Court held that there was no error. 

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction.

The defendant, Sharon Esposito (Sharon), appealed from a Family Court order denying her motion to reform or vacate the court’s prior approval of a property settlement agreement (the Agreement).  At the crux of the dispute was the Agreement Sharon entered into with her former husband, the plaintiff, Joseph P. Esposito (Joseph) in connection with their divorce. Joseph and Sharon entered into the Agreement to equitably divide their marital estate.  The Agreement provided how the marital assets would be divided, with 55 percent assigned to Sharon and 45 percent to Joseph. 
 
The controversy centered on a single asset; a minority interest in Prime Time Manufacturing, Inc., that had been awarded to Joseph.  After the Agreement was executed, but before final judgment was entered in the divorce, Joseph learned that his 25 percent share in Prime Time was worth significantly more than the value upon which the parties had agreed.  Joseph did not notify Sharon of this change in financial circumstances.  After learning about the increase in the value of Joseph’s share in the company, Sharon filed a motion under Rule 60(b) of the Family Court Rules of Procedure for Domestic Relations.

A trial justice of the Family Court ruled that there was a lack of evidence that at the time the Agreement was entered into and approved, the value of Prime Time exceeded that which had been agreed upon by the parties.  He also found that Sharon had failed to produce any evidence that Joseph was privy to any negotiations for the sale of Prime Time at or before the execution of the Agreement.

On appeal, Sharon argued the justice erred when he found that there was no mutual mistake about the value of Joseph’s share in Prime Time when the parties executed the Agreement.  Second, Sharon contended that the justice erred because the proper date for equitable distribution of the marital assets was when final judgment was entered and not when the Agreement was approved by the trial court.  Lastly, Sharon maintained that the justice erred because he failed to recognize the special status of spousal agreements.  

The Supreme Court held that no mutual mistake of fact existed between the parties concerning the value of Joseph’s minority interest in Prime Time at the time the Agreement was executed.  The Court also held the terminal date for equitable distribution was the day that the Agreement was executed and formally approved by the Family Court.  Finally, the Court held that although Joseph breached his fiduciary duty to inform Sharon of his change in financial circumstances, any property rights Sharon had in Joseph’s share of Prime Time were foreclosed when the Agreement was executed and approved by the court.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Family Court.

This case was before the Supreme Court as a statutory petition for certiorari filed by National Grid (or the petitioner) pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 39-5-1.  The petitioner sought review of the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission’s (PUC) decision in docket No. 4065, in which the PUC denied a requested rate increase and only approved half the requested incentive compensation expense.

The petitioner argued that the PUC was unreasonable when it chose a capital structure with a debt to equity ratio of 42.75 percent because the only evidence in the record was that a reasonable equity component would be within the range of 45-50 percent.  The petitioner next asserted that the proposed incentive compensation expense consisted of wages and benefits that were market competitive, offered flexibility and choice, and supported a high performance culture by directly linking performance to financial rewards. 

The Supreme Court vacated that part of the PUC’s decision that established the capital structure of the petitioner.  The Court held that the PUC failed to provide a sufficient evidentiary foundation for its decision to factor in the capital structure of the twice removed, foreign parent to determine an appropriate capital structure for National Grid. 

The Supreme Court affirmed the PUC’s decision disallowing half the incentive compensation expense based on the considerable discretion given to the PUC and the substantial evidence in the record.  The Court held that the PUC’s decision that the expense was unreasonable and excessive because there was insufficient evidence of a direct benefit to taxpayers was fairly and substantially supported by legal evidence.   

The Court remanded the case to the PUC with instructions that it conduct hearings to determine the appropriateness of National Grid’s current capital structure and to consider other evidence in determining an appropriate capital structure for National Grid.   

The defendant, George Bouffard (Bouffard), appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court partly denying his motion to correct his sentence under Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  On appeal, Bouffard challenged the hearing justice’s re-bundling of his sentencing scheme upon the determination that the sentence at issue was illegal or illegally imposed.  Specifically, Bouffard maintained that the hearing justice lacked the authority to correct his sentence because the hearing justice did not impose the original sentence in question.  Bouffard also argued that the hearing justice, in re-bundling the sentencing package, failed to conform to the original sentencing intent of the magistrate who imposed the initial sentence based on Bouffard’s probation violation.  Lastly, Bouffard maintained that the seven-year sentence imposed upon re-bundling no longer “fit the crime,” since prior to his Rule 35 motion, the charge underlying his probation violation had been dismissed.

After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the hearing justice indeed had the authority under State v. Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842 (R.I. 2008), to re-bundle Bouffard’s sentencing scheme to effectuate the original intent of the sentencing magistrate.  The Court further concluded that the hearing justice properly assessed and conformed to the magistrate’s original sentencing intent in restructuring Bouffard’s sentencing package and that the hearing justice considered the dismissal of the underlying charge in his analysis.   Finding no error in the hearing justice’s re-bundling effort, the Court declined to address whether the original sentence at issue was illegal or illegally imposed.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction that reflected the jury’s verdict that he was guilty of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit the offense of murder.  On appeal, the defendant contended (1) that the trial justice erred in her instruction to the jury concerning the concept of aiding and abetting and (2) that the trial justice erred in declining to give a unanimity instruction to the jury with respect to the theories underlying the murder charge.  

With respect to the trial justice’s aiding-and-abetting instruction, the Supreme Court ruled that the instruction that “[a] person who aids or abets is held responsible for the natural, or reasonable, or [probable] consequences of any act if he knowingly and intentionally aided or which he assisted or participated” did not violate the defendant’s due process rights because it is consistent with the intent necessary for aiding and abetting in Rhode Island.  The Supreme Court also ruled that the trial justice’s aiding-and-abetting instruction was not conclusive or burden-shifting because an ordinary, intelligent lay juror would not interpret it as such when the instructions were considered in their entirety.

In addition, the Supreme Court ruled that the trial justice did not err in declining to instruct the jury as to unanimity concerning the theory underlying second-degree murder because a jury must decide unanimously only the elements of a crime and not the underlying theories. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Empire Acquisition Group, LLC, appealed from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Atlantic Mortgage Company, Inc.  The plaintiff argued that summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of the defendant because genuine issues of material fact were in dispute.  In response, the defendant asserted that no genuine issues of material fact existed concerning the subject agreement’s “expiration pursuant to its own terms.”  To support this argument, the defendant pointed to the plaintiff’s failure to produce any evidence explaining why it did not timely close or proving that it had been acting in good faith.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.  The Court reasoned that the defendant’s inexplicable inaction after the final scheduled closing date was unreasonable in light of the parties’ established course of dealings under the agreement.  Further, the Court pointed toward the plaintiff’s complete lack of evidence explaining its silence or proving its contention that it was at all pertinent times ready, willing, and able to perform under the agreement.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff’s complaint, as well as on counts 1 and 2 of the defendant’s counterclaim.

The defendant, Adrian Shepard, by way of a petition for writ of certiorari, sought review of a Superior Court judgment that declared him to be in violation of the terms of his probation and revoked three years of an eight-year suspended sentence.  The defendant also appealed from a Superior Court order denying his motion to correct and reconsider his sentence.  The defendant first argued that the hearing justice abused his discretion in finding that the defendant violated the terms of his probation because the evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient to support that conclusion.  The defendant also argued that the hearing justice erred when he denied his motion for reconsideration of the drastic remedy of revocation.

The Supreme Court affirmed both the finding of the probation violation and the imposition of three years of the defendant’s suspended sentence.  First, the Court noted that the hearing justice acknowledged inconsistencies in the complaining witness’s testimony, but had, nonetheless, found her to be credible.  Second, the Court held that the hearing justice had made sufficient detailed findings to support, by a reasonable satisfaction, his conclusion that the defendant violated his probation by not keeping the peace and by not being of good behavior.  Finally, the Court declared that the hearing justice’s imposition of three years of the defendant’s suspended sentence had been carefully considered and, thus, held that the revocation was an appropriate consequence to the defendant’s continuous refusal to adhere to the terms of his probationary period.